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SUMMARY
The Web and Web-based open systems are characterized by their massive amount
of data and services for leveraging this data. These systems are noted for their open and
unregulated nature, self-supervision, and high degree of dynamism, which are key features
in supporting a rich set of opportunities for information sharing, discovery, and commerce.
But these open and self-managing features also carry risks and raise growing concerns over
the security and privacy of these systems, including issues like spam, denial-of-service, and
impersonated digital identities.
Our focus in this thesis is on the design, implementation, and analysis of large-scale
Web-based open systems, with an eye toward enabling new avenues of information discov-
ery and ensuring robustness in the presence of malicious participants. We identify three
classes of vulnerabilities that threaten these systems: vulnerabilities in link-based search
services, vulnerabilities in reputation-based trust services over online communities, and vul-
nerabilities in Web categorization and integration services. This thesis introduces a suite
of methods for increasing the tamper-resilience of Web-based open systems in the face of a
large and growing number of threats. We make three unique contributions:
• First, we present a source-centric architecture and a set of techniques for providing
tamper-resilient link analysis of the World Wide Web. We propose the concept of link
credibility and present a credibility-based link analysis model. We show that these
approaches significantly reduce the impact of malicious spammers on Web rankings.
• Second, we develop a social network trust aggregation framework for supporting
tamper-resilient trust establishment in online social networks. These community-
based social networking systems are already extremely important and growing rapidly.
We show that our trust framework supports high quality information discovery and
is robust to the presence of malicious participants in the social network.
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• Finally, we introduce a set of techniques for reducing the opportunities of attackers to
corrupt Web-based categorization and integration services, which are especially impor-
tant for organizing and making accessible the large body of Web-enabled databases on
the Deep Web that are beyond the reach of traditional Web search engines. We show
that these techniques reduce the impact of poor quality or intentionally misleading




The explosive rise of the Web and Web-based open systems has had a profound transfor-
mative impact on knowledge discovery and dissemination, business strategy and commerce,
and even the structure of our interpersonal relationships. The growing reliance on the
Web and Web-based open systems - including online social networks (like Facebook and
MySpace), social media and search services (like YouTube, Digg, and Wikipedia), online
vendors (like Amazon and Netflix), and blogspaces (like Blogger and Livejournal) – present
a number of great opportunities and unique challenges.
Consider the Web. From its infancy in the early 1990s, the Web has grown from 200
million indexable pages in 1997 [21] to more than 11.5 billion pages in 2005 [76]. Coupled
with data in Web-enabled databases and other dynamic data sources and the effective
size of the Web is staggering [86, 117]. With this massive growth, we have witnessed
tremendous research and commercial strides in organizing, sorting, and understanding the
Web’s massive amount of data. These advances have encouraged the emergence of innovative
new companies and business strategies, permanently changing how businesses operate and
the quality of our daily lives. Indeed, the ubiquitous impact of the Web has spurred calls
for a new discipline studying the science of the Web [18, 19]. As the Web evolves to provide
the information infrastructure for pervasive and mobile devices, we can anticipate many
exciting new developments.
Similarly, online communities have grown dramatically in the past few years, and are
increasingly recognized as important enablers of information sharing, electronic commerce,
and new modes of social interaction. Social networking services like the ones offered by
MySpace and Facebook support the management of social relationships, connecting millions
of users. MySpace alone has grown from 1 million user accounts in the first quarter of 2004
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to an astonishing 190 million user accounts today.1 Similarly, community-powered services
like the online encyclopedia Wikipedia, the image-sharing site Flickr, the community news
portal Digg, and the video-sharing site YouTube have flourished as users have explored and
contributed to these community-based information spaces.
While the growth of the Web and these online communities has led to increasing media
attention and popular awareness, there has been a commensurate rise in concern over their
security and privacy. For example, recent studies have indicated that a significant fraction of
Web pages contain either executables bundled with spyware [130, 142] or zero-day browser
exploits [171] that can be used to compromise a user’s computer. The large social networking
sites have been the target of specialized phishing attacks and massive email spam campaigns
that leverage the wealth of personal information and relationship data that may be mined
from these communities [42, 94]. Malicious users have been caught impersonating others:
e.g., in April 2006, an 18-year-old was caught impersonating a teacher on MySpace; the
impersonator made racist statements and falsely represented the teacher as a pornographer
and child molester [155]. Other threats have been observed – including the massive Samy
worm that overloaded MySpace with 1 million friend requests in a single day [101]– and
new threats are certain to emerge as attackers grow in sophistication.
Web publishing is fairly inexpensive and there are minimal hurdles to limit who can or
cannot participate on the Web. Similarly, most of the online communities are relatively
open, typically requiring only a simple user registration or a valid email address. This
openness has helped drive the massive growth of the Web and online communities, but the
observed security and privacy problems question the viability and safety of such an open
approach as more and more malicious entities target them.
1.1 Research Challenges
Building effective open Web-based open systems is challenging, and we believe that signif-
icant research advances are needed to support their continued use and to encourage their
adoption by government and business entities interested in providing more effective and
1www.myspace.com
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responsive governance, customer relationship management, emergency and disaster respon-
siveness, and other mission-critical services. As more and more malicious entities target
these systems, what guarantees can we make? Can we develop algorithms and architectures
for the efficient, reliable, and secure use of the Web? Can we build systems in which users
have trust in the data and information derived from these systems, even in the presence of
users intent on undermining the quality of information? In particular, we identify several
research challenges in building tamper-resilience into Web-based open systems:
• Openness: The Web is inherently open in terms of who can access it, who can
publish to it, and how data is shared, though it has some restrictions in terms of the
languages and protocols it respects (e.g., HTML, HTTP). Maintaining this openness
is important for its continued growth and impact. Can we provide some regulation
while maintaining the degree of openness such that we can provide some degree of
privacy and security requirements typically found in tightly controlled systems?
• Accessibility: Any regulation of the Web should maintain the accessibility of data
and information on the Web, without severely restricting what can and cannot be
discovered. Can the tamper-resilience methods developed assure this continued acces-
sibility? Can we provide high assurance of the accuracy and quality of these systems
in the face of a growing number of security and privacy threats?
• Scalability: The Web is very large and continues to grow and to expand into new
forms, with the emergence of pervasive and mobile devices for accessing the Web
and massive eScience and grid initiatives for managing large distributed computing
applications. Techniques for tamper-resilience should respect this scalability.
• Personalization: Seemingly at odds with scalability is personalization. Users have
different perspectives on what is and what is not interesting and relevant. Can we
develop algorithms and architectures that support a customizable personalized view
of the Web?
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Naturally, when building tamper-resilience in open systems, we are faced with the classic
arms race cycle, that is – (i) a solution is proposed; (ii) the adversaries adapt their techniques
to subvert the solution; (iii) the solution is revised, the adversaries adapt, and the cycle
continues. In this thesis, we are interested in exploring whether we can significantly raise
the costs to adversaries, so that they wield only a limited ability to respond to the proposed
countermeasures and to continue the arms race cycle.
1.2 Overview of Thesis
This thesis is concerned with vulnerabilities in the principles, design, and maintenance of
massive Web-based open systems. We argue that tamper-resilience must be built-in to
preserve the quality of these open systems against malicious manipulation and accidental
misuse. Our goal is to develop effective tamper-resilient methods for supporting Web-based
open systems.
In particular, we focus on the design, implementation, and analysis of large-scale Web-
based open systems, with an eye toward enabling new avenues of information discovery
and ensuring robustness in the presence of malicious participants. We identify three classes
of vulnerabilities that threaten these systems: vulnerabilities in link-based search services,
vulnerabilities in reputation-based trust services over online communities, and vulnerabil-
ities in Web categorization and integration services. To address these risks, we introduce
a suite of methods for increasing the tamper-resilience of Web-based open systems in the
face of a large and growing number of threats. One of the goals in this thesis is to study
specific problems, but also consider how the lessons and principles learned can be applied
in other problem domains.
In particular, this thesis research makes three unique contributions toward this direction:
• First, we present a source-centric architecture and a set of techniques for providing
tamper-resilient link analysis of the World Wide Web. We propose the concept of link
credibility and present a credibility-based link analysis model. We show that these
approaches significantly reduce the impact of malicious spammers on Web rankings.
• Second, we develop a social network trust aggregation framework for supporting
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tamper-resilient trust establishment in online social networks. These community-
based social networking systems are already extremely important and growing rapidly.
We show that our trust framework supports high quality information discovery and
is robust to the presence of malicious participants in the social network.
• Finally, we introduce a set of techniques for reducing the opportunities of attackers to
corrupt Web-based categorization and integration services, which are especially impor-
tant for organizing and making accessible the large body of Web-enabled databases on
the Deep Web that are beyond the reach of traditional Web search engines. We show
that these techniques reduce the impact of poor quality or intentionally misleading
resources and support personalized Web resource discovery.
Our methods for increased tamper-resilience are complementary to traditional informa-
tion security approaches. Traditional methods address the authentication, authorization,
confidentiality, and integrity of the users and messages. Concretely, cryptographic tech-
niques are used for authenticating the identity of users and securing the publishing infras-
tructure, or digital signatures are used for providing information integrity, or access control
techniques are used for constraining user behavior. Our work complements these traditional
methods by addressing manipulation and attacks against the intelligence of these systems,
including the underlying principles, usage, and maintenance of these systems.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2: Web Risks and Vulnerabilities – We begin with an overview of
the numerous Web risks and vulnerabilities that have been observed and experienced
in Web-based open systems. We provide a taxonomy of risks and vulnerabilities,
illustrate each with a concrete example, and position our contributions with respect
to this taxonomy.
• Chapter 3: Source-Centric Web Ranking – Since ranking systems (like those
offered by search engines) play a central role in organizing the Web for the vast
majority of Web users, Web spammers spend a considerable effort on manipulating the
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underlying algorithms that drive these ranking systems. In this chapter, we introduce
a source-centric model for Web ranking that promotes a hierarchical abstraction of the
Web graph based on the strong Web link structure. Complementary to the traditional
page-based view of the Web, our source approach naturally limits spam opportunities
and incorporates a novel notion of influence throttling for countering the influence of
spammers.
• Chapter 4: Credibility-Based Link Analysis – In this chapter, we advocate a
clean separation of Web resource quality and link quality and argue that the intrinsic
quality of a Web resource should be distinguished from its intrinsic link credibility. We
formally define the concept of credibility, study the factors impacting the computation
of credibility, and introduce a novel credibility-based Web ranking algorithm, which
incorporates credibility information directly into the quality assessment of each Web
resource. We show that the credibility-based approach is significantly and consistently
more spam-resilient than the state-of-the-art.
• Chapter 5: Trust Establishment in Online Communities – In this chapter,
we present the design and evaluation of the SocialTrust framework for aggregating
trust in online communities. The framework supports tamper-resilient trust estab-
lishment through four key features – (i) trust establishment scope; (ii) trust group
feedback; (iii) relationship link quality; and (iv) the history of the user’s behavior in
the community. We find that SocialTrust supports robust trust establishment even in
the presence of large-scale collusion by malicious participants.
• Chapter 6: Controlled Sampling of Web Resources – Web categorization and
integration services for providing access to the Deep Web may be corrupted by Web
spammers in an effort to disrupt these services and hurt the quality of the information
provided or to drive Web users to spam partners for online commerce and to support
identity theft. In this chapter, we present a technique for controlled sampling of
Web resources. The controlled sampling architecture supports the extraction of high-
quality database samples for reducing the impact of poor quality or intentionally
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misleading resources.
• Chapter 7: Trusted Web Resource Discovery – To support tamper-resilient
categorization and integration, we present the design and implementation of a Web
resource discovery system. By leveraging a set of user-trusted information resources,
the system provides a set of related information resources that can be grouped by
content and trustworthiness properties to auto-generate a trusted categorization hier-
archy, supporting a personalized view over a collection of Deep Web databases through
source-biased database analysis and exploration. We have developed a prototype sys-
tem that is designed for crawling, probing, and supporting personalized Deep Web
databases discovery using the source-biased approach.
• Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work – We conclude with a summary of




WEB RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES
The Web continues to be the largest and most frequently accessed living data repository.
As the Web has grown and increasingly become the primary portal for sharing information
and supporting online commerce, there has been a rise in efforts to pollute the Web with
low-quality and dangerous Web content and to manipulate how users view and interact
with the Web. With the increasing reliance on Web-based marketplaces, social networks,
and large-scale information sharing communities, individuals and their computer systems
are at risk for abuse and exploitation at the hands of malicious actors. These vulnerabilities
degrade the quality of information on the Web and place the user at risk for exploitation.
In this chapter, we survey the current state-of-the-art with respect to (i) content-based
Web risks; (ii) experience-based Web risks; and (iii) discuss some related work that attempts
to deal with this growing threat. This survey is intended to provide an overview of the
current situation, and is not intended to be exhaustive.
2.1 Content-Based Web Risks
We begin by examining some of the currently observed dangerous Web content. Web
publishing has become increasingly cheap and simple, and there are many turn-key solutions
available for easy Web site deployment. As a result, the barriers to making dangerous Web
content available to a wide audience are correspondingly low. We shall refer to a Web
publisher who deploys or supports such dangerous Web content as a spammer.
2.1.1 Badware
One of the most concerning examples of dangerous Web content is badware. We use the term
badware to refer to any type of malicious software on the Web. Examples include keyloggers
designed for user tracking, adware that pops-up annoying advertisements, as well as viruses
and trojans that are part of a Web-borne attack vector (e.g., for commanding a botnet army
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Figure 1: Site That Bundles Badware with Downloadable Games
[67]). A user can be infected with badware through a number of avenues. Badware may be
bundled with a seemingly innocent downloaded executable. In Figure 1 we show a sample
Web site that hosts downloadable games and screensavers, but also surreptitiously installs
an adware program when the user downloads a game. These sites often have a “look-and-
feel” that is similar to legitimate sites, making it difficult to detect the deception. Pop-up
browser windows that emulate legitimate operating system prompts, like the one in Figure 2,
can fool users into downloading badware. One recent study found that as of October 2005,
nearly 5% of all executables discovered on the Web were bundled with some form of badware
[130]. Perhaps even more troubling, malicious Web publishers can insert code into their
Web pages that can directly compromise the Web browser, without any action on the part
of the user. In these instances of “drive-by downloads” a user need only view a compromised
page to be infected. One recent Google study identified 450,000 unique URLs that engaged
in this form of attack and raised the alarming concern that this attack vector could support
botnet formation and deployment [142]. Similarly, a Microsoft study identified a number of
Web-hosted zero-day Windows exploits – these exploits could compromise a fully-patched
and updated Windows machine [171].
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Figure 2: Pop-Up Window For Downloading Badware
2.1.2 Page Spoofing
The second Web risk we identify is page spoofing (or page forgery). In this case, a spammer
pollutes the Web with clones of legitimate sites (like eBay). In doing so, the spammer can
distribute badware or engage in identity theft, since the user believes that she is engaging
with a legitimate Web site. Recent estimates suggest that at least two million Web users
have voluntarily divulged private information to spoofed Web sites, resulting in $1.2 bil-
lion in losses for banks and credit card issuers [51]. In Figure 3, we illustrate a spoofed
Ameritrade site; the critical clue that this is not the legitimate Ameritrade site is the non-
standard URL. Spoofed pages are often used in concert with social engineering techniques
to lure users to these sites, for example, through a phishing email that includes a URL to
the fake page.1
2.1.3 Offensive Content
Instead of spreading badware or stealing a user’s identity, some Web content may simply
be illegal or offensive to a user. Some Web content is considered universally illegal – like
child pornography. Other content may be illegal in one jurisdiction but not another – like
Web-based gambling sites that are intended to be off-limits to U.S. citizens and so are often
hosted offshore [5], or hate speech in certain European countries [157]. And then there
may be some content that is perfectly legal, but of offense to a particular user or group of
users. For example, there is great evidence that many families prefer to install filters for
safeguarding their children from certain types of Web content, be it pornography, drugs, or
extreme violence. Naturally, what is and what is not offensive is debateable, and there are
arguments for and against Web freedom-of-expression versus censorship.
1http://www.antiphishing.org/
10
Figure 3: Page Spoofing Example: Ameritrade
2.1.4 Useless or Derivative Content
Unlike offensive content, some Web content is merely useless or derivative. A number of
studies have identified a large portion of the Web to be duplicated from other portions
of the Web. This duplication occurs on a page-level [41, 60], where entire Web pages are
duplicated, down to a phrase-level, where particular passages from pages are copied [31, 62].
The motivation for the duplication can be innocuous – e.g., identical AP news stories may
be published by separate news sites and some technical FAQs are published in many places.
But in some cases duplicate content is intended to deceive; for example, Figure 4 illustrates
a casino guide that has duplicated some Wikipedia content; at the bottom of the page,
spam hyperlinks to pill sites are inserted. Similarly, spammers “weave” together content
scraped from other sites [79] or auto-generate Web sites and blogs that pollute the Web with
low-quality content. Figure 5 is an example of a machine-generated blog about Brandon
Routh, who portrayed Superman in the recent film. The text of the blog is nonsensical,
though tangentially related to Superman (e.g., “romantic, action-packed Oneida Dispatch,
NY - 28 June 2006 The Man of Steel was”). In the following section, we will discuss some
11
Figure 4: Site With Duplicate Wikipedia Content and Spam Links to Pill Sites
of the reasons why spammers generate such useless or derivative content.
2.1.5 Propaganda
Since the Web is often the first and last resort of information for some users, Web publishers
have an incentive to shape how users view the world around them. We see evidence of this
behavior with respect to consumer products, restaurants, and other goods and services. On-
line commerce sites like eBay and Amazon that aggregate user reviews and ratings to make
product recommendations are subject to manipulation [104]. In one instance, book authors
were caught on Amazon writing rave reviews of their own books (using a pseudonym) and
negatively reviewing the books of their competitors [81]. In a similar fashion, Microsoft
has been accused of paying third-parties to portray their products in a more favorable light
on Wikipedia [17]. For shaping one’s social standing on the Web, several companies of-
fer tools for automatically generating friends on the popular social networking sites (e.g.,
www.friendbot.com).
2.1.6 Discussion
Dealing with content-based Web risks is an open and active area of research and commercial
interest. For identifying Web sites that host malicious code, Microsoft has developed a
custom Web crawler as part of the Strider HoneyMonkey Project.2 Company offerings like
2http://research.microsoft.com/HoneyMonkey/
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Figure 5: Spam Weblog Example
McAfee’s SiteAdvisor3 and TrendSecure’s TrendProtect4 analyze downloaded executables
from Web sites in an attempt to provide a trustworthiness rating to each Web site. As we
mentioned before, there have been several efforts to identify duplication on the Web, e.g.,
[31, 62]. There is a large body of research on personalizing Web search and Web access, e.g.,
[143, 151]; this may be a promising direction for detecting offensive content and propaganda,
especially since what is and what is not offensive is subjective and will vary from person to
person.
2.2 Experience-Based Web Risks
Given the range of Web risks – from cognitive exploits that aim to deceive Web users to
software exploits that compromise a user’s computer – we next explore the ways in which
spammers manipulate how users view and interact with the Web. These experience-based
Web risks can be used to expose users to compromised URLs and worsen the overall quality





The first risk relies on attempts to influence a Web user’s behavior by relying on out-of-band
communication for social engineering. A prominent example is the user of email-based spam
messages that promote particular URLs to the recipients of the messages. These email spam
messages are often used as part of a phishing campaign [42]. Similarly, there are reports of
instant-messaging based spam that includes references to URLs [113].
The incentive for spam creation is strong – an astonishing 5.6% of email users who
receive a pornography-related spam link actually click on it [127] and stock touting email
messages have been shown to influence the price and volume of the targeted stock [64].
Eliminating email spam is the subject of much interest [7, 70, 153], and new techniques will
need to be developed as spam messages cross into new communication paradigms.
2.2.2 Redirection
Another experience-based Web risk is the intentional redirection of a user from one URL to
another, often without the user’s knowledge. This redirection can occur at several points.
First, a user’s machine may be compromised to direct traffic to particular Web sites. For ex-
ample, the hosts file – which is responsible for locally mapping host names and IP addresses
– can be compromised so that users have no assurances that the host names it accesses
are correctly mapped to the legitimate IP address. The Funner worm engaged in this type
of host file re-writing.5 Second, the DNS cache may be poisoned so that a hostname will
be erroneously resolved to a spammer-controlled IP address [82]. In this way, a spammer
can hijack a legitimate Web site, so that all traffic to the legitimate Web site is actually
directed to the hijacked one. Third, a Web page when accessed may redirect the user to
a different, possibly compromised Web page [177], often through obfuscated JavaScript so
that the redirection is difficult to programmatically identify.
Redirection on the user’s machine can typically be mitigated through the use of anti-
virus software or self-management of the hosts file. DNS cache poisoning has received
5See http://www.symantec.com for more information. Interestingly, the Mydoom.B worm, rather than
redirect the user to a compromised IP address, affects the user experience by denying access to certain Web
sites – in this case anti-virus vendors that could be used to identify and remove the worm.
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some recent attention, and there is some work on detecting and preventing it [66, 190].
Web redirection is a common tool for spammers to manipulate search engines. There has
been some preliminary analysis of Web redirection [177] and on identifying large-scale spam
syndicates that engage in page-based redirection for generating Web advertising revenue
[172].
2.2.3 Piggy-Back
Another strategy is to piggy-back on existing high-traffic sites and Web content delivery
systems. Sites that rely on user-contributed content – like the news site Digg – attract
large audiences, but provide little safeguards that user-contributed links refer to legitimate
Web sites. Alternatively, many Web sites rely on a third-party ad syndicator to provide ad
content to the site. A spammer could either directly inject badware into the ad network
(say, via a javascript exploit) or could use the network to spread references to compromised
Web content (via embedded URLs) [142]. In fact, Google’s sponsored advertising links
have been corrupted in the past to surreptitiously install a logger for collecting sensitive
information without the user’s knowledge [149].
The large advertising networks – like Google’s AdSense and Microsoft’s adCenter –
are largely self-policed and their techniques for guarding against corruption are not widely
known. For sites that allow user-contributed content, some solutions suggested for limit-
ing the negative influence of malicious contributors include user authentication (using a
valid email address), captchas (for filtering out bots) [168], language modeling techniques
for identifying suspicious user contributions [128], and tight editorial control for manually
removing unwanted content.
2.2.4 Web Search Engines
Search engines process over 240 million searches per day [44] and nearly 80% of all Web users
rely on search engines. Since search engines play such a central role in bringing the top-
matched Web pages to the vast majority of Web users, a considerable amount of spammer
effort is focused on manipulating search engines. Recent estimates suggest that 8% of all
pages and 18% of all sites are designed to manipulate search engines [61, 80]. Search engine
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manipulation is widely recognized as a major concern [71, 61, 88, 118, 138].
There are three widely accepted types of search engine vulnerabilities [79]:
• Content-Based Manipulation: Search engines rely on content-based analysis of
Web pages as one critical factor in determining their relevance to particular queries.
Early attempts to deceive search engines relied on the coarse insertion of high-value
keywords into pages (so-called keyword stuffing). As algorithms have advanced and
spammers have responded, we see more examples of recycled text from legitimate
pages (see the discussion above regarding Useless or Derivative Content) and other
attempts to construct spam content that has a “look-and-feel” closer to legitimate
content.
• Link-Based Manipulation: Since popular Web page ranking algorithms like Page-
Rank [138], HITS [100], and SALSA [106] use the link structure of the Web to assess
the relative importance of Web pages, spammers manipulate the links on the Web
to construct favorable linking arrangements for their pages. For example, in January
2006, a reputable computer science department’s Web page for new PhD students was
hijacked by a Web spammer, and over 50 links to pornography-related Web sites were
added to the page.6 This type of link-based vulnerability corrupts link-based ranking
algorithms like HITS [100] and PageRank [138] by making it appear that a reputable
page is endorsing the Web spam target pages.
• Cloaking: The third major search engine vulnerability is cloaking, whereby one page
is served to the search engine crawler and another to the user [177]. In one recent
high-profile case, Google temporarily expelled the German BMW site from its index
for engaging in behavior intended to deceive its ranking algorithms [69]. In this case,
BMW provided one page to the search engine’s crawler and a different page to the
user; hence it cloaked its actual content from the search engine. The page served to
the crawler included over 40 instances of “gebrauchtwagen” – the German term for
6For reasons of decency, we do not include the screenshots here. Interested readers are encouraged to
contact us for more information.
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“used car”, in an apparent effort to score highly with term-based ranking algorithms
so used-car related queries would be directed to BMW.
Resisting search engine manipulation is an area of active interest. A number of research
studies have statistically analyzed the content features of Web pages (like page length and
distribution of terms) and discovered that many outliers were, indeed, spam Web pages
[61, 134]. There have been several efforts to leverage the graphical structure of the Web to
identify anomalous linking arrangements [61, 125]. In a similar vein, several researchers have
suggested identifying and penalizing pages that derive a large amount of ranking benefit
from spam links [15, 77, 178]. Rather than identify spam pages outright, the TrustRank
approach propagates trust from a seed set of trusted Web pages [80]. There have been
some initial efforts to apply statistical classification to distinguish between spam links and
legitimate links [6, 49, 56].
2.2.5 Online Communities
With the rise in popularity of online communities, there has been a commensurate rise in
attempts to exploit community members and undermine the quality of these communities.
As we have mentioned, the large social networking sites have been targeted by specialized
phishing attacks and massive email spam campaigns that leverage the wealth of personal
information and relationship data that may be mined from these communities [42, 94].
Malicious participants can exploit the perceived social connection between users in online
communities for increasing the probability of disseminating misinformation, of driving par-
ticipants to the seedy side of the Internet (e.g., to Web sites hosting malware), and of other
disruptions to the quality of community-based knowledge. In fact, the advertising network
on MySpace has already been targeted as a spyware-delivery mechanism [102]. The massive
Samy worm overloaded MySpace with 1 million friend requests in a single day [101] using
the friend links from user to user to propagate through the network. A more dangerous
payload (not just a simple friend request) could have caused severe damage in addition to
overloading the network.
One of the most critical problems in online communities is in the creation of fake or
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Figure 6: Fake George Bush Profile on MySpace
misleading profiles. Some of these fake profiles are easy to spot; Figure 6 illustrates the
supposed profile for George Bush with interests including “hunting, fishing, golf, conquest,
being the decider”. Some fake or misleading profiles are much less obvious. In April 2006, an
18-year-old was caught impersonating a teacher on MySpace; the impersonator made racist
statements and falsely represented the teacher as a pornographer and child molester [155].
In another instance, a 16-year-old impersonated a local police officer and posted unflattering
statements about the officer’s appearance and intelligence [159]. Adware vendors have been
caught creating MySpace profiles to encourage users to download spyware [27]. And some
rogue advertisers create duplicate fake profiles, as in the two nearly identical profiles in
Figure 7. Interestingly, each of these fake profiles has nearly 200 declared friendships with
(seemingly) legitimate community members, indicating that some community members are
either easily deceived or have low standards for friendship.
Online communities have made some attempts to respond to the widespread criticism
over their security and privacy. Some communities have adopted stricter regulation for
supporting better privacy controls [9] and have begun instituting some background checks
on members [139]. Even with strict privacy controls, there is still concern over unintended
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Figure 7: Duplicate Advertising Profiles on MySpace
private information leakage via network analysis [10, 87]. The problems of managing bad-
ware dissemination and identifying false or misleading profiles are two open problems in
online communities.
2.2.6 Categorization and Integration Services
Web categorization and integration services are important for organizing and making ac-
cessible the large body of Web-enabled databases on the Deep Web that are beyond the
reach of traditional Web search engines. Recent estimates report the size of the Deep Web
at orders of magnitude larger than the surface Web reachable by most search engines [117].
Traditional crawling and indexing techniques that have shown tremendous success on the
surface Web of hyperlinked pages are insufficient for the Deep Web – where data is stored
in databases or produced in real-time in response to a particular user query. As a result,
a number of services have been proposed to support categorization of these information
sources as well as integration services for providing uniform query-access to these resources,
e.g., [74, 86, 93, 150, 182].
Malicious Web publishers are motivated to corrupt these services either in an effort to
disrupt these services and hurt the quality of the information provided or to drive Web
users to spam partners for online commerce and to support identity theft. Spammers can
tamper with these services by flooding them with poor quality or duplicate information
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sources, by advertising corrupt or untrustworthy metadata, and by infiltrating legitimate
categorization services.
Most existing efforts have focused on the challenges in accessing and organizing these
Web resources, ignoring the inherent risks in a Web-based open system. The Web services
community has promoted standardization to Web services using technologies like XML and
SOAP, which may alleviate some of the heterogeneity of remote invocation, service compo-
sition, and integration. There are proposed industry standards for supporting secure [137]
and trustworthy [89] services, and selecting trustworthy Web resources has been studied in
[121]. These proposals provide some foundation for supporting trustworthy categorization
and integration services.
2.3 Mitigating Web Risks
In this chapter, we have identified a number of Web risks and vulnerabilities that threaten
the quality of information available on the Web and the overall usefulness of the Web. How
to constrain the prevalence and impact of these vulnerabilities is an open research question,
and one which motivates this thesis. A number of potential solutions are possible. We
identify three broad classes of solutions: (i) Gated Web; (ii) Spam Detection; and (iii)
Tamper-Resilient Methods.
The Gated Web approach is the most restrictive, where only pre-screened and authorized
Web information is made available to users. Given a satisfactory mechanism to analyze
Web content, such an approach has intuitive appeal. Users could be satisfied that the
content that they are viewing is safe. This is the approach advocated by Web filtering
software like NetNanny7 for providing access to Web content that is deemed free of certain
unwanted content. In a similar vein, some Web sites provide content that is geared toward
a particular world view. For example, Conservapedia is an alternative to Wikipedia written
from a politically conservative point-of-view8 and QubeTV is designed to be the conservative





to evaluate and screen the Web, it is subject to abuse or misuse by the third-party. There
is evidence of Web filtering software being overly restrictive and keeping out some wanted
content [194]. Additionally, some countries advocate a restrictive Gated Web approach for
their citizens that is deemed censorship by critics [40, 194]. From a purely technical vantage,
the Gated Web approach is by design going to lag behind the growth of the Web and the
dynamic nature of much Web content, making it difficult to support on a large-scale.
The Spam Detection approach is related to the first, but differs in its application. Rather
than allowing access only to pre-screened Web information, this approach aims to identify
risky content “in-the-wild”. For example, search engines actively purge their indexes of
Web sites deemed to be engaging in manipulative behavior [156]. The Web rating company
SiteAdvisor provides a browser plug-in that displays warnings to users about sites hosting
badware. In both cases, users are still free to view and interact with any Web content they
choose, but now they have some additional assurances over the quality of the Web content.
Detection algorithms typically rely on some pattern-based recognition, e.g., by identifying
close matches to known Web risks, or statistical outliers from “good” Web content or Web
behavior. The Spam Detection approach is a vital and important approach for mitigating
Web risks, and we anticipate it being an important component of any successful holistic
approach.
In this thesis, we study the design, implementation, and evaluation of Tamper-Resilient
Methods for Web-based open systems. We anticipate that any successful effort to mitigate
all Web risks and vulnerabilities will rely on a suite of approaches, and so this approach
can be used in conjunction with the previous two. The goal of Tamper-Resilient Methods
is to create algorithms and architectures that have a degree of resilience built into them
for resisting manipulation by malicious participants, even when malicious content or bad
behavior is not detected outright. Specifically we focus on vulnerabilities in three areas:
vulnerabilities in link-based search services, vulnerabilities in reputation-based trust services
over online communities, and vulnerabilities in Web categorization and integration services.
One of the goals in this thesis is to study specific problems, but also consider how the
lessons and principles learned can be applied in other problem domains. To address the
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risks inherent in the three areas, we introduce a suite of methods for increasing the tamper-




From its earliest days, the Web has been the subject of intense focus for organizing, sorting,
and understanding its massive amount of data. One of the most popular and effective Web
analysis approaches is collaborative Web ranking, in which link relationships on the Web
are used to assess the importance of Web pages. By considering the number and nature
of link relationships among Web pages, each page can be ranked according to the overall
view of all Web pages. The essence of this collaborative approach to ranking has been
adapted to power community-based Web discovery tools like Digg and to organize massive
collaborative review and feedback systems like those used by eBay and Amazon.
Since ranking systems (like those offered by search engines) play a central role in orga-
nizing the Web for the vast majority of Web users, Web spammers spend a considerable
effort on manipulating the underlying algorithms that drive these ranking systems. As we
have noted, this manipulation is a serious problem, and recent studies suggest that it affects
a significant portion of all Web content, including 8% of pages [61] and 18% of sites [80].
In this chapter, we focus on three prominent types of link-based vulnerabilities we have
identified in Web ranking systems:
• Hijacking-Based Vulnerabilities, whereby spammers insert links into legitimate
pages that point to a spammer-controlled page;
• Honeypot-Based Vulnerabilities, whereby spammers create legitimate-appearing
sites to collect legitimate links that are then passed on to spammer-controlled pages;
and
• Collusion-Based Vulnerabilities, whereby spammers create complex link exchange
arrangements to outwit link-based ranking algorithms.
Each of these link-based vulnerabilities subverts traditional link-based ranking approaches
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and undermines the quality of information offered through ranking systems. In the previous
chapter, we identified a reputable computer science department’s Web page for new PhD
students that had been hijacked by a Web spammer, and over 50 links to pornography-
related Web sites were added to the page. This type of link-based vulnerability corrupts
link-based ranking algorithms like HITS [100] and PageRank [138] by making it appear that
a reputable page is endorsing the Web spam target pages.
To defend against these important types of link-based vulnerabilities, we introduce a new
ranking model that promotes a source-level view of the Web and a novel notion of influence
throttling for countering the influence of spammers to manipulate link-based ranking sys-
tems. Most link-based ranking algorithms to date have been based on the most basic Web
element − Web pages. Page-based link analysis relies on a fundamentally flat view of the
Web, in which all pages are treated as equal nodes in a Web graph. In contrast, a number of
recent studies have noted a strong Web link structure, in which links display strong source-
centric locality in terms of domains and hosts (e.g., [22, 97]). This link-locality naturally
suggests the importance of source-centric link analysis. Complementary to the page-based
view, the source-centric view relies on a hierarchical abstraction of the flat page-level view
and reflects many natural types of structured human collaborations. For example, we could
imagine ranking all database students at a university according to the views of the database
community alone. We could then move up the hierarchy to rank the database department
relative to the other departments at the university. Finally, we could rank the entire univer-
sity relative to all other universities. Hence, this structured collaborative approach allows
us to treat the nature of relationships at each level differently.
Research on source-centric link analysis has shown some initial success, however, most
studies over the past years have focused exclusively on a single goal − improving the ef-
ficiency of page-based ranking algorithms (e.g., [30, 97, 115]). All of the approaches have
explored only a fraction of the parameter space, leaving many important questions unan-
swered. We argue that fully exploring source-centric link analysis can have a profound
impact on link-based algorithms and our general understanding of the Web.
In this chapter, we introduce a parameterized framework to support the systematic
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study and evaluation of source-centric link analysis of the Web with an emphasis on spam-
resilience. We address the following three important open questions:
• What are the most important parameters for guiding source-centric link analysis?
• How should these parameters be set to achieve the specific objectives of the source-
centric link analysis?
• What impact do the parameter settings have on the effectiveness of the analysis? Do
certain parameter settings conflict or correlate with the objectives?
Concretely, we identify a set of critical parameters that can impact the effectiveness
of source-centric link analysis, including source size, the presence of self-links, and differ-
ent source-citation link weighting schemes (e.g., uniform, link count, source consensus).
We provide a rigorous study on the set of critical parameters, especially with respect to
the above three open questions. All previously proposed approaches are instances of our
parameterized framework and have certain drawbacks in terms of their applicability to dif-
ferent source-centric link analysis objectives. We conduct a large-scale comparative study
of different parameter settings of source-centric link analysis over three large Web datasets
against multiple and possibly competing objectives. Through experimental evaluation of
our parameterized framework over three objectives – time complexity, stability, and spam-
resilience – we show how the parameters should be tuned to ensure efficient, stable, and
robust Web ranking.
Analytically, we provide a formal discussion on the effectiveness of source-centric link
analysis against link-based attacks. We show how source-centric analysis provides strong
resistance to manipulation and raises the cost of rank manipulation to a Web spammer.
Experimentally, we study the spam resilience of the source-centric Web ranking approach
over three large, real-world datasets ranging in size from 18 million pages to over 100 million
pages. We show how the model integrates spam resilience into the ranking model to counter
the vulnerabilities inherent in PageRank, making it harder for adversaries to abuse.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We identify and describe several link-
based vulnerabilities in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 we present source-centric analysis and
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describe several critical parameters impacting the quality of source-centric analysis, before
showing how to user source-centric analysis for Web ranking in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4,
we analyze the spam-resilience properties of source-centric link-based ranking. We evaluate
the approach in Section 3.5, describe related work in Section 3.6, and wrap-up in Section 3.7.
3.1 Link-Based Vulnerabilities
In this section, we identify three categories of prominent vulnerabilities in link-based ranking
algorithms. We also illustrate over real-world Web data how these link-based vulnerabilities
can severely impact popular link-based algorithms like PageRank. Link-based ranking algo-
rithms such as Google’s PageRank strive to evaluate the quality of a Web page based on the
number and quality of the Web pages that point to it. These algorithms rely on a fundamen-
tal assumption that a link from one page to another is an authentic conferral of authority
by the pointing page to the target page. Link-based vulnerabilities directly attack these
link-based ranking algorithms by inserting links to particular target pages from other pages
that are all under direct or indirect control of a Web spammer. While there are many possi-
ble ways to manipulate links to a target page, we next illustrate three prominent link-based
vulnerabilities: Hijacking-Based Vulnerabilities, Honeypot-Based Vulnerabilities,
and Collusion-Based Vulnerabilities.1
3.1.1 Hijacking-Based Vulnerabilities
The first link-spam vulnerability is link hijacking, as illustrated in the introduction of this
chapter. The goal of link hijacking is to insert links into reputable pages that point to
a spammer’s target page, so that it appears to the ranking algorithm that the reputable
page endorses the spam page. As illustrated in Figure 8, a hijacking-based attack siphons
the authority from a legitimate page to a spammer-controlled page by inserting a new link
from the hijacked page. Spammers have a number of avenues for hijacking legitimate pages,
including the insertion of spam-links into public message boards, openly editable wikis,
1Note that many legitimate enterprises engage in “search engine optimization” for the purposes of making
their sites more amenable to being crawled, indexed, and ranked. In this chapter, we address link-based














Figure 9: Honeypot Example
and the comments section of legitimate Weblogs. Often, the spam links are disguised with
surrounding context-sensitive content so that the spam link appears to be appropriate to
the subject of the hijacked page.
3.1.2 Honeypot-Based Vulnerabilities
Instead of risking exposure by directly hijacking a link from a legitimate page, spammers
also attempt to induce legitimate pages to voluntarily link to pages in spammer-controlled
Web sites. For example, spammers often construct legitimate-appearing Web sites that





Figure 10: Collusion Example: Link Exchange
accumulate links from pages in legitimate sources, as illustrated in Figure 9. A honeypot can
then pass along its accumulated authority by linking to a spam target page. A honeypot will
often include links to legitimate pages (shown in white in the figure) to mask its behavior.
3.1.3 Collusion-Based Vulnerabilities
Finally, spammers also engage in collusive arrangements whereby a spammer constructs
specialized linking structures either (i) across one or more pages the spammer completely
controls or (ii) with one or more partner Web spammers. Unlike the link-hijacking and hon-
eypot cases, the spammer need only rely on spammer-controlled pages, and is not dependent
on collecting links from legitimate pages. One example of a collusion-based vulnerability is
the use of a link exchange, as illustrated in Figure 10. Here, multiple Web spammers trade
links to pool their collective resources for mutual page promotion. Another collusion-based
vulnerability is the construction of a link farm (as illustrated in Figure 11), in which a Web
spammer generates a large number of colluding pages for the sole purpose of pointing to a
particular target page. A link farm relies not on the quality of the pointing page to increase
the rank of the target page, but on the sheer volume of colluding pages.
In practice, Web spammers rely on combinations of these basic attack types to create








Figure 11: Collusion Example: Link Farm
attack both more effective (since multiple attack vectors are combined) and more difficult
to detect (since simple pattern-based linking arrangements are masked).
3.1.4 PageRank’s Susceptibility to Link-Based Vulnerabilities
Given the three link-based vulnerabilities, we next provide a concrete example of the impact
of one vulnerability over a real-world dataset. Although the popular PageRank approach
has typically been thought to provide fairly stable rankings (e.g., [131]), attacks can be
used to wield tremendous influence over the rankings produced by PageRank. PageRank
assesses the importance of a page by recursively considering the authority of the pages that
point to it via hyperlinks. This formulation counts both the number of links to a page
and the relative importance of each link for determining the overall importance of the page.
PageRank provides a single global authority score for each page based on the characteristics
of the entire Web graph.
To illustrate PageRank’s susceptibility to link-based attacks, we computed the standard
PageRank vector over a page graph derived from a dataset consisting of over 100 million
pages and nearly 1 billion links. The dataset – WB2001 – was originally collected by the
Stanford WebBase project2 in 2001 and includes pages from a wide variety of top-level-
domains, including .com, .edu, .org, .mil, .net, as well as a variety of country-specific
top-level-domains. For the PageRank calculation, we relied on the standard parameter
2http://dbpubs.stanford.edu:8090/~testbed/doc2/WebBase/
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settings used in the literature ([138]).
We then identified a target page with a rank of 110 million on the WB2001 dataset
(meaning it is in the 7th percentile of all pages) and constructed a link farm for this target
page that consisted of a single colluding page. Next, we ran PageRank over this spammed
Web graph and identified the rank of the target page. We repeated this process for link
farms of up to 10,000 pages. Table 1 summarizes the impact of these link farms on the rank
of the target page.
Table 1: Link Farm Example: Impact on PageRank
Farm PageRank Rank
Size (pages) Score Rank Percentile
– 2.03e-9 110.0m 7th
1 3.75e-9 48.7m 59th
10 1.92e-8 6.5m 94th
100 1.74e-7 0.4m 99.6th
1,000 1.72e-6 15,800 99.99th
10,000 1.72e-5 147 99.9999th
The rank of the target page jumps to the 59th percentile with a link farm of only 1 page
and to the 94th percentile with a mere 10 page link farm. The largest link farm pushes the
target page’s ranking into the upper echelons, with a final rank in the top 150 of all 118
million pages. Hence, a Web spammer may wield tremendous influence over the PageRank
score of a target page with very little effort. Of course, over a large Web graph (on the
order of billions of pages), more colluding pages will be necessary to yield a similar ranking
boost, but the same phenomenon will continue to exist.
3.2 Source-Centric Link Analysis
To counter the strong influence of link-based vulnerabilities, we study the Web from a
source-centric point of view. In this complementary hierarchical view to the traditional
page graph, pages are grouped into logical collections of Web pages that we call sources.
In this section, we identify important parameters for guiding source-centric link analysis
(SLA), including how sources are defined, and discuss how these parameters impact the
effectiveness of link analysis. Source-centric link analysis relies on a source view of the Web.
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Just as the page graph GP = 〈P,LP〉 models the Web as a directed graph where the nodes
of the graph correspond to Web pages P and the set of directed edges LP correspond to
hyperlinks between pages, the source graph has nodes that correspond to sources and edges
that denote the linkage between sources. We use the term source edge to refer to the notion
of source-centric citation. A source s1 has a source edge to another source s2 if one page
in s1 has a hyperlink to a page in s2. We call s1 the originating source and s2 the target
source.
In general, a source graph can consist of multiple levels of source-hierarchy; that is, a
page may belong to a source that belongs to a larger source, and so on. In the rest of this
chapter we shall require that each page in the page graph belong to one and only one source
in the source graph, meaning that the hierarchal view of the Web consists of two-levels: a
page level and a source level. Hence, a Web source graph GS = 〈S,LS〉 is a directed graph
where the nodes of the graph correspond to Web sources in S and the set of directed edges
LS corresponds to source edges as described above.
3.2.1 Overview
Given the source view of the Web, we next discuss the choice of parameters for guiding
source-centric link analysis. The choice of parameters and their specific settings are greatly
impacted by the particular application of the link analysis (e.g., ranking, categorization,
clustering). In this chapter, we focus our parameter discussion primarily on the objective
of spam-resilience:
• Spam-resilience: Since Web spammers deliberately manipulate link analysis algo-
rithms, our first objective is to understand the spam-resilience properties of source-
centric link analysis.
Spam-resilience may come at a price, however, and so we also consider two additional ob-
jectives that are fundamental across link analysis applications and of particular importance
to Web ranking:
• Time complexity: Since the Web is incredibly large, our second objective is to leverage
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the higher source-abstraction level to improve the time complexity relative to page-
based approaches.
• Stability: The final objective is to study the stability of source-centric link analysis
in the face of the Web’s constant evolution.
We identify five key parameters that impact source-centric link analysis with respect to
these three objectives:
• Source Definition (Γ): The first and most important parameter is the source defini-
tion. The determination of how sources are organized is at the heart of source-centric
link analysis and all other parameter settings are entirely dependent on the source
definition.
• Source-Centric Citation (Θ): The second parameter we consider is the nature of the
citation-based association between sources. We study the presence and strength of
the linkage arrangements from one source to another.
• Source Size (Ξ): Since sources may vary greatly in the number of constituent pages,
the third parameter we study is source size and how this non-linkage information may
be directly incorporated into the analysis.
• Influence Throttling (Λ): The fourth parameter considers the degree to which a
source’s influence in the underlying application should be limited, or throttled. De-
termining the level of influence throttling may require information external to the link
structure of the source graph.
• Application-Specific Parameters (Υ): Finally, there may be some additional application-
specific parameters that are necessary, e.g., the number of iterations to run a ranking
algorithm until sufficient convergence.
We describe source-centric link analysis in terms of an application, a specific objective,
and as a combination of these five parameters: SLA<app,obj>(Γ;Θ; Ξ; Λ; Υ). We measure
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the effectiveness of source-centric analysis with respect to a specific objective (e.g., spam-
resilience).
In the following sections, we discuss the first four of these important parameters, present
some of their possible settings, and provide insight into how best these parameters may
be assigned based on the ultimate objectives of the link analysis. We examine the fifth
parameter in the context of Web ranking in Section 3.3. As we will see in our evaluation
in Section 3.5, a careful approach to these parameters is necessary to ensure high-quality
results across objectives, and especially with respect to spam-resilience.
3.2.2 Parameter 1: Source Definition
How does the source definition impact the quality of source-centric link analysis with respect
to the three objectives? Clearly, the determination of how sources are organized should have
a profound impact on the quality and value of source-centric link analysis. To understand
the importance of source definition, we consider five different approaches – in the first, we
treat each page as a unique source, meaning that the source view of the Web corresponds
directly to the page view; in the second, we disregard all page relationships and randomly
assign pages to sources. The other approaches rely on the link-locality of the Web and
assign pages based on their administrative organization – by domain, host, or directory.
To illustrate the locality-based linking phenomenon on the Web, we consider three large
real-world Web datasets. The first dataset – UK2002 – is derived from a 2002 crawl of the
.uk top-level-domain by UbiCrawler [24]. The second dataset – IT2004 – is derived from a
2004 crawl of the .it top-level-domain, again by UbiCrawler. The third dataset – WB2001
– was originally collected by the Stanford WebBase project3 and includes pages from a wide
variety of top-level-domains. All three datasets are available at http://webgraph-data.
dsi.unimi.it/. For each dataset we report the number of pages and links in Table 2, where
the data has been cleaned by the typical pre-processing step of removing all self-links.
In Table 3, we report four classes of links over these three datasets. We report the
fraction of all links that point from pages in one domain to pages in the same domain
3http://dbpubs.stanford.edu:8090/~testbed/doc2/WebBase/
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Table 3: Fraction of Page Links
Intra- Intra- Intra- Intra-
Dataset TLD Domain Host Directory
UK2002 100.0% 94.6% 92.3% 66.9%
IT2004 100.0% 91.0% 90.8% 67.9%
WB2001 97.9% 95.5% 94.1% 62.7%
(intra-domain links), the fraction that point from pages in one host to pages in the same
host (intra-host links), and the fraction that point from pages in one directory to pages in
the same directory or lower in the directory hierarchy (intra-directory links). Note that we
consider intra-directory links from the first directory level only. Since the WB2001 dataset
includes pages from many domains, we also report the fraction of pages in WB2001 that
point from pages in one top-level domain (TLD) to pages in the same TLD (intra-TLD
links).
These statistics consistently show that the Web exhibits a strong locality-based link
structure. Given this phenomenon, it is natural to assign pages to sources based on one of
these administrative organizations. Hence, we study five different settings for the source
definition parameter Γ – by domain, by host, by directory, as well as the extremes of by
page, and by random assignment.4
As we shall see in Section 3.5, the analysis quality depends heavily on the presence of
link locality and the source definition. We find that a lack of locality results in poor time
complexity, but that even moderate locality (∼ 65%) leads to good time complexity and
stability results that are comparable with source definitions with extremely high locality.
The source definition provides a first step towards mitigating the influence of a Web
4Of course, not all pages grouped by domain, host, or directory will always form a coherent Web source.
It may also make sense to assign pages to sources based on their topical locality as identified in [50]. We are
pursuing these issues in our continuing research.
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spammer. In the ideal scenario, all of the pages under the control of a Web spammer
would be mapped to a single source (and all legitimate pages would be mapped to their
appropriate source, as well), meaning that collusion among Web spammers could be muted
entirely by discounting the links within each source. In practice, spammers can never be
perfectly identified, and they can still rely on hijacking and honeypots to collect links from
legitimate pages. Hence, the next parameter – source-centric citation – can provide another
layer of defense against link-based manipulation.
3.2.3 Parameter 2: Source-Centric Citation
Unlike the straightforward notion of linkage in the page graph, source edges are derived
from the page edges in the underlying page graph. Different page edges often carry different
significance with respect to the sources involved. Careful design that takes these factors
into account is critical, and so the second parameter we study is the nature and strength of
source-centric citation from one source to another.
Given the directed source graph GS = 〈S,LS〉, our goal is to understand the source-
centric citation in terms of the appropriate edge weights for the set of directed edges LS .
Let w(si, sj) denote the weight assigned to the source edge (si, sj) ∈ LS . We consider
source-centric citation as a scalar value in the range [0, 1], where the outgoing edge weights
for any source sum to 1. In cases where the normalization is not explicit, we will require
the normalization of the raw edge weights. We consider six edge weighting schemes.
1. Uniform: This is the simplest case where all source edges pointing out from an origi-
nating source are treated equally. This uniform (u) weighting is defined as:
wu(si, sj) =
1∑
sk∈S I [(si, sk) ∈ LS ]
where the indicator function I(·) resolves to 1 if the argument to the function is true, and
0 otherwise.
Since each node in the source graph is an aggregation of one or more pages, treating each
source edge equally may not properly capture the citation strength between two sources.
With this in mind, we next introduce three source edge weighting schemes that are based
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on the hyperlink information encoded in the page graph GP = 〈P,LP〉.
2. Link Count: The link count scheme assigns edge weights based on the count of page
links between pages that belong to sources. Such an edge weighting is effective when we
would like to reward sources that have strong linkage at the page level. We define the link






I [(pi, pj) ∈ LP ]

where the source to which page pi belongs is denoted s(pi).
3. Source Consensus: This edge weighting scheme counts the number of unique pages
within an originating source that point to a target source. The main motivation behind
the design of this scheme is to address the weakness of the link count weighting scheme.
For example, we may wish to differentiate between the case where a single page within the
originating source is contributing all n links to the target, and the case where there are n
pages in the originating source and each has a single link to the target. We capture this






I [(pi, pj) ∈ LP ]

4. Target Diffusion: In contrast to how many pages in the originating source are respon-
sible for the page links between sources, another factor that is of interest when evaluating
source-citation strength is the number of different target pages that are pointed to by the






I [(pi, pj) ∈ LP ]

Each of the previous three alternatives to the uniform edge weighting scheme – link count,
source consensus, and target diffusion – relies exclusively on the page linkage between the
component pages in each source. In addition to these purely link-based approaches, we
also consider two approaches that rely on both the page links and the quality of the pages
that provide the linking, where we denote page pi’s quality score by q(pi). There are a
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number of ways for assigning a quality value to each page, including the PageRank score
for the page or by using a simple heuristic like the page’s relative depth in the directory
tree. Additionally, content-based factors may be incorporated in the quality component to
reward certain source associations, like those between topically-similar sources.
5. Quality-Weighted Link Count: This edge weighting scheme directly integrates the
page quality score into the link count weighting scheme. Let (q) denote the use of a page






q(pi) · I [(pi, pj) ∈ LP ]

6. Quality-Weighted Source Consensus: Similarly, we can integrate the page quality
score into the source consensus edge weighting scheme to produce the quality-weighted







I [(pi, pj) ∈ LP ]

Interesting to note is that there is not a natural quality-weighted extension to the target
diffusion edge weighting scheme since this edge weighting scheme is not focused on which
page in the source is providing the forward linkage.
From a spam-resilience point-of-view, the source consensus edge weighting schemes place
the burden on the hijacker (or honeypot) to capture many pages within a legitimate source
to exert any influence over the spam target pages. Hijacking a few pages in source i will
have little impact over the source-level influence flow to a spammer source j; that is w(si, sj)
is less subject to manipulation in the presence of many other pages within a source, since
it is aggregated over the link characteristics of all pages in the source.
Another factor that can influence source-centric citation is whether we take into account
self-edges, as illustrated in Figure 12. Given a particular edge weighting scheme, there may
be some applications that require self-edges, while others do not. For example, in a ranking
context, a self-edge may be interpreted as a self-vote by the source, meaning that the source




Source A Source B
Self-Edge
Figure 12: Self-Edges in the Source Graph
the edge weight w(si, si) = 0 for all si ∈ S. On the other hand, it may be reasonable to
include self-edges since the locality-based structure of Web links indicates a strong degree
of association between a source and itself.
Hence, we shall consider twelve different settings for the source citation parameter Θ
– the looped and loop-less versions of the six association strength edge weighting schemes.
We find that some edge weighting schemes are extremely vulnerable to spam manipulation,
while others are much less vulnerable. In terms of stability, we find that self-edges have a
very strong impact.
3.2.4 Parameter 3: Source Size
Since sources may vary greatly in size, from a source of a single page to a source encom-
passing millions of pages, what is the impact of source size on the underlying objectives
of source-centric link analysis? For many applications it may be reasonable to distinguish
between sources based on the per-source size discrepancy. Source size is one example of non-
linkage information that can be incorporated into the link analysis. Of course, there could
be other non-link information of interest (like source topic or source trustworthiness), but
in this chapter we shall restrict our examination to source size. The parameter Ξ considers
two options – the size in pages of each source si (denoted by |si|) and no size information.
As we shall see in Section 3.5, source size is a very important parameter for the stability of
the algorithm, but results in the least satisfactory spam-resilience. In our experiments we
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further explore this fundamental tension.
3.2.5 Parameter 4: Influence Throttling
The fourth parameter is concerned with selectively limiting, or throttling, the influence of
certain sources based on external knowledge. The source view of the Web and the careful
selection the other source-centric parameters can provide a foundation towards mitigating
the influence of link-based manipulation, but there are still open vulnerabilities. First, a
spammer may control pages in multiple colluding sources, meaning that the spammer can
construct a linking arrangement to ensure any arbitrary edge weight between colluding
sources. Second, although the spam-resilient components have some benefit, they are still
subject to hijacking and honeypot attacks by a determined Web spammer (e.g., a spammer
may have to hijack many more pages than in the page-level ranking model, but there is still
room for manipulation in the source-level ranking model).
As a result, we next consider the final parameter of source-centric analysis for managing
the impact of spammer-controlled links – influence throttling – so that a spammer cannot
take unfair advantage of the underlying application, even in the presence of large-scale link
manipulation. For each source si ∈ S, we associate a throttling factor κi ∈ [0, 1]. We refer
to this |S|-length vector κ as the throttling vector. Many factors may impact the specific
choice of κ, including the size of the Web dataset, the number of pages considered, the link
density, and other link characteristics. In the following section, we discuss one alternative
for determining κ using the notion of spam proximity. Hence, we consider two settings for
the influence throttling parameter Λ – in one case we extract influence throttling factors
based on spam proximity, in the other we apply no influence throttling at all.
3.3 Applying SLA to Web Ranking
The parameters introduced in the previous section can be combined in a number of way to
achieve a particular objective with respect to a link-based application (e.g., ranking, clus-
tering). To more fully examine source-centric link analysis, we select one application area
– Web ranking – and examine the parameter settings with respect to the three objectives –
time complexity, stability, and spam-resilience. Source-centric ranking has intuitive appeal
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since many users may be interested in identifying highly-ranked sources of information (e.g.,
CNN or ESPN) rather than specific pages.
Here, we adopt a ranking approach that is similar in spirit to the “random surfer”
model often used to describe PageRank, but adapted to source-centric link analysis. Just
as PageRank provides a single global authority score to each page on the Web based on
a random walk over the linkage structure of the entire Web, the source-centric ranking
approach (SLARank) can be used to rank all sources. In general, a source will be ranked
highly if many other high-ranking sources point to it. We denote source si’s authority score
as σi, where σi > σj indicates that the ith source is more important than the jth source. We
write the authority score for all sources using the vector notation σ, where all |S| sources
are assigned a score.
The random walk over the source graph proceeds as follows. For each source s ∈ S:
• With probability α, the random source walker follows one of the source edges of source
s;
• With probability 1 − α, the random source walker teleports to a randomly selected
source.
We refer to the first option as the edge following factor and the second option as the
teleportation factor. Associated with the edge following factor is an |S| × |S| transition
matrix T, where the ijth entry indicates the probability that the random source walker
will navigate from source si to source sj . Associated with the teleportation factor is an
|S|-length teleportation probability distribution c, where ci indicates the probability that
the random walker will teleport to source si. Such a random walk may be modelled by a
time-homogenous Markov Chain and written in terms of the stochastic transition matrix
T̂, where T̂ is a combination of both the edge following factor and the teleportation factor
according to the mixing parameter α:5
5We adopt a fairly standard solution for handling sources with no outlinks (so-called dangling sources),
whereby we make the transition matrix row stochastic by adding new edges from each dangling source to
every other source.
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T̂ = α ·T + (1− α) · 1 · cT
Since the source graph may have disconnected components and to gracefully deal with
nodes that have no out-links, the teleportation factor is included as a “fix” to guarantee that
the transition matrix associated with the Markov chain be both aperiodic and irreducible,
which ensures convergence to a stationary distribution. The stationary distribution of T̂
(which is its principal eigenvector) encodes the long-term probability of a random walker
being at each particular source. We can interpret this distribution as σ, encoding the
authority scores for all sources.
The eigenvector version:
σT = σT (α ·T + (1− α) · 1 · cT )
may be rewritten in a convenient linear form as:
σT = α · σT ·T + (1− α) · cT (1)
Coupled with the normalization σ/||σ||, this linear formulation results in exactly the
same source-centric ranking vector as the eigenvector problem, but with the added property
that the score for any source may be written as a linear combination of the scores of the
sources that point to it. For more discussion of this linear formulation, we refer the reader
to two recent studies: [23, 105].
Given the source-centric ranking model (SLARank), we next address two questions: (1)
How do the source-centric link analysis parameters map to the Web ranking context? and
(2) How do we evaluate the objectives of link analysis in the context of Web ranking?
3.3.1 Mapping Parameters
All five parameters – Source Definition (Γ), source-centric Citation (Θ), Source Size (Ξ), In-
fluence Throttling (Λ) and the Application-Specific Parameters (Υ) – impact Web ranking.
Clearly, the source definition is critically important since it determines the fundamental
unit of ranking. The source-centric citation is necessary to construct the transition matrix
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T according to the edge weights determined by Θ, that is Tij = w(si, sj)). The source




which intuitively captures the behavior of a random surfer being more likely to jump to large
sources. Alternatively, source size can be disregarded so the teleportation factors defaults
to a uniform distribution: ci = 1/|S|. For Web ranking, there are two application-specific
parameters – the mixing parameter α and the convergence criterion for terminating the
algorithm.
For the influence throttling parameter Λ, we augment the original source graph GS =
〈S,LS〉 to require that all sources have a self-edge, regardless of the characteristics of the
underlying page graph, i.e., ∀si ∈ S, (si, si) ∈ LS holds. Including self-edges in the source
graph is a sharp departure from the classic PageRank perspective and may initially seem
counter-intuitive – since it allows a source to have a direct influence over its own rank –
but we will see how it is a critical feature of adding spam-resilience to source-centric link
analysis.
For each source si ∈ S, we associate the throttling factor κi ∈ [0, 1], such that the
self-edge weight w(si, si) ≥ κi. By requiring a source to direct some minimum amount of
influence (κi) on itself, we throttle the influence it can pass along to other sources. In the
extreme, a source’s influence is completely throttled when κi = 1, meaning that all edges to
other sources are completely ignored (and hence, the throttled source’s influence on other
sources is diminished). Conversely, a source’s influence is not throttled at all when κi = 0.
Based on the throttling vector κ, we can construct a new influence-throttled transition
matrix T′ where the transition probabilities are:
T ′ij =

κi if Tij < κi and i = j
Tij∑
i6=k Tik
· (1− κi)if Tij < κi and i 6= j
Tij otherwise
For a source that does not meet its minimum throttling threshold (i.e., Tii < κi), the
self-edge weight in the transformed transition matrix is tuned upward (i.e., T ′ii = κi), and




ij = 1− κi.
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Unlike the original PageRank-style random source walker, the influence-throttled ran-
dom source walker can be interpreted as a selective random walk, whereby a random walker
arrives at a source, and flips a source-specific biased coin. The random walk proceeds as
follows. For source si ∈ S:
• With probability ακi, the random walker follows source si’s self-edge;
• With probability α(1− κi), the random walker follows one of source si’s out-edges;
• With probability 1− α, the random walker teleports to a randomly selected source.
3.3.2 Spam-Proximity Throttling
Determining the level of influence throttling for each source is an important component. In
this section, we discuss one alternative for determining κ using the notion of spam proximity.
The key insight is to tune κi higher for known spam sources and those sources that link to
known spam sources (e.g., through hijacking, honeypots, or collusion). Spam proximity is
intended to reflect the “closeness” of a source to other spam sources in the source graph. A
source is “close” to spam sources if it is a spam source itself; if it directly links to a spam
source; or if the sources it directly links to link to spam sources, and so on (recursively).
Given a small seed of known spam sources, we adopt a propagation approach that relies
on an inverse PageRank-style model to assign a spam proximity value to every source in
the Web graph, similar to the BadRank [178] approach for assigning in essence a “negative”
PageRank value to spam. First, we reverse the links in the original source graph GS =
〈S,LS〉 so that we have a new inverted source graph G′S = 〈S,L′S〉, where the source edge
(si, sj) ∈ LS ⇒ (sj , si) ∈ L′S . A source that is pointed to by many other sources in the
original graph will now itself point to those sources in the inverted graph. We replace the
original transition matrix T̂ with the inverse transition matrix Û:
Û = β ·U + (1− β) · 1 · dT (2)
where U is the transition matrix associated with the reversed source graph G′S , β is a mixing
factor, and d is a static score vector derived from the set of pre-labeled spam sources. An
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element in d is 1 if the corresponding source has been labeled as spam, and 0 otherwise.
By including the pre-labeled spam sources, the stationary distribution associated with Û is
a spam-proximity vector biased towards spam and sources “close” to spam.
Based on the stationary distribution, we can assign a throttling value to each source,
such that sources that are “closer” to spam sources are throttled more than more distant
sources. There are a number of possible ways to assign these throttling values. In this
chapter, we choose a simple heuristic such that sources with a spam-proximity score in the
top-k are throttled completely (i.e., κi = 1 for all si in the top-k), and all other sources are
not throttled at all.
3.3.3 Evaluating Objectives
We briefly discuss each of the objectives and their necessary parameters. In addition to
the time complexity, stability, and spam-resilience objectives, we also consider a fourth
objective that is specific to Web ranking – approximating PageRank.
• Spam-Resilience: Web spammers spend a considerable effort on manipulating Web-
based ranking algorithms, and recent studies suggest that it affects a significant por-
tion of all Web content, including 8% of pages [61] and 18% of sites [80]. To evaluate
the spam-resilience properties, we measure the impact of several spam scenarios in
terms of the ranking impact on a target source: SLARank;Spam(Γ;Θ; Ξ; Λ; Υ).
• Time Complexity: To measure time complexity, we examine the calculation effi-
ciency of the source-centric ranking approach in terms of the time it takes to calculate
each ranking vector: SLARank;Time(Γ;Θ; Ξ; Λ; Υ).
• Stability: We consider two flavors of stability. First, we evaluate the stability of
the ranking algorithm as the Web graph evolves, and new pages and sources are
discovered. Second, we investigate the stability in terms of the similarity of rankings
induced by the various parameter settings: SLARank;Stab(Γ;Θ; Ξ; Λ; Υ).
• Approximating PageRank: Finally, we consider the ranking-specific objective
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of approximating the traditional global PageRank vector by combining the source-
level ranking information with per-source ranking information. Such approximation
promises to speed the PageRank calculation considerably: SLARank;Approx(Γ;Θ; Ξ; Λ; Υ).
Several previous research efforts have considered a source-centric ranking calculation
over groups of pages, including [8] and [57]. These approaches have had different ultimate
objectives, and each approach has focused exclusively on a handful of parameter settings
with respect to a single objective. The first approach sought to bootstrap the calculation
of PageRank with an initial starting “guess” derived from a decomposition of the Web
into a higher-level block layer and a local level [97]. The second approach has focused
on replacing the traditional PageRank vector with an alternative ranking approach by
determining a page’s authority as a combination of multiple disjoint levels of rank authority
(e.g., [30, 112, 115, 162, 186]); the traditional PageRank vector is never computed. The
third approach decentralizes the computation of PageRank for use in peer-to-peer networks
(e.g., [173, 181]).
Each of these previous approaches relies on only a few parameter settings in the con-
text of a single objective and can be seen as a fairly limited exploration of the parameter
space of SLARank. For example, the BlockRank [97] and ServerRank [173] algorithms both
consider host-level sources, a quality-weighted link count citation weight with self-edges,
and disregard source size. By considering the five source definition parameter settings, the
12 source-citation settings, and the two teleportation vectors, we examine 120 different pa-
rameter settings for source-centric ranking (SLARank), which we evaluate over four distinct
objectives. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to consider such a large
parameter space and in the context of multiple, possibly competing objectives. In our eval-
uation, we shall conduct the first large-scale comparative study to evaluate source ranking
in terms of this parameter space and the four objectives.
3.4 Spam Resilience Analysis
In this section, we analyze the spam resilience properties of the ranking model and compare
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Figure 13: What is the Optimal Source Configuration?
a single target source through the manipulation of links (both from within the source and
from other sources), which corresponds to the vulnerabilities identified in Section 3.1.
3.4.1 Link Manipulation Within a Source
We begin by studying link manipulation that is confined to a single source, which would
correspond to collusive arrangements among spammer-controlled Web pages like link farms
and link exchanges. In the source view of the Web, all intra-source page links are reflected
in a single self-edge to the source, and all page links to others sources are reflected in source
edges to external sources.
How should the Web spammer configure the target source st to maximize its SLARank
score, which in turn will have the greatest impact on the target source’s rank relative to
all other sources? In Figure 13(a), we consider a generic source configuration for st. The
target has a self-edge weight of w(st, st), leaving 1−w(st, st) for all source edges to external
sources. Let z denote the aggregate incoming score to the target source from sources beyond
the control of the Web spammer. Here, the Web spammer has direct influence over its own
links (reflected in w(st, st)) but no influence over the incoming links from other sources. As
prescribed in Equation 1, we can write the target source’s score:





1− α · w(st, st)
which is maximized when w(st, st) = 1. The optimal configuration is for the source to
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Impact of Influence Throttling: Given that the target source has an initial throttling
factor κ < 1 and that w(st, st) = κ, the next question to consider is by how much may a
source improve its score by adopting a self-edge weight even higher than its throttling factor
(i.e., by increasing w(st, st) beyond the mandated minimum κ throttling value)? Examining











For a source with an initial baseline throttling value of κ = 0, a source may increase its
SLARank score by 11−α by increasing its w(st, st) to 1. For typical values of α – from 0.80
to 0.90 – this means a source may increase its score from 5 to 10 times. For sources that
are more throttled there is less room for manipulation. In Figure 14, we show for increasing
values of a baseline κ, the maximum factor change in SLARank score by tuning the κ value
closer to 1. A highly-throttled source may tune its SLARank score upward by a factor of 2
for an initial κ = 0.80, a factor of 1.57 times for κ = 0.90, and not at all for a fully-throttled
source.
By including self-edges in the source graph and the throttling factor κ, we allow a Web
spammer some room for manipulating the score of its sources; however, the manipulation is
for a one-time increase only and it may be limited by tuning the κ throttling factor higher.
No such limit is provided under PageRank, meaning that a Web spammer may arbitrarily
increase the score of a series of target pages by a factor even larger than we see for SLARank.
3.4.2 Cross-Source Link Manipulation
We now study link manipulation across two or more sources, which corresponds to hijacking
and honeypots scenarios, as well as collusive arrangements that span multiple sources. For
this analysis, the spammer wishes to maximize the score for the single target source by
manipulating the links available in one or more colluding sources.
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Figure 14: Change in Spam-Resilient SR Score By Tuning κ from a Baseline Value to 1
In Figure 13(b), we show a generic source configuration for a single target source s0
and single colluding source s1. We let θ0 and θ1 denote the edge weighting for each source
to sources outside the sphere of influence of the Web spammer. Hence, source s0 has
1 − w(s0, s0) − θ0 edge weighting available for the edge to source s1. The corresponding
edge weight holds for the edge from s1 to s0. Let z0 and z1 denote the incoming score
to each source, respectively, from other sources beyond the control of the Web spammer.
Hence, we may describe the SLARank for the two sources with a system of equations, where
the Web spammer may manipulate w(s0, s0), w(s1, s1), θ0, and θ1:
σ0 = αz0 + αw(s0, s0)σ0 +
1− α
|S|
+ α(1− w(s1, s1)− θ1)σ1
σ1 = αz1 + αw(s1, s1)σ1 +
1− α
|S|
+ α(1− w(s0, s0)− θ0)σ0
Solving and taking the partial derivative with respect to the four parameters, we find
that the optimal scenario for a Web spammer who wishes to maximize the SLARank score
for source s0 is to set θ0 = θ1 = 0, meaning that there are no source edges to sources outside
of the Web spammer’s sphere of influence; w(s0, s0) = 1, meaning that the target source
points only to itself and not at all to the colluding source; w(s1, s1) = 0, meaning that the
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colluding source points only to the target source. With the κ1 throttling factor requirement
this means that the best the colluding source can do is meet the minimum requirement
w(s1, s1) = κ1 and direct the rest (1− κ1) to the target.
If we extend this analysis to consider x colluding sources (labelled s1, ...sx) all in service
to a single target source, then the system of equations is:









σi = αzi + αw(si, si)σi +
1− α
|S|
+ α(1− w(s0, s0)− θ0)σ0
The optimal configuration is for all colluding sources to set θi = 0, meaning that there
are no source edges from colluding sources to sources outside of the Web spammer’s sphere
of influence; w(s0, s0) = 1, meaning that the target source points only to itself and not at
all to the colluding source; w(si, si) = κi, meaning that the colluding source directs the
minimum edge weight to itself and the remainder (1−κi) to the target source. Hence, each










Clearly, tuning the κ throttling factor for each source closer to 1 (meaning that the majority
of the colluding source’s edge weight is directed to itself) results in a smaller change to the
score of the target source. Hence, the introduction of the self-edge and the use of the
throttling factor limits the impact of inter-source link manipulation.
Impact of Influence Throttling: To further understand the importance of the κ throt-
tling factor on muting the impact of a Web spammer across sources, we consider a scenario
in which a Web spammer controls x colluding sources, that each source has the same throt-
tling factor of κ, and that the sources are configured optimally (as described above). Now
suppose the throttling factor is raised to κ′ for each source, meaning that each colluding
source has less influence on the target source. How many sources x′ are needed to achieve
the same score as in the original case? I.e., what impact does raising the throttling factor
have on the Web spammer?
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If we let zi = 0, we may write the original Spam-Resilient SLARank score with x colluding
sources and an initial throttling factor κ as well as the SLARank score under the higher













Letting σ0(x, κ) = σ0(x′, κ′), we may find a relationship between the number of original









In Figure 15, we plot the percentage of additional sources (x
′
x − 1) needed for a choice
of κ′ to equal the same influence on the score of the target page as under an initial choice
κ = 0. For example, when α = 0.85 and κ′ = 0.6, there are 23% more sources necessary
to achieve the same score as in the case when κ = 0. When κ′ = 0.8, the Web spammer
needs to add 60% more sources to achieve the same influence; for κ′ = 0.9, he needs 135%
more sources; and for κ′ = 0.99, he needs 1485% more sources. Tuning the throttling factor
higher considerably increases the cost of inter-source manipulation.
3.4.3 Comparison with PageRank
Now that we have studied source-centric ranking and seen how influence throttling can be
used to significantly increase the cost of manipulation to a Web spammer, we next compare
SLARank to PageRank. Since PageRank provides page-level rankings, we consider a Web
spammer whose goal is to maximize his influence over a single target page within a target
source. Extending the framework from the previous section, we consider three scenarios (as
illustrated in Figure 16).
1. The target page and all colluding pages belong to the same source.
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Figure 15: Additional Sources Needed Under κ′ to Equal the Impact when κ = 0
Figure 16: Three Link Manipulation Scenarios
2. The target page belongs to one source, and all colluding pages belong to one colluding
source.
3. The target page belongs to one source, and the colluding pages are distributed across
many colluding sources.
For each scenario, the colluding pages are structured with a single link to the target
page. We consider the impact of an increasing number of colluding pages (τ). Adopting a
linear formulation of PageRank that is similar in spirit to Equation 1, we may denote the
PageRank score π0 for the target page in terms of the PageRank due to pages outside of the
sphere of influence of the Web spammer, the PageRank due to the teleportation component,
and the PageRank due to the τ colluding pages:
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Figure 17: Comparison with PageRank: Scenario 1






where α refers to the teleportation probability and |P| refers to the total number of pages
in the page graph. The contribution of the τ colluding pages to the overall PageRank score
of the target page is:
∆τ (π0) = τα
1− α
|P|
For Scenario 1, the Web spammer configures the target source optimally (as we presented
in Equation 3), meaning that the colluding pages’ intra-source links to the target page have
no impact on the SLARank score (other than perhaps a one-time increase due to tuning the
self-edge weight up from κ to 1). PageRank, however, is extremely susceptible, as illustrated
in Figure 17, where the PageRank score (PR) of the target page jumps by a factor of nearly
100 times with only 100 colluding pages.
For Scenario 2, the Web spammer adopts the optimal (worst-case) two-source configu-
ration discussed in the previous section. In this configuration, the target source points only
to itself, and the colluding source that contains the colluding pages directs κ edge weight
to itself and the rest to the target source. In Figure 18, we see how PageRank is again
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Figure 18: Comparison with PageRank: Scenario 2
extremely susceptible to such collusion, whereas the maximum influence over SLARank is
capped at 2 times the original score for several values of κ. Since PageRank has no notion
of a source, makes no effort to regulate the addition of new pages to the Web graph, and
has no notion of influence throttling, all three spam scenarios under consideration will have
the same extreme impact on the PageRank score of the target page.
In Scenario 3, the Web spammer adopts the optimal configuration for x colluding sources
(as we established in the previous section). Figure 19 plots the extreme impact on Page-
Rank. As the influence throttling factor is tuned higher (up to 0.99), the SLARank score of
the target source is less easily manipulated.
3.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate source-centric link analysis in the context of Web
ranking with respect to four objectives – spam-resilience, time complexity, ranking stability,
and approximating PageRank. Our spam-resilience evaluation is intended to confirm the
analysis of the previous section over real Web data. We are interested to understand what
are the most important parameters, how these parameters should be set, and what impact
these parameter settings have on competing objectives. We find that careful tuning of these
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Figure 19: Comparison with PageRank: Scenario 3
Table 4: Source Graph Summary – By Source Definition
Domain Host Dir Rand Page
Dataset Nodes Links Nodes Links Nodes Links Nodes Links Nodes Links
UK2002 81k 1.2m 98k 1.6m 360k 3.5m 98k 286.0m 18.5m 292.2m
IT2004 136k 2.7m 141k 2.8m 505k 8.6m 141k 1,069.3m 41.3m 1,135.7m
WB2001 620k 10.5m 739k 12.4m 3,315k 24.7m 739k 955.4m 118.1m 992.8m
parameters is vital to ensure success over each objective, and that some objectives cannot
be maximized without negatively impacting other objectives.
3.5.1 Experimental Setup
All of our experimental evaluation is over the three Web datasets described in Section 3.2.2.
For each dataset we extracted the domain, host, and directory information for each page
URL and assigned pages to sources based on these characteristics. We also consider the
extreme case when each page belongs to its own source (equivalent to the page graph
described in Table 2). For the random source definition, we set the number of nodes in the
graph to be the same as the number of hosts. In Table 4, we present summary information
for each of the source graphs (including self-edges). Note that the random source graph
displays nearly no link-locality, with less than 1% of all page links being intra-source.
All of the ranking code was written in Java. The data management component was
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based on the WebGraph compression framework described in [26] for managing large Web
graphs in memory. All experiments were run on a dual processor Intel XEON at 2.8GHz
with 8GB of memory. We measured the convergence rate for all ranking calculations using
the L2-distance of successive iterations of the Power Method. We terminated the ranking
calculations once the L2-distance dropped below a threshold of 10e-9.
As a baseline, we computed the global PageRank vector (π) over each page graph using
the standard Power Method and the parameters typically used in the literature (e.g., [138]),
including a mixing parameter of 0.85, a uniform teleportation vector, and a uniform link
following probability.
For the quality-weighted edge weighting, we measure the quality of each page q(pi) using
the page’s PageRank score πi. Although in practice it may not be reasonable to use the
PageRank score as a measure of quality since it is so expensive to calculate, we include these
PageRank-weighted options here to more fully understand their impact relative to the edge
weighting schemes that do not require PageRank.
For compactness, we shall write a particular SLARank parameter combination like
SR(T∗U , cu), where the transition matrix T is appended with a subscript to indicate which
source edge weighting scheme we use: TU , TLC , and so on. We shall append an asterisk
to the transition matrix to indicate the inclusion of self-edges: T∗. For the choice of tele-
portation vector c, we consider the standard uniform vector (cu) and the source-size-based
vector (cs).
3.5.2 Measures of Ranking Distance
We rely on two distance metrics for comparing ranking vectors. The Kendall Tau Distance
Metric [59] is based solely on the relative ordering of the sources in two ranking vectors.
In contrast, the Jensen-Shannon Divergence [109] measures the distributional similarity of
two vectors, meaning that it considers the magnitude of each source’s authority score and
not just the relative ordering of the sources.
Kendall Tau Distance Metric. This metric measures the relative ordering of two lists of
ranked objects [59]. It is based on the original Kendall Tau correlation described in [99]
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and provides a notion of how closely two lists rank the same set of objects (or Web sources
in our case). The Kendall Tau distance metric takes values in the range [0,1], where two
rankings that are exactly the same have a distance of 0, and two rankings in the reverse
order have a distance of 1. We rely on a variation of an O(n log n) version described in [25].
JS-Divergence. The Jensen-Shannon divergence is a measure of the distributional similarity
between two probability distributions [109]. It is based on the relative entropy measure
(or KL-divergence), which measures the difference between two probability distributions p
and q over an event space X: KL(p, q) =
∑
x∈X p(x) · log(p(x)/q(x)). If we let p be one
of the ranking vectors σ, and q be the other ranking vector σ′, then we have KL(σ,σ′) =∑
i∈S σi · log(σi/σ′i). Intuitively, the KL-divergence indicates the inefficiency (in terms
of wasted bits) of using the q distribution to encode the p distribution. Since the KL-
divergence is not a true distance metric, the JS-divergence has been developed to overcome
this shortcoming, where:
JS(σ,σ′) = φ1KL(σ, φ1σ + φ2σ′) + φ2KL(σ′, φ1σ + φ2σ′)
and φ1, φ2 > 0 and φ1 + φ2 = 1. In the experiments reported in this chapter, we consider
φ1 = φ2 = 0.5. The JS-divergence takes values in the range [0,1] with lower values indicating
less distance between the two ranking vectors.
3.5.3 Objective-Driven Evaluation
We report the most significant results from a total of 360 different ranking vectors we
computed by combining the five source definitions, the 12 source-citation edge weights, the
two teleportation vectors, and the three datasets. For the 360 ranking vectors we analyze,
we fix the mixing parameter α at the commonly adopted value of 0.85 used for PageRank
(e.g., [138]). Note that we also varied α in our preliminary experiments, but find that there
is no significant change in the results we report here.
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Source Definition
Dataset Domain Host Dir Rand Page
UK2002 0.02 0.03 0.07 2.45 2.76
IT2004 0.05 0.05 0.13 9.33 9.44
WB2001 0.21 0.25 0.46 11.32 12.28
Table 5: Wallclock Time (Minutes) Per Iteration
3.5.4 Time Complexity
We begin by examining the ranking efficiency of the source-centric ranking approach in
terms of the time it takes to calculate each ranking vector. The PageRank-style calculation
scans the link file for each source graph multiple times until convergence.
Table 5 shows the average time per iteration to calculate the ranking vector over the
five different source graphs for each of the datasets. We report the results for a ranking
based on the uniform edge weight and a uniform teleportation vector: SR(TU , cu). These
general per-iteration results also hold for the total time to reach the L2 stopping criterion.
In our examination of the 360 different ranking vectors, we find that the source definition
has the most significant impact on the calculation time, since the source definition directly
impacts the size of the source graph. The choice of edge weights and teleportation vector
has little discernable impact on the calculation time.
As we can see, the directory, host, and domain source definitions result in ranking
computation that is one to two orders of magnitude faster than the page-based graph. Since
PageRank over a Web graph of billions of nodes takes days or weeks, this improvement is
important for source-centric ranking to compensate for PageRank’s slow time-to-update.
The random source definition performs poorly, even though there are the same number of
nodes in the random graph as in the host graph. The key difference is that the random
graph has no link locality structure, and hence consists of nearly as many links as in the
page graph. We conclude that link locality strongly impacts the degree of source graph size
reduction, and hence, the ranking calculation time. Due to its poor performance, we shall
drop the random source definition from the rest of our reported experimental results.
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Edge Self- Telep.
Shorthand Version Weight Edges? Factor
Baseline SR(T∗LC , cu) LC Yes Uniform
NoL SR(TLC , cu) LC No Uniform
Size SR(T∗LC , cs) LC Yes Size
Uni SR(T∗U , cu) U Yes Uniform
SC SR(T∗SC , cu) SC Yes Uniform
TD SR(T∗TD, cu) TD Yes Uniform
LC(q) SR(T∗LC(q), cu) LC(q) Yes Uniform
SC(q) SR(T∗SC(q), cu) SC(q) Yes Uniform
Table 6: Ranking Similarity: Parameter Settings
3.5.5 Stability – Ranking Similarity
We next explore the parameter space to investigate the stability in terms of the similarity
of rankings induced by the various parameter settings. Due to its popularity in other works
(e.g. [97, 181]), we adopt a baseline ranking based on the link count edge weight with
self-edges and a uniform teleportation vector, SR(T∗LC , cu), and report seven alternative
ranking vectors computed by tweaking these baseline parameter settings. We consider a
version without self-edges (SR(TLC , cu)), a version including self-edges and the size-based
teleportation component (SR(T∗LC , cs)), and five additional versions using the other edge
weighting schemes (e.g., SR(T∗U , cu)) as shown in Table 6. We report the results for the
host-based graph in this section; we see similar results across the directory and domain
source definition settings.
In Figures 20, 21, and 22 we compare the ranking vector resulting from the baseline
parameter settings with the ranking vector resulting from each of these seven alternative
parameter settings. The y-axis measures the distance between these alternative ranking
vectors and the baseline configuration via the Kendall Tau Distance Metric and the JS-
Divergence.
As we can see, the exclusion of self-edges (NoL) and the choice of teleportation vector
(Size) are the two factors with the most significant impact on the resulting ranking vector in
terms of ranking distance from the baseline setting. Hence, we must be careful when setting
these two critical parameters, since the resulting ranking vectors depend so heavily on
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Figure 20: Parameter Tuning: Ranking Distance Versus Baseline Configuration, UK2002
Figure 21: Parameter Tuning: Ranking Distance Versus Baseline Configuration, IT2004
59
Figure 22: Parameter Tuning: Ranking Distance Versus Baseline Configuration, WB2001
them. The choice of edge weights has less impact, though we observe that the uniform edge
weighting results in the most dissimilar ranking vector of all the edge weighting schemes.
The uniform edge weighting scheme is a less intuitively satisfactory edge weighting scheme,
and these results confirm this view. What is interesting here is that the Source Consensus,
Target Diffusion, Quality-Weighted Link Count, and Quality-Weighted Source Consensus
edge weights have a relatively minor impact on the resulting ranking vector versus the
baseline Link Count version. We note that the Quality-Weighted Link Count deviates very
little from the Link Count version, in spite of the incorporation of the expensive PageRank
scores. This is encouraging since it means we need not rely on PageRank for assessing
source quality.
3.5.6 Stability – Link Evolution
We next evaluate the stability of SLARank as the Web graph evolves for each of the three
Web datasets. Since the source view of the Web provides an aggregate view over Web pages,
we anticipate that domain, host, and directory-based rankings should be less subject to
changes in the underlying page graph than page-based rankings. Our goal is to emulate the
gradual discovery of Web pages, similar to how a Web crawler may incrementally discover
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new pages for ranking.
For each dataset, we randomly selected a fraction of the pages (10%, 30%, ...) and com-
puted the standard PageRank vector over just this fraction of pages, yielding π10%,π30%,
and so on. Additionally, we computed the ranking vector for the domain, host, and
directory-based source graphs derived from the same fraction of all pages, yielding σ10%,σ30%,
and so on. We then compared the relative page rankings for the pages in π10%, π30%, ..., to
the relative rankings of the exact same pages in the PageRank vector for the full Web page
graph. Similarly, we compared the relative source rankings for the sources in σ10%,σ30%, ...,
to the relative rankings of the exact same sources in the ranking vector for the full Web
source graph. To evaluate the stability, we rely on the Kendall Tau Distance metric as a
measure of ranking error.
In Figure 23 we show the ranking error for the WB2001 dataset for PageRank and
for three representative parameter settings over the host-based source graph – the baseline
version SR(T∗LC , cu), the loop-less version SR(TLC , cu), and the size-based teleportation
version SR(T∗LC , cs). Note that these are the three settings that resulted in the most
different ranking vectors in our previous experiment. In all cases, the source-centric rankings
display significantly less error relative to the rankings over the full Web graph than the
PageRank rankings do, meaning that we can rely on source-centric rankings computed over
an incomplete Web crawl with substantial confidence. Also note that the size-based version
is the most stable, and we find that this stability generally improves as the source definition
becomes more inclusive (from page to directory to host to domain).
Since the page and source ranking vectors are of different lengths, we additionally con-
sidered a similar stability analysis over just the top-100 and top-1000 page and source rank-
ings. We relied on a variation of the Kendall Tau Distance metric known as the Kendall
Min Metric [59] for evaluating top-k ranked lists. These results further validate the source
stability.
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Figure 23: Ranking Stability, WB2001
3.5.7 Approximating PageRank
As we have mentioned, one of the important goals of source-centric ranking is to approxi-
mate the traditional global PageRank vector by combining the source-level ranking informa-
tion with per-source ranking information (the local PageRank scores). Such approximation
promises to speed the PageRank calculation considerably. In this experiment we aim to
understand under what conditions source-centric ranking may be used to reasonably ap-
proximate PageRank.
To approximate PageRank, we decompose the global PageRank of a page into source
and local components:
π(pi) = σ(sj) · π(pi|sj) (5)
where we denote the local PageRank score for page i in source j as π(pi|sj). The local
PageRank score is calculated based only on local knowledge (e.g., based on the linkage
information of pages within the source), takes comparably little time relative to the full
PageRank calculation, and forms a probability distribution (i.e.,
∑
pk∈sj π(pk|sj) = 1).
For the PageRank decomposition to hold over all pages, ideally we would have that the
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Figure 24: Approximating PageRank, IT2004





By replacing π(pi|sj) in Equation 5 with the righthand-side of Equation 6, we find that






To test how well the source-centric rankings may be used to approximate PageRank, we
compare the rankings induced from various parameter settings with the rankings induced
from ranking the sources by the sum of the global PageRanks of their constituent pages.
In Figure 24, we report the Kendall Tau Distance Metric and the JS-Divergence for three
representative parameter settings – the baseline version SR(T∗LC , cu), the loop-less version
SR(TLC , cu), and the size-based teleportation version SR(T∗LC , cs) – over the domain,
host, and directory-based source definitions for the IT2004 dataset. Similar results hold for
the other two datasets.
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The baseline parameter setting (which has been used elsewhere, e.g., [97, 181]) performs
poorly, and is not appropriate for approximating PageRank. Similarly, the loopless version,
which disregards the strong evidence of link-locality for setting edge weights, also performs
poorly. Only the size-based version is highly correlated with the sum of the actual PageRank
values for each source, meaning that source size and the presence of self-edges are critical
for approximating PageRank. We also find that high-quality results hold when we replace
the link count edge weighting parameter with the source consensus and target diffusion
schemes.
3.5.8 Spam-Resilience
Finally, we study the spam-resilience properties of source-centric link analysis through three
popular Web spam scenarios.
3.5.8.1 Spam Scenario 1: Intra-Source Link Farm
We first aim to validate the analysis in Section 3.4.1 by considering the impact of page-
level manipulation within a single source. For this intra-source manipulation we study the
impact of a spammer who manipulates the pages internal to a target source for increasing the
rank of a target page within the target source. We again consider the three representative
parameter settings – the baseline, loop-less, and size-based teleportation versions. For each
version, we randomly selected five sources from the bottom 50% of all sources on the host
graph. For each source, we randomly selected a target page within the source and created
a link farm consisting of a single new spam page within the same source with a link to the
target page. This is case A. For case B, we added 10 spam pages to the link farm within
the source, each with a link to the target page. We repeated this setup for 100 pages (case
C) and 1,000 pages (case D). For each case, we then constructed the new spammed page
graph and host graph for each of the three Web datasets. We ran PageRank and the three
source-centric versions for each of the four cases. In Figures 25, 26, and 27 we show the
influence of the Web spammer in manipulating the rank of the target page and the rank
of the target source through the average ranking percentile increase. For example in the
WB2001 case, the PageRank of the target page jumped 80 percentile points under case C
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Figure 25: Intra-Source Link Farm, UK2002
(from an average rank in the 19th percentile to the 99th), whereas the score of the target
source jumped only 4 percentile points for the baseline version (from an average rank in the
27th percentile to the 31st).
We first note the dramatic increase in PageRank for the target page across all three
Web datasets, which confirms the analysis about the susceptibility of PageRank to rank
manipulation. Although PageRank has typically been thought to provide fairly stable
rankings (e.g., [131]), we can see how link-based manipulation has a profound impact, even
in cases when the spammer expends very little effort (as in cases A and B). We note that
the loop-less source-centric version shows no change in rank value, since the addition of
new intra-source links has no impact on the resulting source graph and ranking vector. The
baseline version does increase some, but not nearly as much as PageRank. Since the source
is an aggregation of many pages, the weighting of the source edges is less susceptible to
changes in the underlying page graph. In contrast, the size-based teleportation version is
the most vulnerable to intra-source manipulation. In fact, under this scenario, a spammer
need only add new pages (not links) to increase the score of a source. The addition of so
many new pages increases the size of the source, making it more attractive to the random
walker who considers the size-based teleportation component. In fact, under this scenario,
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Figure 26: Intra-Source Link Farm, IT2004
Figure 27: Intra-Source Link Farm, WB2001
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a spammer need only add new pages (not links) to increase the score of a source.
3.5.8.2 Spam Scenario 2: Inter-Source Link Farm
In the second Web spam scenario, we consider the impact of manipulation across sources,
which corresponds to the analysis in Section 3.4.2. For this scenario, the spam links are
added to pages in a colluding source that point to the target page in a different source. We
paired the randomly selected target sources from the previous experiment with a randomly
selected colluding source, again from the bottom 50% of all sources. For each pair, we added
a single spam page to the colluding source with a single link to the randomly selected target
page within the target source. This is case A. We repeated this setup for 10 pages (case
B), 100 pages (case C), and 1,000 pages (case D). For each case, we then constructed the
new spammed page graph and source graph for each of the three Web datasets. We ran
PageRank and Spam-Resilient SourceRank for each of the four cases.
In Figures 28, 29, and 30 we show the influence of the Web spammer in manipulating
the rank of the target page and the target source. Since the page-level view of the Web
does not differentiate between intra-source and inter-source page links, we again see that
the PageRank score dramatically increases, whereas the source-centric scores are impacted
less. We are encouraged to observe that all three source-centric versions perform better than
PageRank. We witness this advantage using no additional influence throttling information
for the sources under consideration, meaning that the source-centric advantage would be
even greater with the addition of more throttling information. The baseline version does
increase some, but not nearly as much as PageRank. Since the source is an aggregation of
many pages, the weighting of the source edges is less susceptible to changes in the underlying
page graph. Interestingly, the loop-less version is the least resistant to manipulation for cases
A, B, and C. In the loop-less version, external links are the sole determiner of a source’s
rank, meaning that inter-source manipulation wields more influence than for the looped
versions. The size-based teleportation version is the most vulnerable for case D.
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Figure 28: Inter-Source Link Farm, UK2002
Figure 29: Inter-Source Link Farm, IT2004
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Figure 30: Inter-Source Link Farm, WB2001
3.5.8.3 Spam Scenario 3: Link Hijacking
In the third scenario, we consider a spammer who hijacks links from high-quality pages.
The goal of link hijacking is to insert links into reputable pages that point to a spammer’s
target page, so that it appears to the ranking algorithm that the reputable page endorses the
spam page. Spammers have a number of avenues for hijacking legitimate pages, including
the insertion of spam-links into public message boards, openly editable wikis, and the
comments section of legitimate Weblogs.
Given the results of the link farm scenario, we select the baseline parameter settings
SR(T∗LC , cu), as well as two other versions based on the source consensus and uniform
edge weights: SR(T∗SC , cu) and SR(T∗U , cu). For each version, we selected a target source
ranked 100,000th on the WB2001 host graph and four different high-quality sources to
hijack, each ranked close to 100th overall. Each hijacked source has different size and
linking characteristics – case A is a large source with 3,000 pages and 69 source edges; case
B is a medium source with 1,557 pages and 78 source edges; case C is a source with 416
pages and 336 source edges; finally, case D is a small source with 24 pages and 5 source
edges.
For each hijacked source, we assume the hijacker has full control of only a single hijacked
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Figure 31: Link Hijacking, WB2001
page. Since the link count edge weight simply counts the number of links from one source
to another, the spammer can insert sufficient links into the single hijacked page to skew
the weight from the hijacked source to the target source to be nearly 1. In contrast, the
uniform edge weight is constrained by the number of distinct targets (source edges). The
source consensus edge weight is constrained by the number of hijacked pages.
In Figure 31, we show the influence of the link hijacker over the rank of the target source
through the average ranking percentile increase. In all cases, the target source is originally
in the 86th percentile (ranked 100k out of 739k). In case A, the target source jumps nearly
14 percentile points under the link count edge weight up to a final rank in the top-150 out of
738,626 sources. In contrast, the source consensus only jumps around 1 percentile points to
a rank of 92k. As we can see, the source consensus performs the best across the four tested
cases. We see that the link count approach, which is popular in other works, is extremely
susceptible to hijacking across all cases. We also considered a second link hijacking scenario,
in which a spammer inserts multiple links to many different target pages; we find that this
behavior severely negatively impacts the target diffusion edge weighting, resulting in results
nearly as poor as for the link count approach.
For both the link farm and link hijacking scenarios, we find that adopting either a
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directory-based or domain-based source definition versus the host-based definition reported
here leads to mixed results. In the directory-based source graph, sources are on-average
smaller, meaning that the edge weight manipulation for each source is easier to achieve. But
since there are more directories than hosts, a greater degree of manipulation is necessary
to equal the same ranking boost as in the host graph. The opposite situation holds for the
domain source definition, where edge weight manipulation is more difficult (since sources
are larger), but less manipulation is necessary since there are fewer domains than hosts. We
are continuing to study this phenomenon in our ongoing research.
3.5.9 Influence Throttling Effectiveness
In the final experiment, we study the impact of influence throttling on the spam-resilience
characteristics of source-centric ranking. For the WB2001 dataset we manually identified
10,315 pornography-related sources, and labeled these as spam. It is unreasonable for a
spam identification algorithm (whether manual or automated) to identify all spam sources
with high precision. Hence, of these 10,315 spam sources, we randomly selected just 1,000
(fewer than 10%) to use as a seed set for the spam-proximity calculation. We calculated
the spam-proximity score for each source using the approach described in Section 3.2.5.
Based on these scores, we assigned an appropriate throttling value to each source, such
that sources that are “closer” to spam sources are throttled more than more distant sources.
These spam proximity scores are propagated to all sources in the dataset based only on
the seed set of 1,000 identified spam sources. We assigned the top-20,000 spam-proximity
sources a throttling value of κ = 1, meaning that their influence was completely throttled.
For all other sources we assigned a throttling value of κ = 0, meaning that these sources
were throttled not at all. We then computed the source-centric ranking vector using these
throttling values. As a point of comparison, we also computed the baseline ranking vector
using no throttling information.
For each of the two ranking vectors, we sorted the sources in decreasing order of scores
and divided the sources into 20 buckets of equal number of sources. Along the x-axis of
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Figure 32: Rank Distribution of All Spam Sources
Figure 32 we consider these 20 buckets for the WB2001 dataset, from the bucket of top-
ranked sources (bucket 1) to the bucket of the bottom-ranked sources (bucket 20). Along
the y-axis, we plot the number of actual spam sources (of the 10,315 total spam sources) in
each bucket. The approach using influence throttling penalizes spam sources considerably
more than the baseline approach, even when fewer than 10% of the spam sources have been
explicitly marked as spam.
3.5.10 Summary of Experiments
The evaluation of the parameterized source-centric link analysis framework has yielded
several interesting observations:
• Source-centric link analysis heavily depends on the source definition and the degree
of link locality. We find that a lack of locality results in poor time complexity, but
that even moderate locality (e.g., ∼ 65%) leads to good time complexity and stability
results that are comparable with source definitions that display extremely high locality.
• In terms of ranking vector stability across parameters, the most important parame-
ters are self-edges and the source-size teleportation component. We also found that
incorporating expensive quality information into the edge weighting schemes resulted
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in only a slight change to the resulting ranking vector.
• To best approximate PageRank using a layered calculation and for the most stable
rankings in the face of Web link evolution, we saw the critical need for using the
size-based teleportation component.
• However, using the size-based teleportation component resulted in the most severe
vulnerability to spam, although it has these two desirable properties. This fundamen-
tal tension in objectives motivates our continuing research.
• Finally, we saw how incorporating influence throttling information resulted in better
spam-resilience properties than the baseline approach.
3.6 Related Work
In addition to the related work cited elsewhere in this chapter, there have been some other
efforts to understand higher-level Web abstractions. In [52], the hostgraph was explored
in terms of various graph properties like indegree and outdegree distribution, and size of
connected components. Crawling mechanisms based on the site paradigm, rather than the
traditional page-based one, were enumerated in [58]. In [57], the potential spam properties
of a HostRank algorithm were observed, and in [167] the ranking quality of several site-level-
style PageRank variations was studied. In contrast to page aggregations, other researchers
[33] have considered dis-aggregating Web pages into smaller units for providing ranking over
individual components of Web pages.
Source-centric ranking can also take advantage of algorithmic enhancements for speeding
PageRank (e.g., [122]).
As we have noted, several studies have identified large portions of the Web to be subject
to malicious rank manipulation [61, 80], especially through the construction of specialized
link structures for promoting certain Web pages. In Chapter 2, we identified some techniques
for dealing with link-based vulnerabilities. In addition, several researchers have studied
collusive linking arrangements with respect to PageRank, including [192] and [12]. Link
farms have been studied in [2]. Separately, optimal link farms and the effectiveness of spam
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alliances have been studied in [78]. Davison [49] was the first to investigate the identification
of so-called nepotistic links on the Web.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a parameterized framework for source-centric link anal-
ysis, explored several critical parameters, and conducted the first large-scale comparative
study of source-centric link analysis over multiple large real-world Web datasets and multi-
ple competing objectives. We find that careful tuning of these parameters is vital to ensure
success over each objective and to balance the performance across all objectives. We have
introduced the notion of influence throttling, studied analytically its impact, and provided
experimental validation of the effectiveness and robustness of our spam-resilient ranking




Most of the popular link-based Web ranking algorithms, like PageRank [138], HITS [100],
and TrustRank [80], all rely on a fundamental assumption that the quality of a page and
the quality of a page’s links are strongly correlated: a page ranked higher will be unlikely
to contain lower quality links. This assumption, however, also opens doors for spammers to
create link-based Web spam that manipulate links to the advantage of the Web spammers.
Let us revisit two of the link-spam scenarios described in the previous section:
• Hijacking: Spammers hijack legitimate reputable pages and insert links that point to a
spammer-controlled page, so that it appears to link analysis algorithms that the reputable
page endorses the spam page.
• Honeypots: Instead of directly hijacking a link from a reputable page and risking expo-
sure, spammers often create legitimate-appearing Web sites (honeypots) to induce reputable
pages to voluntarily link to these spammer-controlled pages. A honeypot can then pass along
its accumulated authority by linking to a spam page.
Both scenarios show how spammers can take advantage of the tight quality-credibility
coupling to subvert popular link-based Web ranking algorithms and why the assumption
that the quality of a page and the quality of a page’s links are highly correlated is vulnerable
to link-based Web spam.
In this chapter we advocate a clean separation of page quality and link (or reference)
quality and argue that the intrinsic quality of a page should be distinguished from its
intrinsic link credibility. Our goal is to assign each page a link credibility score defined in
terms of link quality, not in terms of page quality. Such an approach is complementary to
the source-centric analysis discussed in Chapter 3; it can be used in conjunction with either
source-centric or page-based link approaches.
To guide our understanding of this problem, we address a number of important research
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questions.
• Can we formally define the concept of credibility to provide a degree of separation between
page quality and link quality?
• What are the factors impacting the computation of credibility, and to what degree do
these factors impact the application semantics of credibility-based link analysis?
• Can and how will credibility be impacted by local versus global linkage information?
This chapter addresses each of these questions in detail to provide an in-depth un-
derstanding of link credibility. We develop a CredibleRank algorithm that incorporates
credibility into an enhanced spam-resilient Web ranking algorithm. Concretely, we make
three unique contributions: First, we introduce the concept of link credibility, identify the
conflation of page quality and link credibility in popular link-based algorithms, and discuss
how to decouple link credibility from page quality. Second, we develop several techniques
for semi-automatically assessing link credibility for all Web pages, since manually determin-
ing the credibility of every page on the Web is infeasible. Another unique property of our
link credibility assignment algorithms is to allow users with different risk tolerance levels
to assess credibility in a personalized manner. Third, we present a novel credibility-based
Web ranking algorithm - CredibleRank - which incorporates credibility information directly
into the quality assessment of each page on the Web.
In addition, we develop a set of metrics for measuring the spam resilience properties of
ranking algorithms and show how the credibility information derived from a small set of
known spam pages can be used to support high accuracy identification of new (previously
unknown) spam pages. We have conducted an extensive experimental study on the spam
resilience of credibility-based link analysis over a Web dataset of over 100 million pages, and
we find that our approach is significantly and consistently more spam-resilient than both
PageRank and TrustRank.
In the next section (Section 4.1), we present the Web graph model and discuss three
representative link-based ranking algorithms. We formally define credibility in Section 4.2,
discuss several approaches for computing credibility in Section 4.3, and present a time-based
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extension in Section 4.4. We show how to incorporate credibility information into an aug-
mented Web ranking algorithm in Section 4.5. An extension for automatically expanding
the scope of credibility information is introduced in Section 4.6. Finally, we report exten-
sive experimental validation in Section 4.7, discuss some related work in Section 4.8, and
summarize the contributions of this chapter in Section 4.9.
4.1 Reference Model
In this section, we present the Web graph model and discuss several popular approaches
for link-based Web ranking. Readers familiar with these concepts can look forward to the
following sections where we provide a formal definition of credibility and begin our study
of relevant critical issues to computing and using credibility.
4.1.1 Web Graph Model
Let G = 〈P,L〉 denote a graph model of the Web, where the vertexes in P correspond
to Web pages and the directed edges in L correspond to hyperlinks between pages. For
convenience, we assume that there are a total of n pages (|P| = n) and that pages are
indexed from 1 to n. A page p ∈ P sometimes is referred to by its index number i. A
hyperlink from page p to page q is denoted as the directed edge (p, q) ∈ L, where p, q ∈ P.
We denote the set of pages that p points to as Out(p), and the set of pages that point to p as
In(p). Typically, each edge (p, q) ∈ L is assigned a numerical weight w(p, q) > 0 to indicate
the strength of the association from one page to the other, where
∑
q∈Out(p)w(p, q) = 1.
A common approach assigns each edge an equal weight (i.e. w(p, q) = 1|Out(p)|). Other
approaches that favor certain edges are possible.
A Web graph G can be represented by an n × n transition matrix M where the ijth
entry indicates the edge strength for an edge from page i to page j. The absence of an edge
from one page to another is indicated by an entry of 0 in the transition matrix:
Mij =
 w(i, j) if (i, j) ∈ L0 otherwise
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4.1.2 Link-Based Ranking: Overview
A number of link-based ranking algorithms have been proposed over the Web graph, includ-
ing the popular HITS [100], PageRank [138], and TrustRank [80]. Most of these algorithms
assume that a link from one page to another is counted as a “recommendation vote” by the
originating page for the target page. To illustrate the core of link-based rank analysis, we
below outline HITS, PageRank, and TrustRank.
HITS: The HITS algorithm uses a query dependent approach to ranking pages. Given a
query result set, one can construct its neighbor graph, which is a subset of the Web graph.
The HITS algorithm then assigns each page within the subset two rank scores: an authority
score and a hub score. Typically the subset is related to a particular topic or query. The
authority score indicates that the page is authoritative for the particular topic. The hub
score indicates that the page points to many authoritative pages on that topic.
For m pages in the topic-specific Web subset we can denote the authority scores as the
vector a = (a1, a2, ..., am) and the hub scores as the vector h = (h1, h2, ..., hm). Suppose U
denotes the transition matrix associated with just the pages belonging to this Web subset.
We can write the HITS equations as follows:
a = UTh and h = Ua
After sufficient iterations, it has been shown that the solution authority vector a con-
verges to the principal eigenvector of UTU, and the solution hub vector h converges to the
principal eigenvector of UUT [100].
PageRank: PageRank provides a single global authority score to each page on the Web
based on the linkage structure of the entire Web. PageRank assesses the importance of a
page by recursively considering the authority of the pages that point to it via hyperlinks.
This formulation counts both the number of pages linking to a target page and the relative
quality of each pointing page for determining the overall importance of the target page.
For n Web pages we can denote the PageRank authority scores as the vector rp =
(rp1, rp2, ..., rpn). The PageRank calculation considers the transition matrix M as well
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. We can write the PageRank equation as a combination of these two
factors according to a mixing parameter α:
rp = αMT rp + (1− α)e (7)
which can be solved using a stationary iterative method like Jacobi iterations [68]. To
ensure convergence, pages with no outlinks are modified to include virtual links to all other
pages in the Web graph (forcing M to be row stochastic).
TrustRank: PageRank’s static score vector can also be used to bias the calculation to-
ward certain pages based on exogenous (non-linkage) information. This bias was originally
suggested in the original PageRank paper [138], and more fully explored in the context
of personalizing PageRank in [83], where a non-uniform topic-sensitive static score vector
was used to skew the PageRank scores toward pages relevant to a particular subject (e.g.,
sports). The recently proposed TrustRank algorithm [80] suggests biasing the PageRank
calculation toward pre-trusted pages in an effort to suppress Web spam (similar to PageRank
personalization suggested in [138] and more fully explored in [83]). Instead of considering
the uniform static score vector e, the TrustRank algorithm considers an n-length vector v
that reflects a priori trust in each page. For example, in a Web graph of 5 pages, if pages





2 , 0, 0
)
. For n Web pages the
TrustRank scores can be denoted by the vector rt = (rt1, rt2, ..., rtn), and we can write the
TrustRank equation as:
rt = αMT rt + (1− α)v (8)
Determining the a priori trust vector v is of critical importance, and a number of tech-
niques have been suggested, including the use of expert-selected whitelists, high PageRank
pages, and topically-segmented trusted pages [80, 180].
In summary, link-based ranking algorithms like HITS, PageRank, and TrustRank at-
tempt to estimate a page’s intrinsic quality by analyzing the hyperlink structure of the
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Web. Fundamentally, the quality of a page and the quality of its links are tightly coupled
in each of these ranking algorithms. Returning to Equation 7, a page with a PageRank
score of r contributes α · r to the pages that it links to, where α is typically in the range
[0.75, 0.95]. We have discussed that such tight coupling is not only inadequate in practice
but also creates Web spam vulnerabilities. In the rest of this chapter we present the concept
and the usage of credibility-based link analysis.
4.2 Link Credibility
In this section, we formally introduce the concept of credibility in terms of k-Scoped Cred-
ibility. We shall ground our discussion of link credibility in the context of Web spam and
explore how to algorithmically determine a page’s credibility. Concretely, let C be a credi-
bility function that instantaneously evaluates the link quality of a Web page p at time t. A
score of C(p, t) = 0 indicates that the page p is not credible in terms of its links at time t. In
contrast, a score of C(p, t) = 1 indicates that the page p is perfectly credible in terms of its
links at time t. We observe that a desirable credibility function should have the following
qualities:
• First, we observe that a page’s link quality should depend on its own links and perhaps
is related to the link quality of its neighbors up to some small number (k) of hops away.
Hence, link credibility of pages should be a function of the local characteristics of a page
and its place in the Web graph, and not the global properties of the entire Web (as in a
PageRank-style approach).
• Second, we observe that relying heavily on a set of known good pages (a whitelist) may
be problematic. Spammers may attempt to mask their low quality links to spam pages by
linking to known whitelist pages. Also, relying too heavily on a whitelist for link credibility
assignment makes these pages extremely valuable for spammers to corrupt.
• Third, we observe that a page’s credibility should be related to its distance to known
spam pages (a blacklist) to penalize pages for poor quality links. Since blacklist pages may
be abandoned by spammers once they are identified, a credibility function should be robust
to such transience.
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Generally speaking, the Web is too large and too quickly growing to manually label
each page as either spam or not spam. We shall assume that the set P of all pages can be
divided into the set of known good pages, denoted by Pw (the whitelist), the set of known
spam pages, denoted by Pb (the blacklist), and the set of pages for which the user has no
experience or judgment, denoted by Pu (the unknown pages), such that P = Pw ∪Pb ∪Pu.
In practice, only a fraction of all pages on the Web will belong to either the whitelist or the
blacklist(|Pw|, |Pb| << |P|).
4.2.1 Naive Credibility
We begin our analysis of credibility functions by considering a simple approach that illus-
trates some of our observations above and serves as a comparison to the k-Scoped Credibility
function. The naive credibility function assigns a whitelist page a perfect credibility score
of value one, a blacklist page no credibility (value zero), and an unknown page a default
credibility value θ, (0 < θ < 1):
Cnaive(p, t) =

0 if p ∈ Pb
θ if p ∈ Pu
1 if p ∈ Pw
The advantage of this naive credibility assignment is its ease of evaluation. However it
has several apparent drawbacks – (i) it makes no effort to evaluate credibility in terms of
the links of a page; (ii) the majority of all pages (Pu) receive a default credibility value; and
(iii) whitelist pages, though generally high-quality, may not necessarily be perfectly credible
in reality at all times.
4.2.2 k-Scoped Credibility
We next introduce k-Scoped Credibility, which evaluates the credibility of a page in terms
of the quality of a random walk originating from the page and lasting for up to k steps.
Critical to this k-Scoped Credibility is the notion of a path.
Definition 1 (path) Consider a directed Web graph G = 〈P,L〉, an originating page p and
a destination page q. A path in the directed graph G from page p to page q is a sequence
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of nodes: path(p, q) = 〈n0, n1, ..., nj〉 (where p = n0 and q = nj) such that there exists a
directed edge between successive nodes in the path, (ni, ni+1) ∈ L for 0 ≤ i ≤ j − 1. The
length |path(p, q)| of a path is j, the number of edges in the path. There may exist multiple
paths from p to q.
We refer to the set of all paths of a specified length (say, k) that originate from a page
p as Pathk(p). We will sometimes refer to a specific path of length k originating from p
using the notation pathk(p), where pathk(p) ∈ Pathk(p).
Our notion of k-Scoped Credibility relies on a special type of path that we call a bad
path.
Definition 2 (bad path) Consider a directed Web graph G = 〈P,L〉, an originating page
p and a destination page q. We say that a path in the directed graph G from page p to
page q is a bad path if the destination page is a spam page, q ∈ Pb, and no other page in
the path is a spam page. path(p, q) = 〈n0, n1, ..., nj〉 (where p = n0 and q = nj) and q ∈ Pb
and ni /∈ Pb, for 0 ≤ i ≤ j − 1.
We refer to the set of all bad paths of a specified length (say, k) that originate from a
page p as BPathk(p).
The probability of a random walker travelling along a k-length path originating at page
p is denoted by Pr(pathk(p)), and is determined by the probabilistic edge weights for each





Formally, we define the k-Scoped Credibility of a page in terms of the probability that
a random walker avoids spam pages after walking up to k hops away from the originating
page. For k = 1, the k-Scoped Credibility is simply the fraction of a page’s links that point
to non-spam pages. Increasing k extends the scope of this credibility function by considering
random walks of increasing length. For an originating page p ∈ P, if p is a spam page, we
set its link credibility to be 0, regardless of the characteristics of the pages it links to.
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Definition 3 (k-Scoped Credibility) Let G = 〈P,L〉 be a directed Web graph, k be a
maximum walk radius where k > 0, and p ∈ P be a page in the Web graph. The k-Scoped
Credibility of page p at time t, denoted by Ck(p, t), is defined as follows:







For the special case when p ∈ Pb, let Ck(p, t) = 0.
In the case that there are no spam pages within k hops of page p, then p is perfectly
credible: Ck(p, t) = 1. In the case that p itself is a spam page or in the case that all
paths originating at page p hit a spam page within k hops, then p is not credible at all:
Ck(p, t) = 0. Intuitively, the k-Scoped Credibility function models a random walker who
when arriving at a spam page, becomes stuck and ceases his random walk, and for all other
pages the walker continues to walk, for up to k hops.
4.3 Computing Credibility
In practice, of course, the k-Scoped Credibility function can only have access to some portion
of the entire Web graph, due to the size of the Web, its evolution, and the cost of crawling
all pages. Additionally, only some spam pages will be known to the credibility function
through the blacklist. In order to correct the inaccuracy in computing k-Scoped Credibility
due to the presence of an incomplete Web graph and a partial blacklist, in this section we
introduce the concept of tunable k-Scoped Credibility, which augments the basic k-Scoped
Credibility computation by including a credibility penalty factor as a control knob. Our
goals are to better approximate the k-Scoped Credibility under realistic constraints and
understand how different parameters may influence the quality of a credibility function.
4.3.1 Tunable k-Scoped Credibility
The tunable k-Scoped Credibility is a function of two components: a random-walk compo-
nent with respect to the known bad paths (based on the blacklist) and a penalty component.
The penalty component is intended to compensate for the bad paths that are unknown to
the credibility function. We first define the tunable k-Scoped Credibility and then focus our
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discussion on alternative approaches for assigning the credibility discount factor to offset
the problem of an incomplete Web graph and a partial blacklist.
Definition 4 (Tunable k-Scoped Credibility) Let G = 〈P,L〉 be a directed Web graph,
k be a maximum walk radius where k > 0, and γ(p) be the credibility penalty factor of
a page p ∈ P where 0 ≤ γ(p) ≤ 1. We define the tunable k-Scoped Credibility of page p,








In the case of p ∈ Pb, let Ck(p) = 0.
The penalty factor γ(p) is an important tunable parameter of the credibility assignment
and can be used as the credibility discount knob. Since the blacklist Pb provides only a
partial list of all spam pages in the Web graph at a given point of time, the penalty factor
can be used to update the random walk portion of the credibility calculation to best reflect
the possible spam pages that are not yet on the blacklist. We rely on a hop-based approach
for determining the proper credibility discount factor in computing k-Scoped Credibility
for each page in the Web graph. To better understand the advantage of our hop-based
approach, we also discuss the optimistic and pessimistic approaches as two extremes for
selecting the penalty factor for each page.
4.3.1.1 The Optimistic Approach
This approach defines the credibility penalty factor for a page by assigning no penalty at
all. In other words, for all pages, we assign a credibility discount factor of 1:
γopt(p) = 1,∀p ∈ P
meaning the random walk component of the tunable k-Scoped Credibility is not penalized
at all. We call this approach an optimistic one since it is equivalent to assuming that all
spam pages are on the blacklist. The optimistic approach will tend to over-estimate the
credibility of pages that link to the spam pages not on the blacklist.
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4.3.1.2 The Pessimistic Approach
In contrast, a pessimistic approach treats a page with any j-length path (1 ≤ j ≤ k)
leading to a blacklist page as not credible within the k-hop scope in the sense that all paths
originating from such a page are considered bad paths.
γpess(p) =
 0 if |BPathj(p)| ≥ 1 for any j, 0 < j ≤ k1 otherwise
A pessimistic approach may be appropriate in circumstances when links to spam pages
are highly correlated (e.g., if the presence of a link to a blacklist page is always accompanied
by another link to a spam page that is not on the blacklist). In many circumstances, the
presence of a single bad path originating at a page may be the result of a temporary linking
mistake (as in the hijacking example discussed in the introduction) or truly indicative that
the page has only a fraction of links leading to spam pages. Hence, the pessimistic approach
may be too draconian.
4.3.1.3 The Hop-Based Approach
The third approach for determining the credibility discount factor balances the extremes of
the optimistic and pessimistic approaches by considering the number and the length of the
bad paths for a page. A bad path is treated as evidence that there are other bad paths for
an originating page that have been overlooked due to the partial nature of the blacklist and
the incompleteness of the Web graph.
For a bad path of length j originating at page p, we associate a hop-based discount factor
γhop,j(p), where 0 ≤ γhop,j(p) ≤ 1. By default, we let γhop,j(p) = 1 if there are no bad paths
of length j originating from p (i.e. BPathj(p) = ∅). The hop-based discount factor can then
be calculated as the product of the constituent discount factors: γhop(p) =
∏k
j=1 γhop,j(p).
Determining the choice of hop-based discount factors is critical to the quality of tun-
able k-scoped credibility calculation. We below discuss three alternative ways to compute
γhop,j(p). We begin with a user-defined discount factor ψ (0 < ψ < 1) to set the initial
hop-based discount for bad paths of length 1, i.e., γhop,1(p) = ψ. Then we introduce three
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approaches for damping the user-defined discount factor that determine how quickly the
discount factor approaches 1 as path length increases. Setting ψ close to 0 will result in a
more pessimistic credibility penalty, whereas ψ close to 1 is intuitively more optimistic. By
tuning ψ and the damping function we can balance these extremes.
Constant: One way for damping the initial setting of the user-defined discount factor ψ
for bad paths of increasing length is to penalize all paths of varying lengths emanating from
a page equally if there exists one bad path, i.e., BPathj(p) 6= ∅. We refer to this approach
as a constant discount factor since the hop-based discount does not vary with bad path
length:
γhop,i(p) = ψ
Using a constant damping factor, a page that directly links to a spam page results in a
credibility penalty that is the same as the penalty for a more distant path to a spam page.
Linear: The second approach to set the discount factor is linear in the length of a bad
path up to some pre-specified path length L. Paths of distance L or greater are considered
too distant to provide additional evidence of other bad paths, and so the discount factor is





(1− ψ) + ψ if i < L
1 otherwise
Using a linear damping factor, a path to a spam page that is farther away from the
originating page results in a less severe hop-based discount than the credibility penalty for
a direct link or short path from the originating page p to a spam page.
Exponential: The third approach for setting the discount factor is exponential in the
length of the path, meaning that the initial discount factor ψ for bad paths of length 1 is
quickly damped close to 1 as the bad path length increases.
γhop,i(p) = 1− (1− ψ)ψi−1
Compared with the linear damping factor, the exponential damping factor allows the
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credibility discount for a spam page to be quickly damped close to 1. Put differently, when
a spam page is closer to the originating page p, the link credibility of p is discounted less
than the linear case with respect to the hop count.
4.3.2 Implementation Strategy
The k-Scoped Credibility is a local computation, requiring only an originating page and a
forward crawl of all pages within k hops of the originating page. Hence, the credibility of a
page can be updated in a straightforward fashion and as often as the k-hop neighbors are
refreshed via Web crawls.
In practice, we anticipate computing the k-Scoped Credibility in batch for all Web
pages in the current Web graph state after each Web crawl. The main cost of computing the
tunable k-Scoped Credibility is the cost of identifying the set of bad paths for each page and
the cost of explicitly computing the path probabilities (recall Section 4.2.2). We calculate
the tunable k-Scoped Credibility for all pages using an equivalent iterative approach that
is cheaper and faster. Let G = 〈P,L〉 denote a graph model of the Web and |P| = n (recall
Section 4.1.1). We first construct an n-length indicator vector d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn) to reflect
whether a page is in the blacklist or not:
di =
 1 if pi ∈ Pb0 otherwise
We next construct an n× n transition matrix B that replicates the original Web graph
transition matrix M, but with transition probabilities exiting a blacklist page of 0, to
indicate the random walker stops when he arrives at a blacklist page.
Bij =
 Mij if di 6∈ Pb0 otherwise
In practice, the matrix B need not be explicitly created. Rather, the original matrix M
can be augmented with rules to disregard blacklist entries.
The penalty factors can be encoded in an n× n diagonal matrix Γ, where the diagonal
elements correspond to the per-page penalty factors:
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Γij =
 γ(i) if i = j0 otherwise






where 1 is an n-length vector of numerical value 1s. Note that the matrix multiplication of
Γ can be implemented as an element-wise vector product, so the expense of a matrix-by-
matrix multiplication can be largely avoided.
4.4 Time-Sensitive Credibility
Recall that the k-Scoped Credibility function described in Section 4.2 can be instantaneously
evaluated for a page over the entire Web graph. To simplify the presentation, in all of the
tunable credibility functions described so far, we have considered a single (incomplete)
Web graph snapshot for assessing link credibility. Since the Web is constantly evolving and
spammers are known to shift tactics, the credibility functions defined based on one snapshot
of the Web graph may not accurately reflect the actual credibility of each page at any given
time t. In this section, we extend these credibility functions to consider a history of Web
graph snapshots in an effort to reflect the actual k-Scoped Credibility of each page in the
presence of an evolving Web graph.
4.4.1 Credibility Over Time
We maintain multiple snapshots of the Web graph as it evolves over time. Since resources
are limited for collecting snapshots (via Web crawls), we consider a finite sequence of snap-
shots E consisting of a current snapshot, plus up to H additional history snapshots. For
presentation clarity, we assume that the snapshots are collected at regular intervals, but
our approach in this section can be easily extended to consider non-regular intervals.
E = 〈G[t−H], ...,G[t−2],G[t−1],G[t]〉
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Our goal is to assign each page in the current Web graph snapshot a time-sensitive
credibility score over its entire link history using a weighted average over a sequence of
snapshot-based credibility calculations. By considering a history of a page’s links, we are
able to assess the link credibility of the page and assign a better quality credibility score by
incorporating more evidence on how the quality of the links in the page evolves over time.
We may discover bad paths in some snapshots that are not present in the current snapshot
merely due to the incomplete nature of the current Web crawl. Similarly, we may have a
page that historically has had many bad paths (and hence, low credibility), but then has
no bad paths in our most recent crawl.








where C[t](p) is a credibility function (like the ones introduced in the previous sections)
evaluated over G[t]; and I[t] is an importance weight associated with a page’s credibility for
the Web graph snapshot at time t.
There are two challenges for implementing the time-sensitive weighted average credibility
function – the choice of importance weight and the policy for assigning credibility scores to
pages that are not present in all snapshots.
4.4.2 Choice of Importance Weight
One choice of importance weight is the exponentially weighted sum: I[t−i] = λi for 0 ≤ i ≤
H. For λ < 1, the time-averaged credibility favors more recent credibility scores for a page
over older credibility scores. Letting λ = 1 results in a simple average of the credibility
scores for the history. Alternatively, we could treat evidence of bad paths at any point
in a page’s link history as a strong predictor for a page’s current credibility, regardless of
the page’s most recent link state. For such a scenario, we can select weights that favor
snapshots in which a page’s credibility is low.
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4.4.3 Missing Page Policy
Since a page may be present in some Web snapshots but not all (because it is a newly created
page or missing from some Web crawls), the time-averaged credibility function needs a policy
for handling missing pages. We consider two approaches for assigning a page not present in
the G[t−j] snapshot a default credibility score C[t−j](p). The first assigns the page the best
credibility score from across the entire Web graph history: C[t−j](p) = maxHi=0C[t−i](p).
The second assigns the page the worst credibility score from across the entire Web graph
history: C[t−j](p) = minHi=0C[t−i](p). There are other alternatives, including assigning a
missing page a default value or the average credibility value over the existing snapshots.
We study the max and min policies only in our experiments.
4.5 Credibility-Based Web Ranking
We have presented the design of several credibility functions for evaluating Web page
link quality. In this section, we use this decoupled credibility information to augment
the page quality assessment of each page on the Web with a goal of suppressing Web
spam. Concretely, we demonstrate how link credibility information can improve PageRank
and TrustRank-style approaches through a credibility-based Web ranking algorithm called
CredibleRank.
Returning to PageRank (see Equation 7), there are several avenues for incorporating
link credibility information. We outline four alternatives below:
• First, the initial score distribution for the iterative PageRank calculation (which is typ-
ically taken to be a uniform distribution) can be seeded to favor high credibility pages.
While this modification may impact the convergence rate of PageRank, it has no impact
on ranking quality since the iterative calculation will converge to a single final PageRank
vector regardless of the initial score distribution.
• Second, the graph structure underlying the transition matrix M can be modified to
remove low credibility pages and edges to low credibility pages. While this modification may
eliminate some Web spam pages, it could also have the negative consequence of eliminating
legitimate pages that are merely of low credibility.
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• Third, the edge weights in the transition matrix M can be adjusted to favor certain
edges, say edges to high-credibility pages. While this change may have some benefit, a low
credibility page p’s overall influence will be unaffected (since
∑
q∈Out(p)w(p, q) = 1).
• Finally, the static score vector e can be changed to reflect the link credibility information,
much like in TrustRank and Personalized PageRank [80, 83]. By skewing e toward high
credibility pages (or away from low credibility pages) we can give a ranking boost to these
pages, which could have the undesired consequence of ranking a low-quality high-credibility
page over a high-quality low-credibility page.
Alternatively, we advocate a credibility-augmented Web ranking algorithm that uses
credibility information to impact the size of the vote of each page. CredibleRank asserts
that a page’s quality be determined by two criteria: (1) the quality of the pages pointing to
it; and (2) the credibility of each pointing page. A link from a high-quality/high-credibility
page counts more than a link from a high-quality/low-credibility page. Similarly, a link
from a low-quality/high-credibility page counts more than a link from a low-quality/low-
credibility page. By decoupling link credibility from the page’s quality, we can determine
the credibility-augmented quality of each page through a recursive formulation.
Recall that In(p) denotes the set of pages linking to p. We compute the CredibleRank




C(q) · rc(q) · w(q, p)
This formula states that the CredibleRank score (quality) of page p is determined by
the quality (rc(q)) and the link credibility (C(q)) of the pages that point to it, as well as
the strength of the link w(q, p). In this sense, the link weights are used to determine how a
page’s “vote” is split among the pages that it points to, but the credibility of a page impacts
how large or small is the page’s vote.
We can extend this formulation to consider n Web pages, where we denote the Cred-
ibleRank authority scores by the vector rc = (rc1, rc2, ..., rcn). Recall that M denotes the
n×n Web transition matrix, and v is an n-length static score vector. We can construct an
n×n diagonal credibility matrix CR from the link credibility vector γ, where the elements
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of the credibility matrix are defined as:
CRij =
 C(i) if i = j0 otherwise
We can then write the CredibleRank vector rc as:
rc = α(CR ·M)T rc + (1− α)v (9)
which, like PageRank and TrustRank, can be solved using a stationary iterative method
like Jacobi iterations. The matrix multiplication of CR and M can be implemented as an
element-wise vector product to avoid the expense of a matrix-by-matrix multiplication.
4.6 Blacklist Expansion
We have presented our mechanisms to compute the time-sensitive link credibility for pages
in a Web graph and described the CredibleRank algorithm for spam-resilient Web page
ranking, all based on the availability of a small blacklist Pb. In this section we discuss
our strategy for semi-automatically extending the small manually-created blacklist. Main-
taining a high-quality up-to-date blacklist is an important and challenging problem, not
only because our credibility functions are dependent on blacklist quality, but also because
pages that are identified as spam are often abandoned by Web masters once discovered,
and spammers continue to construct and push new spam pages to the Web over time. In
this section, we briefly describe our development of a semi-supervised blacklist expansion
algorithm using link and credibility information alone.
We have assumed the existence of an initial blacklist Pb, where the pages on the black-
list may have been identified by human experts, trusted authorities (like SiteAdvisor), or
algorithmic approaches, e.g. [62, 77, 134]. We are interested in using these blacklist pages
to identify unknown spam pages from the space of all other Web pages (P−Pb) for addition
to the blacklist. While a number of factors can be used to support blacklist expansion, we
focus here on using link and credibility information alone.
While a number of popular classifiers are available (e.g., naive bayes, SVM), we have
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adopted a threshold-based inverse PageRank approach to assign a spam-likelihood value
to all pages in the Web graph. To derive spam-likelihood for all pages, we propagate a
spam-likelihood score to every page in the Web graph using an iterative process similar to
the PageRank calculation in Equation 7. We denote the spam-likelihood score for page p as
s(p). The n-length spam-likelihood vector is denoted by s. We say that s(p) > s(q) means
that page p’s spam-likelihood is greater than page q.
We begin by reversing the links in the original page graph G = 〈P,L〉 so that we have
a new reversed page graph G′ = 〈P,L′〉, where every edge (p, q) ∈ L ⇒ (q, p) ∈ L′. Hence,
a page that is pointed to by many other pages in the original graph will now itself point to
those pages in the reversed graph. Corresponding to the reversed page graph is a transition
matrix Mr (where, typically Mr 6= MT ). We then create a static score vector that is biased
toward low credibility pages (like blacklist pages and those pages pointing to blacklist pages):
1−C[k]. We can then compute the spam likelihood vector s as the solution to:
s = βMrT s + (1− β)(1−C[k])/||1−C[k]||
where ||1 − C[k]|| is the L1-norm and β is a mixing parameter. Spam-likelihood models
a “reverse” random walker who visits the pages that point to a given page, and, when he
gets bored, resets to low credibility pages. Intuitively, a page will receive a high spam-
likelihood score if it points to pages with high spam-likelihood. Pages that are distant
from spam pages will receive lower spam-likelihood scores. Note that unlike our credibility
formulation, spam-likelihood leverages the global structure of the Web and provides a global
rank to pages (and not a per-page probabilistic interpretation). In our experiments section,
we study the accuracy of a threshold-based spam classifier that classifies as spam all pages
with spam-likelihood above some threshold.
4.7 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we report the results of an experimental study of credibility-based link
analysis over a Web dataset of over 100 million pages. We report three sets of experiments
– (1) an evaluation of tunable k-Scoped Credibility and the factors impacting it (like scope
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k, discount factor, blacklist size, time-sensitivity, and damping function); (2) a study of
the spam-resilience characteristics of CredibleRank, where we show that our approach is
significantly and consistently more spam-resilient than both PageRank and TrustRank; and
(3) an evaluation of our credibility-based blacklist expansion.
4.7.1 Setup
The experiments reported in this chapter use the Stanford WebBase dataset (described in
Chapter 4) consisting of 118 million pages and 993 million links. The dataset was originally
collected in 2001 and includes pages from a wide variety of top-level-domains.
Defining what exactly constitutes spam is an open question, and so as a baseline for our
experiments we considered pornography related pages in the dataset as spam. Naturally,
this is one of many possible spam definitions and we anticipate revisiting this topic in our
continuing research. Since manually inspecting all 118 million pages is an onerous task,
we applied a simple procedure to identify spam pages. We first identified all sites with a
URL containing a pornography-related keyword (where we define a site by the host-level
information embedded in each page’s URL). This resulted in 11,534 sites and over 1.5
million pages. For these 11,534 sites, we then sampled a handful of pages from each site
and kept only those sites that we judged to be spam. Applying this filter yielded 9,034 sites
consisting of 1,202,004 pages. We refer to these pages as the Spam Corpus.1
We generated three blacklists by randomly selecting sites from the Spam Corpus. The
first blacklist (referred to as Large) contains 20% of the sites in the Spam Corpus (1807
sites, or 0.24% of all sites); the second blacklist (Medium) contains 10% of the Spam
Corpus (903 sites); the third blacklist (Small) contains just 1% (90 sites). This spam set
does not contain all pornography pages in the dataset, but we can be assured that all pages
in it are indeed spam (i.e., there are no false positives).
For the whitelist, we manually selected 181 sites from the top-5000 sites (as ranked
by PageRank). These whitelist sites are each maintained by a clearly legitimate real-world
entity, either a major corporation, university, or organization. We additionally ensured that
1In a 1964 U.S. Supreme Court case, Justice Potter Stewart famously declared that obscenity was hard
to define but that “I know it when I see it”. We concur.
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each of these 181 sites was not within two-hops of any site in the Spam Corpus.
We grouped pages in the entire dataset into sites (again, by the host information of each
page’s URL), resulting in 738,626 sites. We constructed a site graph where each site is a
node in the graph. If a page in one site points to a page in another site we included an edge
in the site graph, excluding self-edges. The result is 11,816,108 edges in the site-level Web
graph. We adopted a fairly standard approach for defining the edge strength for a site-level
edge as the fraction of page-level hyperlinks pointing from the originating site to the target
site (e.g., [97, 173]), and constructed the transition matrix M based on these edge weights.
For all ranking calculations, we relied on the standard mixing parameter α = 0.85 used in
the literature (e.g., [80, 138]), and we terminated the Jacobi method after 50 iterations.
Site-level link analysis has several appealing characteristics – iterative ranking algo-
rithms are considerably faster than over page-level graphs and links internal to a site are
discounted. Also, spam sites may include a mix of legitimate pages and spam pages; since
all the pages are controlled by a spammer, it is reasonable to mark all pages as spam. The
techniques presented here can be trivially applied to the page-level Web graph as well.
The data management component of the ranking algorithms was based on the WebGraph
compression framework described in [26] for managing large Web graphs in memory.
4.7.2 Credibility Assignment Evaluation
In the first set of experiments, we evaluate tunable k-Scoped Credibility and the many
factors impacting it.
4.7.2.1 Credibility Coverage
In our first experiment (shown in Table 7), we examine how widely the tunable k-Scoped
Credibility can assign link credibility scores to sites beyond the pre-labelled blacklist. By
increasing the tunable scope parameter k, the credibility function will consider paths of
increasing length, meaning that there will be a greater opportunity for identifying bad
paths. We measure the coverage of k-Scoped Credibility in terms of the scope parameter
k, a complete blacklist b (the Spam Corpus), and a partial blacklist b′, where b′ ⊂ b:
95
Table 7: Credibility Coverage
Blacklist Size
Scope (k) Small Medium Large
1 7% 27% 39%
2 5% 33% 46%
3 26% 73% 79%
4 75% 94% 95%
5 95% 98% 98%
10 99% 99% 99%
cov(k, b, b′) =
|{p ∈ P|∃j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k s.t. BPathj(p, b′) 6= ∅}|
|{p ∈ P|∃j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k s.t. BPathj(p, b) 6= ∅}|
where BPathk(p, b) denotes the set of all bad paths to sites in blacklist b of length k that
originate from a page p. The numerator corresponds to the count of all sites with at least
one path to a site on the partial blacklist. The denominator corresponds to the count of
all sites with at least one path to a site on the complete blacklist (the Spam Corpus). So,
for k = 1, there are 18,305 sites that are either spam sites or directly link to spam sites; of
these 27% are on the Medium blacklist or directly link to a site on the Medium blacklist.
There are three interesting observations. First, the size of the blacklist is important.
A larger blacklist leads to more evidence of bad paths, and hence will give our tunable k-
Scoped Credibility function the opportunity to make higher-quality credibility assessments,
even for small k. Second, even for the Small blacklist – with just 90 sites – we find fairly
reasonable coverage (26%) for k = 3, indicating that there is some linking correlation for
pages in our dataset with respect to the Spam Corpus. While this correlation may not be
present for all types of spam, it is encouraging and an avenue we anticipate studying more
in our continuing research. Third, for large k, nearly all pages have at least one path to a
spam page. Thus, pages that are quite distant from an originating page likely have little
impact over the credibility of the originating page. The choice of k should be made with
care, and so we must be careful in our application of the credibility penalty factor. As we
will see in our next set of experiments, a Pessimistic penalty factor will result in nearly all
sites being assigned very low credibility if a large scope is considered.
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4.7.2.2 Credibility Quality
We next study the quality of the tunable k-Scoped Credibility function over different settings
of the credibility penalty factor (Figures 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37). Recall that the penalty
factor is used to update the random walk portion of the credibility calculation to reflect
the possible spam pages (or sites, in this case) not yet on the blacklist. Our goal is to
understand how well the tunable k-Scoped Credibility functions perform as compared to
the k-Scoped Credibility with access to the full Spam Corpus.
We consider five different settings for the penalty factor of the k-Scoped Credibility –
the Optimistic, Pessimistic, and three Hop-Based approaches. For each of the Hop-Based
approaches – constant, linear, and exponential – we report the results for an initial credibility
discount factor ψ = 0.5. For each of these 5 settings, we calculated the credibility for each
site using only 10% of all spam sites (the Medium blacklist b′).
We evaluate the error for each of these credibility functions over the Medium blacklist
b′ versus the actual credibility computed over the entire Spam Corpus b. We measure the
overall error for a tunable credibility function C over b′ as the average of the pair-wise
credibility differences with the actual credibility function C∗ over b:






where X is the set of sites with at least one bad path to a site in the Spam Corpus:
X = {p ∈ P|∃j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k s.t. BPathj(p, b) 6= ∅}.
In Figure 33, we report the average credibility error for each of the five tunable k-Scoped
Credibility functions evaluated over increasing values of the scope parameter k.
There are three interesting observations. First, the Optimistic penalty factor performs
very well, resulting in the lowest average credibility error for k >= 2. This indicates that the
credibility scores assigned by the Optimistic approach are the closest to the scores assigned
by the credibility function with access to the entire Spam Corpus. The Optimistic approach
assigns nearly all sites a credibility close to 1; on inspection, we discover that the actual
credibility of most sites is close to 1, and so the optimistic approach does well by defaulting
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Figure 33: Average Credibility Error - Varying k
to a high credibility score for most sites.
Second, the Pessimistic and Constant penalty factors perform well for k = 2, and then
increasingly worse as the scope parameter k increases. These two approaches are very
pessimistic, assigning 0 or low credibility to sites with even a single bad path. For k = 2,
only sites within a close radius of sites on the blacklist are penalized. Thus we see a fairly
low error rate. As k increases, most sites have at least one path to a blacklist site (recall
Table 7), and are assigned a 0 or low credibility score, resulting in a high error rate.
Third, the Exponential and Linear approaches result in better performance than Pes-
simistic and Constant, but worse than Optimistic. As k increases, the error increase ob-
served in the Constant approach is avoided since the Exponential and Linear penalty fac-
tors treat long paths less severely. On further inspection, we discovered that only these
two approaches balance the credibility over-estimation of the Optimistic approach and the
under-estimation of the Pessimistic and Constant approaches.
To further illustrate this over and under estimation balance, we next report the distri-
bution of credibility scores based on the Medium blacklist for the Optimistic, Pessimistic,
and Hop-Based (exponential) approaches for all sites that point to sites in the Spam Cor-
pus. Figures 34, 35, and 36 report the distribution of credibility scores versus the actual
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Figure 34: Optimistic Credibility Score Distribution (vs. Actual) [k=3]
credibility scores based on the entire Spam Corpus. The Optimistic approach assigns very
high credibility for nearly all sites that point to the Spam Corpus, whereas the Pessimistic
approach assigns 0 credibility to most sites. Only the Hop-Based approach balances these
over and under estimation errors. As we will see in our spam resilience experiments in
the following sections, this balance will lead to better spam-resilience than the Optimistic
approach in all cases, and to better spam-resilience than the Pessimistic approach for k > 2.
The linear and exponential Hop-Based approaches are also impacted by the choice of
the initial discount factor ψ. In Figure 37, we report the average credibility error for the
linear case (for L = 4) for three setting of ψ (0.25, 0.50, and 0.75). It is encouraging to see
that the error drops significantly for k = 2 and is fairly stable for increasing values of k (in
contrast to the Constant and Pessimistic approaches reported in Figure 33).
We have also studied the impact of the partial blacklist size on credibility quality. We
find that for the Optimistic, Linear, and Exponential approaches the error rate is fairly
stable, whereas the Pessimistic and Constant approaches degrade severely as the blacklist
size increases. For these two cases, a larger blacklist leads to more sites within a few hops
of the blacklist, resulting in more 0 scores, even when the random walk probability of such
a bad path is low.
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Figure 35: Pessimistic Credibility Score Distribution (vs. Actual) [k=3]
Figure 36: Hop-Based (exp ψ = 0.5) Credibility Score Distribution (vs. Actual) [k=3]
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Figure 37: Average Credibility Error - Varying ψ
4.7.2.3 Time-Sensitive Credibility
In Section 4.4 we introduced several strategies for incorporating link history into credibility
evaluation. In this set of experiments, we illustrate this time-sensitive credibility over two
common spam scenarios. In Scenario 1, we consider a site that historically has had many
links to spam sites, but then chooses to “whitewash” its credibility by removing all links
to spam sites. In Scenario 2, we consider a legitimate site that has been hijacked by a
spammer.
For Scenario 1, we randomly selected a non-credible site with a Hop-Based (exponential,
ψ = 0.5, k = 3) credibility score less than 0.01. For this experiment, we assume that the
site has historically always had spam links, and only in the most recent Web snapshot does
it replace all of its spam links with links to reputable (non-spam highly credible) sites. In
Figure 38, we report the time-sensitive credibility for the whitewashed site by considering
the current “clean” snapshot and an increasing number of history snapshots as we vary the
importance weight parameter λ. By considering the history component, we see that for
all values of λ the credibility of the site achieves a maximum of 0.8. Note that λ = 0.25
favors the most recent credibility score for a page. Choosing λ = 0.75 places less emphasis
on the most recent snapshot, and hence the credibility falls as low as 0.27 when 8 history
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Figure 38: Time-Sensitive Scenario 1 (whitewash)
snapshots are considered. To illustrate the missing page policy, we randomly dropped four
credibility measurements for the site. Using the max policy favors the most recent good
snapshot, and so we see how the credibility score rises considerably.
For Scenario 2, we randomly selected a highly credible site with a Hop-Based (exponen-
tial) credibility score above 0.99. We then modified the Web graph to remove all of the site’s
existing links and inserted links to sites in the Spam Corpus, resulting in a new credibility
score for the page of 0. In Figure 39, we investigate how quickly the site can recover its
high credibility once it purges the spam links and replaces them with its original links. As
the history component increases, more “clean” snapshots are available, and we can see how
the site’s credibility can quickly recover from a single hijacking incident.
4.7.3 Spam Resilience Evaluation
In the following sections we evaluate the quality of each credibility assignment approach
through Web ranking experiments, and compare these results with PageRank and TrustRank.
We measure the effectiveness of a Web ranking approach by its spam resilience. To quantify
spam resilience, we introduce two metrics that each evaluates the quality of a candidate
ranking algorithm’s ranked list of sites versus a baseline ranking with respect to a set
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Figure 39: Time-Sensitive Scenario 2 (hijack)
of spam sites X . We refer to X as a portfolio of spam sites. In this chapter, we use
the Spam Corpus as the portfolio X . We consider the baseline ranking for a portfolio of
|X | sites: B = (B1, ..., B|X |), and a ranking induced by the candidate ranking algorithm
E = (E1, ..., E|X |).
Rank-Based Spam Resilience







where R(Ei) returns the rank of site Ei according to the candidate ranking algorithm and
R(Bi) returns the rank of site Bi according to the baseline ranking algorithm. By evaluating
SRRank(m) for different values of m, we may assess the spam resilience of a ranking algo-
rithm at different levels (e.g., for the top-100 pages, the top-1000, and so on). A candidate
ranking algorithm that induces a ranking that exactly matches the baseline ranking will
result in SR(m) values of 0 for all choices of k. A ranking algorithm that induces a more
spam-resilient ranking will result in positive SRRank(m) values, meaning that the rank of
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the portfolio will have been reduced. Negative values indicate that the candidate algorithm
is less spam-resilient than the baseline.
Value-Based Spam Resilience
The second spam resilience metric is based on the change in value of the spam portfolio.
Let us assume that each rank position has an associated value (say, in dollars), and that
these values are monotonically decreasing as the rank position increases. That is, for a
value function V (·), we have R(i) < R(j) ⇒ V (R(i)) > V (R(j)). Hence, we can measure
the spam resilience by considering the relative change in the value of the spam portfolio
under the candidate ranking algorithm versus the baseline ranking algorithm:




where V (R(Ei)) and V (R(Bi)) are the values of applying a value function to the rank R(Ei)
and R(Bi) respectively. A positive SRV alue value means that the candidate algorithm is
more spam-resilient than the baseline algorithm since the overall value of the spam port-
folio has been reduced. We consider a power-law rank value function since there is nice
intuitive support for it, that is, the top-rank positions are quite valuable, while most posi-
tions have relatively low value. Confirming this intuition are several previous studies that
have indicated that users tend to focus on the top-ranked results (e.g., [95, 107]), meaning
that a very lowly-ranked page may be of little value. Concretely, the value of rank x is
V (x) = 1, 000, 000x−0.5, meaning that the top-ranked site has value of $1m, the 100th-
ranked site is worth $100k, the 10,000th-ranked site is worth $10k, and so on.2 The key
here is not to estimate the actual value precisely, but to provide a relative value of different
rank positions.3
2Although PageRank, TrustRank, and CredibleRank scores are also distributed according to a power-law,
it is inappropriate to rely on these scores to estimate value since these power-law distributions vary across
ranking algorithms and parameter settings. We believe a value function is primarily dependent on rank
position and fairly independent of the algorithm choice for determining rank positions.
3Recall that most ranking systems combine query-independent authority measures (like PageRank) with
query-dependent features (like the presence and placement of particular keywords within a page) to generate
their final rankings. In this chapter, we focus our analysis on query-independent ranking, so we consider a
single global ranking (and value) over all sites.
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4.7.3.1 PageRank versus CredibleRank
Given the above two metrics, we now compare the effectiveness of CredibleRank in compar-
ison to PageRank with respect to spam resilience. Here PageRank is used as the baseline
ranking. For fairness of comparison, we do not incorporate any whitelist information into
the CredibleRank calculation, so the static score vector in Equation 9 is set to the uniform
vector, as it is in PageRank (Equation 7).
For CredibleRank, we consider the Naive approach and three tunable k-Scoped Credibil-
ity assignment approaches – Optimistic, Pessimistic, and Hop-Based (exponential ψ = 0.5)
– using the medium blacklist for scope of k = 2. In Figures 40 and 41, we report the
SRRank(m) and SRV alue(m) spam resilience scores for m = 1 to m = 9, 034 (the size of
the Spam Corpus) for the four candidate CredibleRank rankings (i.e., Opt, Pess, Hop, and
Naive) versus the baseline PageRank ranking. We are encouraged to see that for both rank-
based and value-based spam resilience that all CredibleRank approaches result in more
spam-resilient rankings versus PageRank, with the Pessimistic performing the best, closely
followed by the Hop-Based approach. The spam resilience rapidly increases and then peaks
over the top-2000 spam sites, indicating that CredibleRank performs well over these top-
ranked spam sites. As k increases to consider more sites in the spam resilience measurement,
more lower-ranked sites are considered which have less downward space to move, meaning
that the overall spam resilience decreases relative to the top-ranked sites.
Changing the value function V (x) = axb to consider different values of a has no impact
on the spam resilience results since only relative value is measured. Secondly, changing the
exponent b to b = −0.1 results in a less profound drop in value from one rank to the next,
and we find that the SRV alue(m) scores are in the 10% range. When b = −0.9 the value
drop from one rank to the next is more severe, meaning that the top-ranked sites are valued
very heavily; for this scenario, we again find that CredibleRank is more spam-resilient, with
SRV alue(m) scores in the 40-50% range.
To further demonstrate how CredibleRank demotes spam sites relative to PageRank,
we sorted the sites by rank order for the Hop-Based CredibleRank and PageRank ranking
vectors, and divided the sites into 20 buckets of an equal number of sites. Along the x-axis
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Figure 40: CredibleRank vs. PageRank: Rank Spam Resilience
Figure 41: CredibleRank vs. PageRank: Value Spam Resilience
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Figure 42: CredibleRank vs. PageRank: Spam Distribution
of Figure 42 we consider these 20 buckets, from the bucket of top-ranked sites (bucket 1) to
the bucket of the bottom-ranked sites (bucket 20). Along the y-axis, we plot the number
of Spam Corpus sites (of the 9,034 total spam sites) in each bucket. What is immediately
obvious is that CredibleRank penalizes spam sites considerably more than PageRank by
demoting spam sites to lower-ranked buckets, even when only 10% of the spam sites have
been explicitly assigned to the blacklist.
Our results so far have measured the effectiveness of CredibleRank with respect to its
spam resilience. We also would like to show that CredibleRank does not negatively impact
known good sites. Hence, we compared the ranking of each whitelist site under PageRank
versus its ranking under CredibleRank. We find that the average rank movement is only 26
spots, meaning that we can feel fairly confident that CredibleRank is not unduly punishing
good sites.
4.7.3.2 TrustRank versus CredibleRank
Recall that TrustRank incorporates whitelist information into the ranking calculation to
favor whitelist sites and the sites that they point to over other sites. In this experiment,
we compare CredibleRank to TrustRank, where TrustRank is used as the baseline ranking
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Figure 43: CredibleRank vs. TrustRank: Rank Spam Resilience
and for fairness, the CredibleRank approach relies on the same whitelist-based static score
vector used in TrustRank (Equation 8).
For CredibleRank, we again consider the four link credibility assignment approaches –
Naive, Optimistic, Pessimistic, and Hop-Based – using the medium blacklist. In Figures 43
and 44, we report the SRRank(m) and SRV alue(m) spam resilience scores for m = 1 to
m = 9, 034 for the three candidate CredibleRank rankings versus the baseline TrustRank
ranking. As in the PageRank comparison, we see that all CredibleRank approaches result in
more spam-resilient rankings comparing to TrustRank, with the Pessimistic and Hop-Based
performing the best.
For the Hop-Based CredibleRank and the TrustRank ranking vectors, we report the
bucket-based spam site distribution in Figure 45. We find that CredibleRank penalizes
spam sites considerably more than TrustRank, pushing most sites into the bottom-ranked
buckets.
We wish to note that the choice of whitelist is extremely important for TrustRank. Since
links from whitelist sites are favored over links from other sites, a spammer has a great in-
centive to induce links from a whitelist site. In our experiments, we find choosing a whitelist
with sites that either link directly to spam sites or are within several hops of spam sites
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Figure 44: CredibleRank vs. TrustRank: Value Spam Resilience
Figure 45: CredibleRank vs. TrustRank: Spam Distribution
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results in very poor spam resilience for TrustRank. We find for one poor quality whitelist
that CredibleRank has a rank-based spam resilience achieving a maximum improvement of
107% over TrustRank, with a 32% improvement over the entire spam corpus. We have also
evaluated CredibleRank and TrustRank using only blacklist information and no whitelist
information (by skewing the static score vector to non-blacklist sites). Since CredibleRank
distinguishes page (or site) quality from link credibility, we find that it achieves rank-based
spam resilience of up to 134% over TrustRank, with a 16% improvement over the entire
spam corpus.
4.7.3.3 Impact of Scope (K)
Our results so far have measured the effectiveness of CredibleRank with respect to the
tunable k-Scoped Credibility function for k = 2. But what are the implications of changing
the scope parameter on the spam-resilience of CredibleRank? In Figure 46 we report the
value-based spam resilience for k = 1 to k = 5 for the Naive approach and the three
tunable k-Scoped Credibility assignment approaches – Optimistic, Pessimistic, and Hop-
Based (exponential ψ = 0.5). The Naive approach does not consider scope and so its
spam-resilience is unaffected by changes in k. The Hop-Based and Optimistic approaches
are fairly stable with increasing k. For k = 1 and k = 2, the Pessimistic approach performs
well, since sites that either directly link or are within 2 hops of blacklist sites have no ranking
influence over the sites that they point to. The Pessimistic approach severely degrades in
spam-resilience for increasing values of k until it performs even worse than PageRank for
k = 5. When k = 5, nearly all sites have at least one path to a blacklist site, resulting
in a Pessimistic credibility score of 0. In the CredibleRank interpretation, this means that
nearly all links in the Web graph are disregarded and so the resulting rankings are essentially
random.
4.7.3.4 Impact of Blacklist Size
We have also explored the impact of the blacklist size on the spam resilience of CredibleRank.
For the three blacklists – small (1% of the Spam Corpus), medium (10%), and large (20%)
– we report in Figure 47 the ranking distribution of the Spam Corpus for the Hop-Based
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Figure 46: Impact of Scope [K] (CR vs. PR)
CredibleRank versus PageRank. For presentation clarity, we divide all sites into 10 buckets
in this experiment. CredibleRank based on the small blacklist (containing just 90 sites)
results in a remarkable improvement over PageRank. The advantage increases as more
spam sites are added to the blacklist.
We also evaluated CredibleRank’s spam-resilience versus TrustRank for varying choices
of scope parameter (k) and blacklist size, and we find results of a similar spirit to the ones
reported for PageRank in Sections 4.7.3.3 and 4.7.3.4.
4.7.4 Blacklist Expansion
In our final experiment, we report results for our credibility-based blacklist expansion algo-
rithm described in Section 4.6. In Table 8 we report the precision of the blacklist expansion
using a static score vector based on the exponential Hop-Based credibility scores used in
our previous experiments. These results are based on the Medium blacklist.
Recall that the blacklist expansion algorithm ranks all sites with respect to spam-
likelihood. Here we measure the precision of identifying as spam all sites ranked higher
than some threshold (e.g., top-10, top-100, etc.). For example, in the top-1,000 sites as
ranked by spam-likelihood, we find that 94.4% are actually spam. Of these 944 spam sites,
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Figure 47: Impact of Blacklist Size (CR vs. PR)
Table 8: Blacklist Identification Precision
Rank On Newly
Threshold Precision Blacklist Identified
10 90% 1 8
100 89% 1 88
1000 94% 4 940
2000 91% 4 1814
3000 81% 11 2428
4000 70% 15 2785
5000 62% 15 3075
10000 44% 26 4414
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only 4 were on the initial blacklist, meaning that we have identified 940 new spam sites pre-
viously unknown to us. Increasing the threshold results in a degradation of precision, and
by the top-10,000, only 44% of sites are actually spam. In our continuing work, we are ex-
ploring whether a very tight threshold (say, the top-100) coupled with repeated applications
of the blacklist expansion will perform even better.
4.8 Related Work
Our notion of link credibility has some analogues in trust network research, in which com-
putational models are developed for measuring trust. One of the seminal papers in trust
research [20] argued for distinguishing between direct trust and recommendation trust. In
the context of transactional peer-to-peer networks, the PeerTrust system models the be-
lievability (or credibility) of peer feedback to guide the trust calculation of nodes in the
network [183]. Link credibility is also somewhat related to the notion of distrust, which has
recently received increasing attention (e.g., [75], [179]). For example, in [75], the authors
argue for a trust propagation technique in which the recommendations of distrusted nodes
are discounted completely. Note that our link credibility model allows for a continuum of
credibility scores.
4.9 Summary
In this chapter, we have explored the concept of link credibility, presented several techniques
for semi-automatically assessing link credibility for all Web pages, and presented an efficient
and yet spam-resilient credibility-based Web ranking algorithm. We also introduced a set
of metrics to measure the spam resilience properties of credibility-based link analysis, and




TRUST ESTABLISHMENT IN ONLINE COMMUNITIES
In the previous two chapters, we focused on vulnerabilities in link-based search services.
We now move to the second of our three major topics, wherein we study tamper-resilience
in trust-based algorithms for online communities. Online communities like Bebo, Facebook,
MySpace, and Xanga have grown tremendously in the past few years, enabling millions of
users to discover and explore community-based knowledge spaces and engage in new modes
of social interaction. These online communities are positioned as a potential future com-
puting platform; in fact, Facebook has recently released an API for supporting a “social
operating system” [165]. This opportunity and growth has not come without a price, how-
ever, as we explored in Chapter 2. Online communities have been targeted for malware
dissemination [27, 102], identify theft [42, 94], and deception in digital identity [155], to
name just a few threats.
With these problems in mind, we focus on building an online community platform that
allows wide access to many different types of users and that still remains useful, even in the
presence of users intent on manipulating the system. We introduce SocialTrust, a social
network trust aggregation framework for supporting tamper-resilient trust establishment in
online social networks. A trust-based approach is one of the most promising avenues for
maintaining the relative openness of these communities (and the corresponding benefits)
and still providing some measure of resilience to attacks. Using trust ratings, a user can
decide with whom to engage in new social interactions, to form new groups, to engage in
transactions, and so forth. SocialTrust establishes trust for a participant in the social
network through four key features – (i) the trust establishment scope in which we build trust;
(ii) how well the user participates in the network; (iii) the quality of a user’s relationships
in the network; and (iv) the history of the user’s behavior.
The Need for Trust? An important point that deserves attention is whether trust is
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necessary at all. The no trust case is widespread in popular online social networks like
MySpace and Facebook, where users maintain only their local relationships with no access
to system-wide or aggregated trust information. The advantage of such an approach is the
avoidance of potentially expensive trust computations and the sharing of user relationship
links with either other users or the system as a whole. The lack of such aggregated trust
information has certainly not stymied the growth of these networks, but as these commu-
nities attain more mass and public attention, we observe an increasing number of attacks
on the legitimacy of these communities.
In summary, this chapter makes the following contributions:
• We study online social networks, consider a number of vulnerabilities inherent in
online social networks, and introduce the SocialTrust framework for supporting
tamper-resilient trust establishment.
• We study four key factors for trust establishment in online social networks – trust
establishment scope, trust group feedback, and relationship link quality – and describe
a principled approach for assessing each component.
• In addition to the SocialTrust framework, which provides a network-wide perspec-
tive on the trust of all users, we describe a personalized extension called mySocial-
Trust, which provides a user-centric trust perspective that can be optimized for
individual users within the network.
• We experimentally evaluate the SocialTrust framework using real online social
networking data consisting of millions of MySpace profiles and relationships. While
other trust aggregation approaches have been developed and implemented by others,
we note that it is rare to find such a large-scale experimental evaluation that carefully
considers the important factors impacting the trust framework.
In the following section, we begin by modeling online social networks (Section 5.1). We
identify several vulnerabilities in Section 5.2 and discuss strategies for countering these vul-
nerabilities in Section 5.2. The overall SocialTrust framework is presented in Section 5.3.
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We then provide an in-depth look at computing feedback ratings in Section 5.5, link quality
in Section 5.6, and trust in Sections 5.7 and 5.8. We present the personalized mySocial-
Trust approach in Section 5.9. We describe the experimental setup in Section 5.10 evaluate
the trust model in Section 5.11, before wrapping up with related work in Section 5.12, and
a summary in Section 5.13.
5.1 Reference Model
In this section, we describe the reference model for an online social network. The model
represents an online social network SN as a triple consisting of profiles P, relationships R,
and contexts C: SN =< P,R, C >. A profile p is the online representation of a particular
person, place, or thing. We denote the set of all profiles in the social network SN as P. We
shall assume there are n profiles in the network, numbered from 1 to n: P = {p1, ..., pn}.
We denote a relationship between profiles i and j with two entries in the relationship set
R to characterize each participant’s contextual view of the relationship: rel(i, j, c1) and
rel(j, i, c2), where c1 and c2 are two contexts drawn from the context set C. We denote user
i’s set of friends as rel(i) and the total number of relationships i participates in as |rel(i)|.
The most basic element in a social network is a profile. We most typically think of
profiles in terms of specific people (e.g., me, my friends, my parents, etc.), but profiles
may represent companies, products, musical groups, abstract concepts (like love, harmony,
and peace), and so on. For simplicity in presentation, we will refer to profiles and users
interchangeably in the rest of this chapter. Typically, a profile is a user-controlled Web page
that includes some descriptive information about the person it represents. In Figure 48, we
illustrate a sample profile from Facebook. Most profiles include some personal information
like the person’s picture, age, gender, location, and interests. Additionally, a profile may
be augmented with a collection of digital artifacts like Web documents, media files, etc.
Profiles are connected to other profiles through explicitly declared relationships. A
relationship in a social network is a bidirectional link between two users. A relationship is
only established after both parties acknowledge the relationship. To initiate a relationship,
a user sends a request to another user. If the other user accepts this request, the relationship
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Figure 48: Sample Profile from Facebook
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Figure 49: Simple Social Network: Profiles and Relationship Links
is established, and a relationship link is added to both users’ profiles.
A relationship link may be augmented with contextual information indicating the nature
of the relationship – e.g., the two people are friends from school, co-workers, neighbors, etc.
The context is an annotation of a relationship. Several recent ethnographic studies of online
social networks have identified a number of reasons for friend formation in online social
networks, including: the two nodes are actually friends, as a means of displaying popularity,
for friend “collecting”, for reasons of courtesy, and others [28, 147]. We emphasize that we
make no requirements on how relationships in the community arise, and all of the algorithms
presented in this chapter are agnostic to this relationship formation.
We can view the social network SN =< P,R, C > as a graph where the profiles P are
nodes and the relationships R are labeled directed edges. A node in the graph represents
one profile. Each node in the graph is denoted by the associated profile’s number. A
labeled directed edge in the graph represents a relationship link from one profile to another.
A relationship link from profile i to j is represented by the edge from node i to node j in
the graph and is denoted with a context c as i c−→ j. In Figure 49, we illustrate a simple
network of six profiles and their declared relationships.
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5.2 Vulnerabilities in Online Social Networks
In Section 2 we identified a number of threats to the privacy and security of online com-
munities. While there are important problems associated with securing the social network
infrastructure (e.g., ensuring that profiles are correctly formatted and contain no browser
exploits, containing denial-of-service attacks), we explore vulnerabilities to the quality of
information available through online social networks even when the underlying social net-
work infrastructure has been secured. We make note of some key differences between online
social networks and the Web-at-large.
In particular, we identify three important vulnerabilities:
• Malicious Infiltration: Unlike the Web-at-large, most online social networks do
provide some limits as to who can and cannot participate. Users typically must
register with an online social network using a valid email address or by filling out a
user registration form. As a result, many social networks give the illusion of security
[14], but malicious participants can gain access as has been observed in MySpace [155]
and the more closely guarded Facebook [32].
• Nearby Threats: Unlike the Web domain, in which a site can link to any other site
on the Web, online social networks enforce bilateral agreement between both parties
in a relationship. As a result, participants in a social network have tight control over
who their friends are. There is a well-noted illusion of privacy in online social networks
[29, 136] in which participants have a lack of understanding of the potential threat of
participants two or more hops away. The small world phenomenon – a feature of many
social networks [126, 175, 176] – means that there is a short distance in the network
between any two participants. So even if a user has tight control over his direct friends,
malicious participants can be just a few hops away from any participant. For example,
in Chapter 2 (Figure 7), we identified a deceptive rogue profile on MySpace with
nearly 200 declared friendships (see Figure 50) with (seemingly) legitimate community
members, indicating that some community members are either easily deceived or have
low standards for friendship.
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Figure 50: Example Deceptive Profile with Many Legitimate Friends on MySpace
• Limited Network View: Even if a user in the social network maintains tight control
over her friends and closely monitors the quality of her neighbors’ friends, she will still
have access to only a limited view of the entire social network. Since any one user may
have direct experience or relationships with only a small fraction of all social network
members, she will have no assurances over the vast majority of all participants in the
network.
To counter these vulnerabilities, we can rely on a number of approaches including legal
enforcement, background checks, and reliance on a trusted central authority. A strictly
legal approach is one adopted by many of the popular social networking sites, in which
participants who are deemed to be in violation of the terms of service may be identified
and removed from the social network. Complementary to this approach, a trusted central
authority may be empowered to monitor the community (as in MySpace and Facebook).
Alternatively, users may be required to undergo a background check to provide some off-
line assurances as to their quality. These approaches typically suffer from problems with
120
enforcement and scalability. In this chapter, we use a reputation-based trust approach for
maintaining the relative openness of these communities (and the corresponding benefits)
and still providing some measure of resilience to the described vulnerabilities.
Many e-marketplaces and online communities use reputation systems to assess the qual-
ity of their members, including eBay, Amazon, and Digg, and reputation-based trust sys-
tems have received considerable attention in P2P systems (e.g., [1, 45, 48, 98]), as well as
for facilitating trust in the Semantic Web [148]. These approaches aggregate community
knowledge for evaluating the trustworthiness of participants. The benefits of reputation-
based trust from a user’s perspective include the ability to rate neighbors, a mechanism to
reach out to the rest of the community, and some assurances on unknown users in the net-
work. Most existing approaches, however, ignore the social constructs and social network
topology inherent in online social networks, and typically provide less personalized criterion
for providing feedback and computing reputations. A key challenge then is whether we can
develop a trust framework for online social networks that is tamper-resilient even in the
presence of malicious users. And what are the key factors impacting such a framework?
5.3 The SocialTrust Framework
In this section, we introduce the SocialTrust framework. The goal of SocialTrust is
to provide a trust rating for each user in the online social network by leveraging the rich
social connections of the social network. SocialTrust is explicitly designed to (i) leverage
the relationships inherent in the social network; (ii) gracefully handle the addition of new
users to the network as it evolves; and (iii) be robust against efforts to manipulate the trust
ratings.
SocialTrust establishes trust for a participant in the social network through four key
features – (i) the trust establishment scope in which we build trust; (ii) how well the user
participates in the network; (iii) the quality of a user’s relationships in the network; and
(iv) the history of the user’s behavior.
We denote the SocialTrust trust rating of user i by Tr(i). For any two users in
the community, we may evaluate the relative trustworthiness, e.g., that user i is more
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trustworthy than user j (i.e., Tr(i) > Tr(j)). This aggregated trust information may be
used by users for enhancing the quality of their experiences in the community. Since users
will typically have direct relationships with only a small fraction of all users in the network,
trust values may be used to evaluate the quality of the vast majority of other users for
which the user has no direct experience.
For presentation clarity, we shall assume the presence of a centralized trust manager
whose job is to compute trust ratings for users in the network and to communicate these
trust ratings to users when needed. Alternatively, the duties of the trust manager may be
securely distributed throughout the network (see, for example, [96]).
Initially all users are treated equally. SocialTrust supports trust maintenance through
dynamic revision of trust ratings according to four critical components:
• Trust Establishment Scope: Trust establishment scope governs which other par-
ticipants in the social network a user can make an assessment of (and conversely,
which other participants can make an assessment of that user).
• Trust Group Feedback: The second key component of trust establishment is the
feedback rating of participants in the network. User i’s feedback rating F (i) could
be used directly for trust establishment, but it takes no advantage of the rich social
connections of the online social network for evaluating user trustworthiness.
• Relationship Link Quality: Hence, the third component of trust establishment
for a user in the social network is that user’s relationship link quality, denoted L(i).
Monitoring link quality provides an incentive for users to ensure the quality of their
relationships.
Based on these first three components, we can establish the overall quality component
of trust Trq(i) for the user.
• History Component of Trust: The final component of SocialTrust is the history
component Trh(i), which considers the evolution of a user’s trust rating. This history
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component is important for limiting the ability of malicious participants to whitewash
their trust ratings by repeatedly leaving and re-entering the network.
The overall SocialTrust trust metric for user i is a simple linear combination of the
quality component and the history component of trust:
Tr(i) = αTrq(i) + (1− α)Trh(i) (10)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Choosing α = 1 favors the most recent quality assessment and disregards
the history component altogether. Conversely, choosing α = 0 favors the history component
over the most recent quality assessment.
Given the basic SocialTrust framework, there are a number of open questions. How is
each component assessed? How are these components combined? What are the important
factors impacting trust assessment? In the following sections, we address each of these
questions to provide a thorough understanding of SocialTrust and how it supports robust
trust establishment.
5.4 Trust Establishment Scope
The trust establishment scope governs what other participants in the network each user
can judge, and what other participants can judge each user. Trust group formation can
be tuned to balance efficiency and scalability and the security of the overall system (by
constraining users from manipulating the reputation of distant users).
At one extreme, there is a single trust group consisting of all members of the social
network. At the other extreme, each user belongs to a lone trust group consisting of only
themselves, meaning that the system supports no trust aggregation. For balancing these
two extremes, we could rely on trust groups defined by self-described interests (e.g., sports),
location (e.g., members who all live in Texas), or other contextual information.
We define trust groups based on the chains of relationships that are fundamental to the
formation of social networks. Hence, we consider a relationship-based model for determining
a user’s trust group where the size of the trust group is determined by a network-specified
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radius, ranging from a user’s direct neighbors (radius 1), to a user’s direct neighbors plus
his neighbors’ neighbors (radius 2), and so on.
Relationship-based trust groups can be formed either through the browse-based search
capability or the forwarding-based search capability of online social networks.
5.4.1 Trust Group Formation: Browse-Based Search
Most current online social networks support browse-based search. By browse-based search
capability, we mean that a user’s profile may be viewed (or browsed) by other users and
possibly the overall social network system (e.g., a central authority like in MySpace). Users
may manually browse from profile to profile and provide ratings on users encountered subject
to the degree of the relationship-based trust group. A user can elect to make portions of
the profile either (i) public; (ii) semi-public; or (iii) private. A public profile can be browsed
by all other members of the social network. A semi-public profile can be browsed by some
other members of the social network, say direct friends. A private profile can be browsed
by no other members. The browse-based search capability is inherently passive – a user
need only agree to allow other users (or the system) to view portions of her profile.
5.4.2 Trust Group Formation: Forwarding-Based Search
Alternatively, in forwarding-based search capability, a user agrees to participate in the for-
warding of queries through the social network along relationship links. This type of active
search capability is similar in spirit to search in unstructured peer-to-peer networks, and we
see it as a natural addition to current social networking sites for providing more personal-
ized search functionality. Forwarding-based search proceeds as follows. An originating user
sends a query to some subset of her friends, whose selection may depend on the context of
their relationship. Each of the selected friends can choose to answer the query or to pass
the query along to some subset of his neighbors, and so on, until a stopping condition is
met. The originating user can rate each user who responds.
Within the entire trust group, a user may choose to send a query to the entire trust
group or to some subset of the entire group. We consider three query forwarding models
for exploring a user’s trust group: Flooding, Random Selection, and Selective Forwarding.
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• Flooding: For flooding, a user forwards a query to all of her neighbors, regardless
of the content of the query or the expected quality of the neighbors in answering the
query. Such a flooding mechanism can communicate the query to a large audience in
the user’s trust group, but at the expense of burdening many users.
• Random Selection: In the second case, a user forwards a query to some random
selection of r friends. For user j with relationship set rel(j), the user randomly selects
max(r, |rel(j)|) neighbors. For r = 1, this random selection is a simple depth-first
traversal of the user’s trust group. Such a query forwarding mechanism can be tuned
to avoid the high message cost of flooding-based search, but at the expense of not
finding high quality users for responding to the query.
• Selective Forwarding: In the third case, a user selectively forwards queries based
on a matching criterion between the query and the user’s neighbors. For now, we
consider a fuzzy match function based only on the profile published by each user in
the social network. Other features like previous search history, length of time in the
network, and context-sensitive information could also be used for selecting neighbors.
A user selects the best r scoring neighbors based on the match estimation.
We consider a horizon-based model for determining how wide a query will be forwarded
within a user’s trust group. Each query is annotated with an integer-valued horizon in-
dicating how many hops through the network a query should pass, such that the horizon
is not greater than the radius of the user’s relationship-based trust group. When a user
receives a query, it decrements the horizon value. When the horizon is 0, a user no longer
forwards the query.
5.5 Assessing Trust Group Feedback
Given a trust group, we next describe several strategies for assessing the second component
of SocialTrust – trust group feedback. We assume that each user i in the network is
associated with a feedback value F (i) that indicates how well the user’s trust group views
the user. The feedback ratings are taken from the interval [0, 1]. We make two observations:
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(i) user behavior is dynamic, so the feedback ratings should be dynamically updated; and
(ii) malicious users may attempt to subvert the feedback ratings.
For assessing feedback ratings, each user maintains state about the other users it has
made a rating for (either through browsing-based search or forwarding-based search). As
one example, in forwarding-based search an originating user i can rate user j based on well
user j satisfies the query. Based on the ratings of all users who have interacted with user
j, we can assess a feedback rating F (j). Guaranteeing that feedback ratings are robust to
manipulation is an important feature, and there have been several recent studies on how to
ensure such robustness, e.g., [152], [163], and [183].
We briefly describe five important factors (as identified in [183]) that any feedback
mechanism should consider (where we adapt these factors to online social networks):
• Satisfaction: When user i encounters user j either through the browsing process or
through a query response, how well is user i satisfied with user j? This satisfaction
level is the basis for assessing user j’s overall feedback rating.
• Number of Interactions: For how many interactions does a user satisfy the origi-
nating user? For example, if user i satisfies 10 queries in the most recent period, but
user j satisfies 999 out of 1,000, which user should be deemed of higher quality? A
clique of malicious participants may engage in fake interactions with each other to
mask their poor behavior to legitimate users in the network.
• Feedback Credibility: How credible are the users providing the feedback? Some
users may habitually provide non-truthful feedback ratings while others are truthful.
It is important to understand each user’s credibility to prevent gaming of the feedback
system through dishonest feedback.
• Interaction Context Factor: Some interactions between users may be more im-
portant than others, and the interaction context factor is intended to capture this
relative value. For example, a user who provides high-quality job lead information for
a high-ranking executive could be rewarded more in terms of feedback rating than a
user who provides less valuable information.
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• Community Context Factor: Finally, the online community may choose to reward
members who provide feedback as an incentive for encouraging participation in the
feedback process.
Based on these observations, we develop a feedback aggregation approach. We begin
with a very basic rating system. A vote is a pair of the form < user, vote >, where user
is a unique user identifier (the profile number) and vote is either “good” or “bad”. Each
user communicates to the trust manager a vote for each search in the most recent period.
We consider three voting schemes – (i) open voting; (ii) restricted voting; and (iii) trust-
aware restricted voting. We describe the first two and their drawbacks to motivate the final
trust-aware restricted voting scheme. This final voting scheme incorporates the first three
important factors described above; we anticipate revisiting it in our future work to customize
it both in terms of search context factor and community context factor. Alternative feedback
approaches are possible and easily pluggable into the SocialTrust framework.
5.5.1 Open Voting
We use the shorthand vi(j)+ to indicate a “good” vote by user i for user j; vi(j)− indicates
a “bad” vote. In the simplest case user j’s feedback rating F (j) is the fraction of “good”




i I(vi(j)+) + I(vi(j)−)
where the indicator function I(·) resolves to 1 if the argument to the function is true, and
0 otherwise. This open voting policy is subject to ballot stuffing. A single malicious user
can issue an unlimited number of “good” votes for raising the feedback rating of colluding
users or can issue “bad” votes for demoting the feedback rating of competing users.
5.5.2 Restricted Voting
We can restrict how much each user can vote by assigning each user a limited number of
points to be allocated over all of its votes. We let wij denote the number of points user i uses
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to weight her vote for user j, where the total points allocated to each user is an arbitrary
constant:
∑





By restricting the total size of vote allocated to each user, this restricted voting scheme
avoids the problem of vote stuffing by a single user. We have no assurances that a malicious
user will choose to vote truthfully for other users it has actually interacted with, but we
do know that the total amount of voter fraud is constrained. Unfortunately, such a voting
scheme is subject to collusive vote stuffing, in which many malicious users collectively decide
to boost or demote the feedback rating of a selected user.
5.5.3 Trust-Aware Restricted Voting
To handle the problem of collusive vote stuffing, we advocate a weighted voting scheme
in which users are allocated voting points based on how trustworthy they are. We again
let wij denote the number of points user i uses to weight her vote for user j, but now the
total points allocated to each user depends on her trustworthiness:
∑
j wij = Tr(i). This




i Tr(i)wijI(vi(j)+) + Tr(i)wijI(vi(j)−)
Hence, feedback ratings and trust are connected from period to period. If a malicious
user receives poor feedback from more trusted users in the system, then his feedback rating
will be negatively affected, which in turn will impact his trustworthiness in the system.
Intuitively, this cycle is appealing since it can dynamically adapt to trusted users who over
time begin behaving badly as well.
5.6 Assessing Relationship Link Quality
In this section, we discuss the third critical factor of the SocialTrust framework – re-
lationship link quality. Recall that user i participates in a total number of relationships
|rel(i)|. How many of these relationships are with high quality users? Are any of these
128
relationships with users that have been flagged by the system? Our goal in this section is
to formally assess the quality of a user’s relationship links. Concretely, let L(i) denote the
relationship link quality of user i. A score of L(i) = 0 indicates that user i has poor quality
relationship links. In contrast, a score of L(i) = 1 indicates that user i has high quality
relationship links.
The small world nature of many social networks means that a large portion of the net-
work may be reachable from any one user within a few hops. Hence, a user’s relationship
link quality should depend on the user’s direct relationship links and perhaps the relation-
ship links of its neighbors up to some small number (k) of hops away. We also observe
that a user’s link quality should be related to the feedback ratings of its neighbors. A user
who only engages in relationships with well-behaving users should earn a higher link-quality
score than a user who has relationships with poorly behaving members of the network. In
the rest of this section, we formally define link quality and provide a discussion of the factors
impacting its assessment.
5.6.1 Link Quality as a Scoped Random Walk
We model the link quality of user i in terms of a scoped random walk model, in which a
random walker originates its walk at user i and randomly follows the relationship links of
user i and the subsequent users at which it arrives up to some small number of steps.
In the extreme, when all users within k hops of the original user i have a perfect feedback
rating (i.e., F (j) = 1 for all users within k hops of i), then user i has link quality Lk(i) = 1.
In contrast, if user i either has a poor feedback rating (i.e., F (i) = 0) or all of the users
within k hops of user i have poor feedback ratings, then user i’s link quality is Lk(i) = 0.
To summarize, the link quality of user i can be interpreted as the probability that a random
walker originating its walk at node i ends at a high-quality user after walking up to k-hops
away from i.
We can begin our examination of link quality by considering the base case when the
scope (k) is 0.
Base Case (k=0): In the base case, the link quality of a user is merely its feedback rating
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F (i):
L[0](i) = F (i)
The random walker walks for 0-hops, meaning that it stays at the original user. The
probability that the random walker ends at a high-quality user is thus F (i).
One-Hop Case (k=1): In the one-hop case, the link quality of a user is the probability
that the random walker ends at a high-quality user after walking forward to one of the friends
from the original user’s set of relationships (recall that rel(i) denotes the relationship list
for user i):




Note that the random walker proceeds initially according to the feedback rating F (i) of
the original user. Accordingly, the link quality of a user that have received poor feedback
will be low. But a user with a high feedback rating who recommends poor quality users
will be penalized with a low link quality.
Two-Hop Case (k=2): The link quality can be extended to consider random walks of
length two, where:








We can extend link quality to consider random walks of arbitrary length k. In all cases,
link quality is a local computation and can be updated in a straightforward fashion.
5.6.2 Correction Factor
The scoped random walk provides a natural measure of the relationship link quality of each
user. Recall that the feedback ratings used for driving the link quality assessment may
not be known with certainty and malicious users may attempt to subvert them. Hence, in
this section, we discuss several correction factors for augmenting the basic scoped random
walk model in the presence of such uncertainty. Such a correction factor is inspired by the
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penalty factor associated with the tunable k-Scoped Credibility introduced in the previous
chapter (recall Chapter 4).
We denote the updated link quality score for user i as L̂[k](i), and evaluate it in terms
of the original link quality score and a correction factor φ:
L̂[k](i) = φ · L[k](i)
We present an optimistic and a pessimistic correction factor as two baseline approaches
to motivate a hop-based correction factor. The hop-based factor balances the extremes of
the optimistic and pessimistic factors for guiding the proper link quality correction factor
for each user.
Optimistic Correction
The optimistic correction factor makes no changes to the original link quality as determined
by the scoped random walk. For all users, the optimistic correction factor is 1:
φopt(i) = 1,∀i
The optimistic approach will tend to over-estimate the link quality of users that (i) are
part of a malicious clique in which some users behave well to mask their relationships with
clique members who behave poorly; or (ii) engage in relationships with poor quality users
for whom the feedback ratings have incorrectly identified as high quality.
Pessimistic Correction
The pessimistic correction factor treats a user with even a very small likelihood (call it δ)
of recommending a poorly performing user as if all of the user’s relationship links were to
users of feedback rating.
φpess(i) =
 0 if L[k](i) < 1− δ1 otherwise
A pessimistic approach may be appropriate in circumstances when relationships with
malicious users are highly correlated (as in a malicious clique) or when malicious users in the
network are considered extremely dangerous. In this second case, even a single relationship
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link to such a dangerous user would warrant a severe correction to the link quality of the
recommending user.
Hop-Based Correction
In contrast, the hop-based correction factor seeks to provide a balance between the opti-
mistic and pessimistic correction factors by considering the number and the length of the
paths emanating from a user that reach bad users. A path in the social network from user i
to user j is a sequence of users: path(i, j) = 〈x0, x1, ..., xn〉 (where i = x0 and q = xn) such
that there exists a relationship link between successive nodes in the path, xl+1 ∈ rel(l), for
0 ≤ l ≤ n − 1. We say a path reaches a bad user if the feedback rating for the user is less
than some threshold δ. We call such a path a bad path.
For a bad path of length l originating at user i, we associate a hop-based correction
factor φhop,l(i), where 0 ≤ φhop,l(i) ≤ 1. By default, we let φhop,l(i) = 1 if there are no bad
paths of length l originating from i. The hop-based discount factor can then be calculated
as the product of the constituent discount factors: φhop(i) =
∏k
l=1 φhop,l(i).
Selecting the appropriate hop-based correction factor is important, and as we saw in
the previous chapter with respect to Web link analysis, there are a number of possible
approaches, including a constant, linear, and exponential approach. Due to the success
with the exponential-based approach in the Web context, we adopt it here.
Beginning with a user-defined factor ψ (0 < ψ < 1) to set the initial hop-based correction
for bad paths of length 1, i.e., φhop,1(i) = ψ, the exponential approach tunes this correction
closer to 1 as the bad path length increases:
φhop,l(i) = 1− (1− ψ)ψl−1
meaning that longer bad paths result in a less severe correction to a user’s link quality than
do shorter paths. Starting with an initial correction factor ψ close to 0 will result in a more
pessimistic correction, whereas ψ close to 1 is intuitively more optimistic.
132
5.7 Assessing the Quality Component of Trust
Recall that the overall SocialTrust trust metric for user i considers both a trust quality
component Trq(i) and a history component Trh(i) (see Equation 10). In this section, we
discuss how to compute the quality component of each user’s overall trust rating Trq(i)
(recall Equation 10) through an analysis of the relationship structure in the social network
graph SN . In particular, we treat relationships maintained by each user as a list of rec-
ommendations of other users, and view the directed graph SN as a recommendation-based
trust network, where a relationship link from user i to user j is treated as a recommenda-
tion by user i of user j. Based on this recommendation structure, we develop the quality
component of trust. The quality component of trust leverages the relationships inherent
in the social network to gracefully handle the addition of new users to the network as it
evolves. One of the key distinguishing factors of the trust assessment is its incorporation of
both feedback ratings and link quality.
5.7.1 Popularity
We begin our development of the SocialTrust quality component by considering a basic
trust model that considers the sheer quantity of recommendations for evaluating the trust-
worthiness of participants. By counting how many recommendations a user receives from
other users throughout the network, we can evaluate the popularity of the user in the net-
work. Recall that rel(i) denotes the set of users i has a relationship with (and hence these
users have a relationship link to i in the social network graph SN ). The popularity-based
trust model prescribes a trust value for user i, where:
Trq(i) = |rel(i)| (11)
This recommendation count has close analogs in other network analysis domains, in-
cluding bibliometrics (where Garfield’s Impact Factor measures the importance of academic
journals by counting citations) and traditional social network analysis (where popularity
can be measured by a count of friends) [129]. The basic popularity trust model is subject
to extreme manipulation by malicious (or even just ego-centric) participants. Since online
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identities are cheap (often requiring only a valid email address for authentication), malicious
cliques can form in which many new users join the network for subverting the trust model;
each user in the clique maintains a relationship with a specific target user, resulting in an
arbitrarily high popularity and, hence, trust rating for the target user.
5.7.2 Basic Random Walk Model
A natural extension of the basic popularity trust model is to consider both the number
of recommendations for a user and the quality of the users making the recommendations.
Intuitively, if a user is highly trusted, then her recommendations of other users will be
considered as more significant than the recommendations of a less trusted user. In this
way, the power of malicious cliques can be mitigated to a degree if the colluding users are
of sufficiently low quality (and hence their recommendations will count less). This trust





Equivalently, this approach can be described in terms of a random walker who behaves in
a manner similar to the random surfer of the popular PageRank approach for Web ranking
[138]. The random walker proceeds across the recommendation network; at each node i,
the random walker follows one of i’s recommendation links with probability 1/|rel(j)|.1 In
the trust domain, such random walk models have been studied in both the peer-to-peer file-
sharing domain [98] and in the context of trust management for the Semantic Web [148].
In the long run, the random walker will visit high-quality users more often than low-quality
ones.
5.7.3 Incorporating Link Quality
In Section 5.6, we presented the design of several approaches for evaluating a user’s rela-
tionship link quality. Naturally, we can incorporate this link quality information into the
1For presentation clarity we are assuming that a user’s recommendations are treated equally. It is fairly
straightforward to generalize to the case of arbitrary recommendation strength; in terms of the random
walk, recommendation links will be followed with non-uniform probability according to the recommendation
strength.
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trust assessment of each user for improving the quality and robustness of the trust assess-
ments. We use the link quality information to impact the size of the vote of each user in
the overall trust aggregation process. The intuition is that a user’s trustworthiness should
be determined by both: (i) the number and trustworthiness of the users who recommend
her; and (ii) the link quality of each recommending user. In this way, a recommendation
from a high-trust/high-link-quality user counts more than a recommendation from a high-
trust/low-link-quality user. Similarly, a recommendation from a low-trust/high-link-quality
user counts more than a recommendation from a low-trust/low-link-quality page. Building




L(j) ∗ Trq(j)/|rel(j)| (13)
This formula states that the trustworthiness of user i is determined by the trustwor-
thiness Trq(j) and the link quality L(j) of the users that recommend her, as well as by
the number of recommendations made by user j (via the factor |rel(j)|). In this sense, the
recommendation weights are used to determine how a user’s “vote” is split among the users
that it recommends, but the link quality of a user impacts how large or small is the user’s
vote.
In practice, the basic random walk formulation must be augmented, both for technical
reasons (to insure convergence of the calculation) and for intuitive reasons. The basic
random walk can be modified to include a reset probability, such that after walking for
a while, the random walker resets to randomly chosen users in the social network. In
terms of the random walk, the random walker chooses to follow a user’s relationship links
(recommendations) with probability λ. With probability 1− λ, the random walker chooses
to reset to another randomly selected user. This resetting approach is useful for ensuring
the random walker does not become “stuck” in a clique controlled by malicious users. In
the initial case with no additional information about the relative trustworthiness of users,
we have a reset probability of 1/n for all i. Hence, we can extend Equation 13 to the









By including the reset probability, however, the random walk model can be made vul-
nerable to brute-force attacks. A sufficiently large malicious clique can, in essence, attract
the random walker via the reset probability 1 − λ for increasing the trust ratings of its
members.
5.7.4 Incorporating Trust Group Feedback
We can further enhance the augmented random walk model by incorporating additional
information about each user. Recall that in Section 5.5, we developed several strategies
for rating each user through feedback aggregation. These feedback ratings can be used to
bias the random walk’s reset probability so that it favors users who have been rated highly.
These users receive a trust-boost, so that their recommendations have an advantage over





L(j) ∗ Trq(j)/|rel(j)|+ (1− λ)F (i) (15)
Incorporating such feedback information will give an advantage to well-behaved users.
5.7.5 The SocialTrust Model
To complete the trust quality component of SocialTrust, we finally consider the input
from a trusted central authority (like the administrators of an online social network) or
pre-trusted users. An authority can directly flag malicious users once they are discovered,
even if their feedback rating or link quality is high. Similarly, an authority may choose to
tune the ratings of users who are new to the online social network that provide some off-line
assurances as to their quality (e.g., by submitting to a background check).
If we denote the score assigned to user i by this tunable knob as A(i), then we can
enhance the reset probability of the random walk to consider both this authority-based





L(j) ∗ Trq(j)/|rel(j)|+ (1− λ)(βF (i) + (1− β)A(i)) (16)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Choosing β = 0 favors the central authority’s view of user i over any
feedback user i may have received. This final SocialTrust trust assessment incorporates
the relationship structure of the social network, feedback ratings, link quality, and the
tunable input from a trusted central authority. In our evaluation, we shall validate that
this approach does, in fact, lead to more tamper-resilient trust ratings than the interim
trust models discussed in this section.
5.8 Assessing the History Component of Trust
In the previous sections, we have developed the trust quality component Trq(i). We now
move to the second key piece of SocialTrust: the history component Trh(i) for tracking
the evolution of a user’s trust rating over time. This history component is important for (i)
providing an incentive to all users in the network to behave well over time; and (ii) limiting
the ability of malicious participants to whitewash their trust ratings by repeatedly leaving
and re-entering the network.
5.8.1 Historical Trust Ratings
The trust quality component Trq(i) indicates how well the social network believes that user
i can be trusted at point-in-time, but without any consideration of user i’s behavior in the
past. Suppose the overall trust value Tr(i) is continuously updated. One approach for
evaluating the history component of trust considers the integral of the trust value over the





In practice, the trust computation will be launched at periodic intervals or on a per-need
basis, and so this integral will need to be estimated based on discrete trust computations.
Assuming that the trust computation is launched at regular intervals for some maximum
history H, then the trust manager has access to M historical trust values for user i, denoted
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Tr(i,m) for 1 ≤ m ≤ M . We can evaluate the history component of trust as a weighted






where Im is an importance weight associated with the trust value computed during the
m’th time interval. One choice of importance weight is the exponentially weighted sum:
Im = ξm for 1 ≤ m ≤ M . For ξ < 1, the time-averaged trust favors more recent scores for
a user over older trust scores. Letting ξ = 1 results in a simple average of the trust scores
for the history.
5.8.2 Fading Memories
The SocialTrust framework supports the maintenance of history scores for each user up
to some system-specified limit M . Choosing a small value for M means that bad behavior
will be forgotten by the system after M time intervals. Naturally, we would prefer a large
M so that as much historical information about each user is available for trust assessment.
Choosing a large M , however, may pose a number of challenges in terms of the space and
time burden on the system. Hence, in this section we adopt a fading memories approach
for balancing the size of the history component with the precision of the historical trust
assessments, in a manner similar to the approach proposed in [163].
The goal of fading memories is to summarize the historical trust assessments into inter-
vals of exponentially increasing length, so that more precise trust assessments are available
for recent intervals and faded memory estimates are available for older intervals. For tun-
able parameters f and g, the fading memories approach summarizes fg − 1 trust scores by
maintaining just g values, where the intervals are of exponentially increasing length:
f0, f1, ..., fg−1
Suppose f = 2 and the current time is t, and the trust manager wishes to maintains a
history of 2g − 1 trust scores computed at times t− 1, t− 2, ..., t− (2m − 1). With fading
memories, the trust manager stores only g historical trust scores: one for t−1, one for t−2
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and t− 3, one for t− 4, t− 5, t− 6, and t− 7, and so on. For example, for f = 2 and g = 4,
this means 15 historical trust values may be summarized by storing just 4 values. The 15
values are compressed by keeping scores for intervals of length 1, 2, 4, and 8, rather than
the original 15 scores for each interval of length 1. By varying f the system can choose to
maintain a longer history of trust scores (with less precision for older scores) or a shorter
history of trust scores (with more precision for older scores).
Given the basic fading memory model, it is important to address how the trust manager
updates the historical scores as more recent trust scores are added. At each update, there are
m available historical scores. Let j be the index of the intervals of exponentially increasing
length and FTrt[j] denote the faded trust value for a user at time t for the j’th interval.
Then the faded trust values may be updated at time t+1 according to the following formula:
FTrt+1[j] =
FTrt[j] ∗ (2j − 1) + FTrt[j − 1]
2j
Hence, the faded trust values may be updated after each interval using only the g
historical trust values, instead of the entire 2g−1 trust values. For a more detailed treatment
of fading memories, we refer the interested reader to [163].
5.9 Personalized Trust Aggregation with mySocialTrust
In the trust framework so far, we have identified feedback ratings and link quality as im-
portant features and seen how to assess trust based on each user’s position in the social
network. We have stressed the overall perspective of the community in assessing trust. In
this section, we seek to balance the personal experiences of each user with the larger view
of the entire community through a personalized extension to the trust framework called
mySocialTrust.
Suppose we are viewing the network from user i’s perspective. User i maintains his
direct relationships and may have had some direct experience with a small fraction of all
community members. In the current model, user i can assess the relative trustworthiness
of an unknown user by relying on the community-wide aggregated trust values.
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5.9.1 Basic Personalization
One natural approach to provide a more personalized view over these global trust values is to
combine the user’s direct experiences with the global trust ratings via a linear combination.
Tr[i](j) = αD[i](j) + (1− α)Tr(j)
where we denote i’s direct trust rating of user j by D[i](j) and the combined trust rating
as Tr[i](j). Regardless of how the personal trust ratings are made (e.g., personal trust
ratings may be a function of direct experience or some trust propagation approach), the
main drawback of this approach is its sparsity of data for augmenting the trust ratings of
most users. Since any one user may have direct experience with only a small fraction of all
community members, such a combined trust rating will result in the re-scoring of only a
few other nodes.
One way to provide some personalization is to use the distance between nodes to weigh
the global trust assignment. If we let d(i, j) denote the shortest distance between two
users in a social network (e.g., if user i recommends user k who recommends user j, then
d(i, j) = 2). Discounting the global trust value of users who are far away in the network
leads to the following personalized trust score:
Tr[i](j) = αD[i](j) + (1− α)Tr(j)γd(i,j)
where γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) is a discount factor for controlling how much to value distant users
relative to close users. While such an approach to personalization has the advantage over
the basic formulation by considering personalized node distance, it lacks the intuitive appeal
of the random walk models advocated in Section 5.7.
5.9.2 Random Walk Personalization
Suppose instead that we augment the original SocialTrust random walk approach de-
scribed in Equation 16 to consider user i’s perspective. Replacing the global values Tr(j),





L[i](k) ∗ Tr[i](k)/|rel(k)|+ (1− λ)(βF [i](j) + (1− β)A(j)) (17)
We can interpret Tr[i](j) as user i’s trust rating of user j. But how are the personalized
link quality and feedback ratings made in the first place? Since the trust rating is driven
by these two inputs, it is of critical importance to identify how they are made.
One approach uses a similar spirit of the hop-based trust dampening suggested above
to influence the link quality and feedback ratings for each user. In this case we can replace
L[i](k) and F [i](j) with estimates based on the global values and the distance of each user
j from user m:
L[i](k) = L(k)γd(i,k)
F [i](k) = F (k)γd(i,k)
Plugging these values into Equation 17 yields a recursive formulation in which the trust
value of each user is impacted by the relative link quality and feedback rating as a function
of the user’s distance from the point of view of user i. This formulation has the nice property
of balancing the local and global perspectives relative to i. A user that is farther from i will
require proportionately more high quality recommendations (via the link quality factor) to
score as high as a user much closer to i. In this way, users that are deemed globally of high
link quality and trust can score high even if they are quite distant from user i.
5.10 Experimental Setup
We evaluate the SocialTrust framework through a series of simulations over real social
network data. In this section, we describe the simulation setup for our evaluation of the
SocialTrust framework. We present the data, experimental setup, and metrics for evalu-
ation. Note that in our evaluation we focus exclusively on the quality component of trust.
For further discussion of trust history and its impact on trust effectiveness, we refer the
interested reader to [163].
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5.10.1 Data
All of the experiments reported in this chapter rely on data collected from the MySpace
social networking site. MySpace is currently the largest social networking site and one of
the few that provides open access to public user profiles. Many other sites (e.g., Facebook,
LinkedIn) require a user account and, even then, access to the entire social network can be
restricted. We ran multiple parallel crawlers over MySpace in July 2006, beginning from
a random sample of seed profiles. The crawlers followed the relationship links listed on
each profile’s front page in a breadth-first traversal of MySpace, resulting in a collection of
891,197 full-text profiles. Based on these profiles, we generated a directed social network
graph consisting of 5,199,886 nodes representing both the collected full-text profiles and
additional referenced profiles and 19,145,842 relationship links. As a pre-processing step,
we removed the default relationship links to the profile belonging to “Tom”, the purported
creator of MySpace who serves as a default friend for all new users, and whose super-user
presence is atypical of most social networks.
We performed validation of the graph, in which we confirmed that the link distribution
of the graph follows a power-law and that the clustering coefficient (an indicator of the
small-worldness of graphs) was 0.06. Both features have been observed to be important in
social networks [103, 175]. We also confirmed that the graph is connected.
5.10.2 Setup
The simulation begins from a cold start, in which each user in the network is assigned a de-
fault trust score. Thereafter, users issue queries to the network according to the forwarding-
based search capability, report their feedback to the trust manager, and at regular intervals
the trust manager calculates the trust score for each user in the network for use in the next
cycle. All trust calculations are performed using the Jacobi method for 25 iterations and a
mixing parameter λ = 0.85. In all of our experiments, a simulation cycle consists of 5,000
queries. There are 30 simulation cycles in total. For each query, users provide feedback
over the top-20 responses received. We report results over the last 5,000 queries, averaged
over five simulation runs.
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Queries are randomly selected from a query dictionary composed of all the terms in the
collected MySpace profiles. Each candidate query q is weighted by the number of profiles
in which it occurs. When a user receives a query, she performs a simple binary match
between the query term and her profile terms. If the profile contains the term, there is
a match, and the user responds to the query originator. In our threat scenarios, we shall
consider two types of users: (i) malicious users, who always provide an irrelevant response
to queries that they receive; and (ii) legitimate users, who sometimes accidentally provide
an irrelevant response to queries that they receive.
5.10.3 Metrics
In this section, we discuss several metrics for measuring the cost and quality of search and
ranking in online social networks.
5.10.3.1 Cost
Depending on the search strategy, a query may be forwarded to many users in the social
network or very few. We measure the cost of search in terms of how loaded the system
becomes in terms of users contacted per query and messages sent per query:
• Users Contacted: We measure the cost of search in terms of how many users are
contacted per query. When a query reaches a user, the user can choose to respond
directly to the originating user or can choose to pass the message along to some subset
of her friends. A query that contacts more users requires either more user attention
or more system resources for forwarding and query processing.
• Number of Messages: Related to the first cost metric is the number of messages
passed from user to user for satisfying a query. A duplicate message could arrive at
a user through different relationship chains. A search strategy that communicates a
query to a user only once is preferred to a strategy that communicates with the same
user multiple times for the same query.
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5.10.3.2 Quality of Results
The goal of social search and ranking is to identify high-quality results for a query, even in
the face of intentional user manipulation. For a query q, let R+ denote the set of relevant
users for q throughout the entire space of users, let R denote the set of all responses to q,
and let Rn denote the n-highest-ranked responses. We measure the quality of search and
ranking through two commonly used information retrieval metrics.
• Precision at N: Since a user may be only interested in the top-ranked results re-
turned, we measure a focused version of the standard precision measure that considers
the quality of the results returned in the top-n (e.g., for n = 1, 5, 10): precn =
|R+∩Rn|
n
• Relative Precision at N: The precision@n metric penalizes a ranking in which fewer
than n results are returned, even if the returned results are all relevant. Hence, we
also measure the relative precision@k that measures the quality of results only over
the results returned, even if fewer than n are returned: p̂recn =
|R+∩Rn|
min(|Rk|,n)
Note that the traditional precision measure over all candidate results – precision =
|R+∩R|
|R| – provides little distinguishing power since malicious users may overwhelm an orig-
inating user with many poor quality results, even if the top-k are of high-quality. The
recall measure – recall = |R
+∩R|
|rel| – also provides little distinguishing power among ranking
strategies since any search is expected to identify only a fraction of the possible relevant
results.
For each quality metric, we measure the average performance over many queries issued
to the network from many different originating users, so that we can identify system-wide
quality metrics for comparing trust models.
5.10.4 Baseline Trust Model
In all of the reported experiments, we use the SocialTrust trust model described in
Equation 10 using the quality component described in Equation 16. For the link quality
component, we rely on the scoped random walk model with scope of k = 3 and an expo-
nential correction factor with ψ = 0.5 and δ = 0.5. For now, we shall ignore the history
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component and assume no trusted central authority for making corrections via the tunable
knob A(i). We rely on a relationship-based trust group with radius 7 for which we shall
search using random selection with up to eight random neighbors at a horizon of 7. We
shall revisit some of these assumptions in the following experiments.
5.11 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the SocialTrust framework. through a series of experiments
over real social network data collected from MySpace. We focus on four aspects: (i) a
comparison of the trust group search strategies; (ii) a comparison of SocialTrust versus
alternative trust models; (iii) the study of link quality; and (iv) an evaluation of Social-
Trust in the presence of strategies attempting to subvert its effectiveness, including clique
formation and collusive feedback. We find that the SocialTrust framework supports
robust and tamper-resilient trust ratings even when large portions of the social network
engage in behavior intended to undermine its effectiveness.
5.11.1 Comparing Trust Group Search Strategies
In Section 5.4, we described the formation of relationship-based trust groups for each user.
A user’s trust group is governed by the network-specified trust group radius. When a user
queries the social network, she forwards the query to some portion of the trust group. In this
first set of experiments, we explore the relative quality of several search strategies over these
trust groups as a baseline for the rest of our evaluation of the SocialTrust framework.
Given a fixed ranking model, a search model that explores very little of the social network
may provide high quality responses for the queries that it can answer, but overall provide
little value if it can answer only a small fraction of all queries. On the other hand, a search
model that explores a wide range of the social network may be able to satisfy many queries,
but at the cost of burdening the social network by contacting too many users.
We randomly identify 25% of the users in the network as malicious. When contacted,
these malicious provide a corrupt result with 100% probability. Since regular users may
sometimes accidentally provide incorrect or corrupt results, all other users respond with a
corrupt result with 5% probability.
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Figure 51: Trust Group Search Strategy: Precision @ 1
In Figures 51 to 55, we compare the flooding-based search strategy (Flood) versus three
random selection strategies that select one neighbor RS(1), up to four neighbors RS(4),
and up to eight random neighbors RS(8). In Figure 51, we evaluate the precision @ 1
for each of the four strategies for an increasing search horizon. In all cases as the search
horizon increases, more of the social network is explored and the precision for all strategies
increases, except the RS(1) strategy. The RS(1) is a depth-first exploration of the network,
contacting very few users in the network.
Naturally, Flood and RS(8) perform the best, but it is interesting to note that the
precision in both cases approaches 90% for a large search horizon. Even in the presence
of 25% malicious users, this indicates that the SocialTrust framework supports high-
quality tamper-resilient rankings. Note that the precision does not reach 100% since even
non-malicious users will sometimes answer a query with a non-relevant response.
Coupled with this result, we show in Figure 52 the precision @ 10 for the same four
search strategies. As in the precision @ 1 case, the Flood and RS(8) strategies perform the
best, and we note only a slight drop in precision across all cases.
In Figure 53, we report the relative precision @ 10 for the four search strategies over
only the queries that were actually answered. Here we see that even for the search models
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Figure 52: Trust Group Search Strategy: Precision @ 10
Figure 53: Trust Group Search Strategy: Relative Precision @ 10
147
Figure 54: Trust Group Search Strategy: Users Contacted
that answer only a small fraction of all queries that they do provide high quality responses
for the queries that they do answer. This suggests that the SocialTrust framework is
providing high-quality responses and that it is primarily the search strategy over the trust
group that is limiting the precision.
We compare the cost of the four search strategies by measuring the number of users
contacted by each, and by the message premium – that is, the Number of Messages /
Users Contacted. In Figure 54, we see that the users contacted per search strategy grows
exponentially (note that the y-axis is log-based). At a horizon of 7 the flooding strategy
contacts nearly half of the entire social network with a message premium of 200% (see
Figure 55), meaning that each user is being contacted twice per query issued to the network.
Finally, we consider the impact of users making a more informed decision when deciding
to whom to forward a query. In practice, users will have some knowledge of which neighbors
are more suited to answer a query. We compare the random selection strategy versus the
selective forwarding search strategy, where a user relies on a fuzzy match function between
the profile published by each neighbor versus the query. For each buddy j ∈ rel(i), we
assess the neighbor match function NeighborMatch(q, j) based on a Gaussian distribution
with noise, such that NeighborMatch(q, j) ∼ N(µ + δ, σ2) if user j’s profile contains the
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Figure 55: Trust Group Search Strategy: Message Premium
query term q. If not, then the match is estimated as NeighborMatch(q, j) ∼ N(µ− δ, σ2).
We consider µ = 0 and σ2 = 1, and compare three version of selective forwarding based on
δ = 0.1, δ = 1, and δ = 2. A higher δ means that a user is more confident in assessing the
quality of his neighbors for answering a query.
In Figure 56, we compare random selection versus the three versions of selective for-
warding – SF (0.1), SF (1), and SF (2) – for a horizon of 7 and maximum neighbors selected
by each user of 8. We see that in all cases selective forwarding does result in a slightly
higher precision.
In the rest of the evaluation reported here, we shall rely on a trust group with radius
7 for which we shall search using Random Selection with up to eight random neighbors
(RS(8)) at a horizon of 7. This search strategy contacts orders of magnitude fewer users
per query with a much less message premium (∼ 40%) versus the flooding strategy, and
it achieves a precision comparable to the flooding strategy. Since this strategy balances
the cost on the network with high precision results, we shall use it as our standard search
strategy for the rest of our reported experimental results.
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Figure 56: Trust Group Search Strategy: Informed Search
5.11.2 Comparing Trust Models
In the next set of experiments, we evaluate the quality of SocialTrust against alternative
trust models and for varying degrees of user manipulation within the network. We again
use the SocialTrust trust model described in Section 5.10.4.
We first compare SocialTrust against the No Trust case – in which a user randomly
selects among the returned query responses – and a simple trust model based on the Pop-
ularity of the user in the network (refer to Equation 11). For each of the trust models, we
consider seven scenarios: 10% of the network is malicious, 20%, ..., 70%. Malicious users
provide a corrupt result with 100% probability; other users respond with a corrupt result
with 5% probability. In all cases, if 100% of the network is malicious, the trust ratings are
meaningless and the overall search precision drops to 0.
In Figure 57 and Figure 58, we report the relative precision @ 10 and the relative
precision @ 5 for each of these trust models and scenarios. In both cases, we see that the
relative precision for SocialTrust is resilient to the increase in malicious users, whereas
the No Trust and Popularity models degrade severely.
The rapid degradation in precision quality for the No Trust model is not surprising.
With an increasing number of malicious users in the network, the No Trust model gives the
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Figure 57: Trust Models: Relative Precision @ 10
Figure 58: Trust Models: Relative Precision @ 5
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Figure 59: Comparing Random Walk Trust Models: Relative Precision @ 10
unsuspecting user who queries the network no assurances as to the quality of the returned
results. At first glance, the fall in precision for the Popularity model may be surprising,
but consider that malicious users are distributed throughout the network at all ranges of
popularity. Hence, when a proportion of the most popular (and most trusted) users behave
maliciously, there is no mechanism for correcting this bad behavior.
In contrast, the SocialTrust model incorporates link quality and feedback ratings
into the trust assessment so that bad behavior is punished, and so the resulting precision
measures are resilient to the presence of a large fraction of malicious users in the network.
This is especially encouraging since the feedback ratings available in one simulation round
may be incomplete for users who have not yet responded to a query in previous rounds.
To further illustrate why the SocialTrust model performs so well, we next consider
several related trust models described in Section 5.7. We consider a simple random walk
model (RW ) like the one in Equation 12 that considers only the relationship structure of the
social network; a random walk model that incorporates feedback ratings (RW w/FR) like
the one in Equation 15 but without link quality; and a random walk model that incorporates
link quality but without feedback (RW w/LQ) as in Equation 14.
In Figure 59 and Figure 60 we report the relative precision @ 10 and the relative precision
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Figure 60: Comparing Random Walk Trust Models: Relative Precision @ 5
@ 5 for an increasing proportion of malicious users for each of these trust models. Note
that the basic random walk model performs approximately the same as the No Trust and
Popularity models shown in Figure 57. Incorporating feedback provides only a slight boost
in the precision. In contrast, we see that incorporating link quality provides the single
biggest improvement in precision, since it reduces the influence of users who engage in
poor quality relationships. When coupled together, both feedback ratings and link quality
provide the overall best performance.
To further illustrate, we show in Figure 61 the relative precision @ 10 for the scenario
when 50% of the network is malicious.
5.11.3 Impact of Link Quality
Since link quality is such an important factor, we next compare several versions. We addi-
tionally the optimistic approach for k = 1 to k = 5, the pessimistic approach for k = 1 to
k = 5 (with δ = 0.5), as well as the exponential hop-based approach for k = 1 to k = 5.
In Figure 62, we report the relative precision @ 10 for the scenario when 50% of the users
in the network are malicious, but with the different approaches for computing link quality
incorporated into the trust model.
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Figure 61: Comparing Random Walk Models: 50% Malicious
Figure 62: Comparing Link Quality Approaches
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First, the optimistic and hop-based approach are stable and perform fairly well as the
scope parameter k increases. These approaches penalize a candidate user’s link quality score
in proportion to the distance of malicious users from the candidate user. Direct links to
malicious users result in a lower link quality score than paths of multiple hops to malicious
users. In contrast, the pessimistic approach results in a worsening of precision as the scope
increases. As k increases, most users have at least one path to a malicious user and are
assigned a 0 or low link quality score. As the link quality score approaches 0 for nearly
all users in the network, the rankings induced from the trust model (recall Equation 10)
become essentially random, and so we see the precision fall considerably.
5.11.4 Clique Formation
We have witnessed how the SocialTrust approach provides resilient ranking support for
search in online social networks. We next consider several alternative scenarios and evaluate
the robustness of the approach. In our previous experiments, malicious nodes enter the
network randomly. Suppose instead that malicious nodes seek to form cliques in the social
network so that they can leverage their tightly-coupled relationship structure to overpower
the quality component of trust (recall Section 5.7).
For this experiment, rather than randomly assigning users to be malicious, we now
construct cliques of malicious users. The setup works like this: first a node is randomly
selected and assigned to be a malicious node, then up to three-hops of its neighbors are
also assigned to be malicious. We repeat this process until 10% of the network is malicious.
This overall procedure continues for the 20% case, 30% case, up to the 70% case.
In Figure 63 we report the relative precision @ 10 for SocialTrust over this clique-
based strategy (Clique). As points of comparison, we also show the performance of So-
cialTrust over the original non-clique strategy (Non-clique), as well as the performance
of the No Trust strategy over the clique-based strategy. Even in the presence of cliques,
the SocialTrust approach provides resilient rankings as the fraction of malicious users
increases. For many malicious users, the non-clique case behaves in a manner similar to the
clique case. With so many malicious users, by chance there will be many random cliques
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Figure 63: Effectiveness of Clique Strategies
formed. We attribute the success of the SocialTrust approach to its incorporation of
link quality, so that the influence of malicious cliques over the aggregated trust ratings is
reduced.
5.11.5 Subverting Feedback
Suppose that in addition to providing poor search results, that malicious users also attempt
to subvert the feedback ratings. So far, we have used the Trust-Aware Restricted Voting at
the end of each simulation cycle, where a user’s feedback is proportional to his trust rating.
In this final experiment, we consider the other two voting schemes discussed in Section 5.5
– open voting and restricted voting.
Recall that the Trust-Aware approach allots a voting share to each user based on his
trust value, so that more trusted users have greater sway over the feedback ratings of other
users than do lowly trusted users. For the restricted voting case, each user is allotted an
equal voting share for distributing among the users in his trust group who have answered
its queries in the past. In the open voting case, there are no constraints on the number of
votes cast by any user.
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Figure 64: Comparing Feedback Schemes
For each voting scheme, we assume that a malicious user always provides negative feed-
back for legitimate users, regardless of the quality of the search result provided; a legitimate
user provides honest feedback. For the open voting case, we assume that malicious users
ballot stuff the voting process, resulting in feedback ratings for legitimate users randomly
distributed between [0, 0.1]. Malicious users receive high feedback ratings randomly dis-
tributed between [0.9, 1].
In Figure 64, we compare the performance of the SocialTrust framework over each
voting scheme. As the network tips over 50% malicious, the restricted voting case begins
a steep decline. In this scenario, there are more malicious users in the network and so
(regardless of their past trust values), they can promote other malicious users, so that in
the following round these malicious users receive a boost in feedback rating (and hence,
link quality, and ultimately, trust). For the open voting scheme, we see that precision is
very low across the scenarios. In this case, even a small percentage of malicious nodes can
subvert the feedback ratings of legitimate users (and promote the scores of other malicious
users), so that the derived trust ratings favor malicious users.
In contrast, the trust-aware voting scheme is fairly resilient; as more and more malicious
users enter the network, the highly-trusted users manage to keep them under control. The
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robustness of the SocialTrust model, even with large portions of the network providing
dishonest feedback, can be partially attributed to our model of how malicious users enter
the network. In our simulations, malicious user are activated in 10% chunks. Since trust
and feedback ratings are linked from round-to-round, the votes of legitimate users in one
round can deter the malicious users from receiving high trust scores in the following round.
In contrast, if 70% of the entire network were to suddenly behave maliciously, we would
observe a steep degradation in precision. This experiment emphasizes the need for high-
quality feedback aggregation; without it, even the best trust model is subject to extreme
manipulation.
5.12 Related Work
The study of social networks has a rich history [126], and there are a number of tools for
the analysis of social networks [174]. Recently there have been some advances in studying
small-world networks [175, 176] and how to search traditional off-line social networks [54].
The rise of online communities has spurred interest in community information management
[53], social network formation [11], and the modeling of online social networks [103, 108].
One recent study examined email networks for analyzing how users navigate an online social
network [3].
The advances made in peer-to-peer networks, e.g., [146, 164], could inform the develop-
ment of robust and scalable online social networks. For example, there have been a number
of advances in efficiently searching unstructured P2P networks, as in [47], [116], [188], and
[187]. Note that there are some key differences which could prove important for building
effective and efficient search mechanisms for online social networks. P2P networks often
are concerned with high node churn and guaranteeing anonymity; the networks are often
formed via randomization protocols for establishing links between nodes. In contrast, on-
line social networks tend to include long-lived profiles that strive to be known (i.e., are not
anonymous); links in the social network stress the personal connection. There have been
several attempts in the P2P domain to manage trust and reputation, including [1], [45],
and [48].
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Trust and reputation are important computational concepts. For an overview of trust,
we refer the interested reader to [119]. Several studies have examined how to compute direct
trust between nodes, including: [152], which developed statistical models of bid behavior on
eBay to determine which sellers are suspicious; TrustGuard [163], which targeted strategic
malicious nodes who oscillate their behavior; PeerTrust[183], which studied feedback credi-
bility; and [120], which stresses the need for direct trust. How to propagate trust through
a network was studied in [75], where the notion of distrust was also considered. Yu and
Singh suggested a framework for reputation formation in electronic communities [189].
5.13 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the design and evaluation of the SocialTrust framework
for aggregating trust in online social networks. The framework supports tamper-resilient
trust establishment in the presence of large-scale manipulation by malicious users, clique
formation, and dishonest feedback. We have introduced relationship link quality as a scoped
random walk and explored key factors impacting it. Link quality can be optimized depend-
ing on the context and application scenario and on the risk tolerance of the social network.
We have developed a new random walk trust model incorporating relationship link quality




CONTROLLED SAMPLING OF WEB RESOURCES
In this and the following chapter, we address the third and final major thesis contribution –
tamper-resilience in Web categorization and integration services. These services are impor-
tant for organizing and making accessible the large body of Web-enabled databases on the
Deep Web that are beyond the reach of traditional Web search engines. Recent estimates
report the size of the Deep Web at nearly 92,000 terabytes of data versus only 167 terabytes
on the surface Web [117] of Web documents that reside physically in a file directory reach-
able by the respective Web server. Deep Web data resources are growing fast. The practical
size of Deep Web resources is over 450,000 autonomous databases, offering over 1.2 million
unique search services. The number of resources more than quadrupled between 2000 and
2004 [39], and considerable data on the Deep Web is subject to real-time changes [39].
Most existing Web crawlers tend to ignore the data offered by Deep Web databases due
to the technical difficulties of locating, accessing, and indexing Deep Web data. As a result,
a number of services have been proposed to support categorization of these information re-
sources as well as integration services for providing uniform query-access to these resources,
e.g., [74, 86, 93, 150, 182].
To reduce the opportunities of attackers to corrupt Web-based categorization and in-
tegration services, we introduce in this chapter a controlled sampling architecture for ex-
tracting representative summaries of each Web resource, in an effort to avoid the possibly
corrupt or untrustworthy self-published metadata and categorization information.
6.1 Controlled Sampling Overview
To enable advanced information services (such as classification and integration) over the
large and growing number of distributed information resources like those on the Deep Web,
traditional approaches for generating summary information for each text database under
consideration through crawling all available content are unrealistic for a couple of reasons.
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First, most Deep Web resources are autonomous and offer limited query capability through
a site-specific query interface, making it difficult if not impossible to obtain the complete
collection of their data through query probing, especially for resources that are unwilling to
allow complete access to their entire archives. Second, the cost of collecting all Deep Web
data from a large number of Deep Web resources is prohibitive due to the computational
burden on each Deep Web resource to answer every query. As a result, query-based sampling
mechanisms have become a popular approach for collecting document samples from each
Deep Web resource of interest.
By query-based sampling from each Deep Web resource, we may support a host of
advanced information services built on the sampled data, including: (i) the automated
categorization of Deep Web resources for use by a Yahoo!-style Web directory service;
(ii) the clustering of Deep Web resources for discovering interesting relationships among
Deep Web resources; (iii) the routing of queries so that user queries are only sent to the
most appropriate Deep Web resources for evaluation; and (iv) the augmenting of traditional
search engines, so that Deep Web data may be indexed and made available alongside surface
data that has been crawled by the search engine. The sampling-based approach has garnered
previous research attention and shown success in several contexts, including distributed
information retrieval, database selection, database categorization, peer-to-peer information
retrieval, to name a few [35, 91, 114, 160].
There are three key challenges for using a sampling-based approach to analyze dis-
tributed text databases and Deep Web resources. First, a sampling-based approach must
understand the query interface of each distributed text database for effectively sampling
from the space of all documents available at the database [how to sample]. This entails
parsing the query interface, automatically filling out the query interface, and selecting ap-
propriate queries to probe the target databases. Second, given the rate of change and evo-
lution of distributed data resources, we need to consider the appropriate sampling schedule
to maintain sample freshness [when to sample]. Finally, given realistic network constraints
and the size and growth rate of distributed text databases, we require an approach for
knowing what to sample from each database [what to sample]. Important questions related
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to what to sample include (i) should each resource be treated equally? (ii) should we devote
a higher sampling allocation to certain databases to obtain high-quality samples? (iii) how
do we determine the quality of each sample? and can we use a dynamic quality-conscious
approach to manage the overall sampling process?
While there have been some previous efforts to study how to sample (e.g., [37, 145]) and
when to schedule such samples (e.g., [92]), there has been no dedicated study on the problem
of what to sample from each text database given a collection of databases and a resource
constraint for sampling. In this chapter we provide the first comprehensive investigation
of the problem of what to sample from each text database. Concretely, given a set of
n distributed databases, each of which provides access primarily through a query-based
mechanism (like a keyword search interface), and given limited resources for sampling all
n databases, can we identify an optimal strategy for extracting the highest-quality samples
from the n databases? We refer to this problem as the distributed query-sampling problem.
In this chapter, we present an adaptive distributed query-sampling framework that is
quality-conscious for optimizing the quality of database samples. The framework divides
the query-based sampling process into initial seed sampling phase and a quality-aware iter-
ative sampling phase. In the second phase the sampling process is dynamically scheduled
based on estimated database size and quality parameters derived during the previous sam-
pling process. The unique characteristic of our adaptive query-based sampling framework is
its self-learning and self-configuring ability based on the overall quality of all text databases
under consideration. We introduce three quality-conscious sampling schemes for estimat-
ing database quality, and evaluate our adaptive sampling approach using standard TREC
information retrieval data collections. Our results show that the adaptive query-based sam-
pling framework supports higher-quality document sampling than existing approaches. We
also evaluate our adaptive sampling framework using the real-world application of database
selection, demonstrating the quality and performance enhancement of our approach.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes how text
databases are modeled and the basics of metadata acquisition through sampling. We then
introduce the adaptive architecture for distributed query sampling in Section 6.3, including
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three quality-conscious sampling schemes. We present the data and metrics in Section 6.4
along with a series of experiments for evaluating the quality of the sampling framework. We
then conclude the chapter with related work in Section 6.5 and a summary in Section 6.6.
6.2 Basic Reference Model
Before introducing the distributed query-sampling framework, we first describe the basic
reference model used in this chapter, including how text databases are modeled, how doc-
ument samples are extracted from each text database using query-based sampling, and the
representative state-of-the-art solution for the distributed text database sampling problem.
6.2.1 Modeling Text Databases
We consider a text database to be a database that is composed primarily of text docu-
ments and that provides query-based access to these documents either through keyword
search or more advanced search operators. Examples of text databases include Deep Web
data resources, digital libraries, and legacy databases searchable only through query-based
mechanisms.
We consider a universe of discourse U consisting of n text databases: U = {D1, D2, . . . , Dn}
where each database produces a set of documents in response to a query. A text database
D is described by the set of documents it contains: D = {doc1, doc2, · · · }. We denote the
number of documents in D as |D|. We denote the set of terms in D as the vocabulary V of
D. The number of unique terms, denoted by |V |, is referred to as the vocabulary size of the
database D. We also track the following detailed term statistics: c(t,D) denotes the count
of documents in D each term t occurs in; and f(t,D) denotes the frequency of occurrence
of each term t across all documents in D (i.e., how many times the term appears in the text
database).
A document sample from database D, denoted by Ds, consists of a set of documents
from D. We use |Ds| to denote the number of documents in the sample Ds, where typically
|Ds|  |D|. We refer to the set of terms in Ds as the sample vocabulary Vs of Ds. The
number of unique terms |Vs| is referred to as the sample vocabulary size of the database
sample. Similar to the text databases, we also track the following detailed term statistics for
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Table 9: Text Database Notation
D a text database, composed of documents
V vocabulary of D
|D| number of documents in database D
|V | size of vocabulary V
c(t,D) count of documents in D each term t occurs in
f(t,D) frequency of occurrence of each term t
across all documents in D
Ds sampled set of documents from database D
Vs vocabulary of Ds
|Ds| number of documents in sample Ds
|Vs| size of vocabulary Vs
c(t,Ds) count of documents in Ds each term t occurs in
f(t,Ds) frequency of occurrence of each term t across
the sampled documents Ds
f(t, doc,Ds) frequency of occurrence of term t in document
doc in Ds
each sample Ds: c(t,Ds) denotes the count of documents in Ds each term t occurs in; and
f(t,Ds) denotes the frequency of occurrence of each term t across the sampled documents
in Ds. We additionally track f(t, doc,Ds) = the number of occurrences of a term t for each
doc in Ds. Figure 9 summarizes the notation introduced in this section for ease of reference.
6.2.2 Query-Based Sampling
To support database sampling, Callan and his colleagues [36, 37] have previously introduced
the query-based sampling approach for generating estimates of text databases by examining
only a fraction of the total documents. The query-based sampling algorithm works by
repeatedly sending one-term keyword queries to a text database and extracting the response
documents:
Steps of Query-Based Sampling from a Database D
1: Initialize a query dictionary Q.
2: Select a one-term query from q from Q.
3: Issue the query q to the database D.
4: Retrieve the top-m documents from D in response to q.
5: [Optional] Update Q with the terms in the retrieved documents.
6: Goto Step 2, until a stopping condition is met.
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Critical factors impacting the performance of Query-Based Sampling algorithms include
the choice of the query dictionary Q, the query selection algorithm, and the stopping condi-
tion. The optional step 5 allows the algorithm to learn a database-specific query dictionary
as a source of queries after the first successful query from the initial query dictionary. Re-
search [36, 37] has shown that document samples extracted by Query-Based Sampling can
be of high quality based on a number of quality metrics. Concretely, these studies show
that document samples consisting of a fairly small number of documents (e.g., 300) are
of high quality over text databases consisting of millions of unique documents. Since the
distribution of terms across documents in a text database typically follows a Zipfian dis-
tribution – meaning a few terms occur across many documents, but most terms occur in
only a few documents – sampling a small number of documents can extract many of the
high-frequency terms in the text database. As a result, the sample vocabulary will cover
only a fraction of all possible terms in the database (that is, |Vs|  |V |).
6.2.3 Sampling From Distributed Text Databases
The problem of distributed query sampling is to determine what to sample from each of
the n text databases under a given sampling resource constraint. To simplify the discussion
without loss of generality, we assume that there are uniform sampling costs from each
database, and that the distributed query sampling algorithm may sample at most a total
of S documents from the n databases. Hence, the goal of the distributed query-sampling
framework is to identify the optimal allocation of the S documents to the n databases.
An effective sampling framework must address the competing issues: the quality of each
database sample versus the overall quality of all databases.
Naive Solution – Uniform Sampling: The simplest sampling framework is to uniformly
allocate the S sample documents to each database, meaning that for each database an equal
number of documents will be sampled, i.e. bSnc, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The uniform approach is
fairly standard, and has been widely adopted, e.g., [85, 90, 160]. Such a uniform allocation
is indifferent to the relative size of each database or the relative quality of the document
samples. Thus, the number of sample documents collected from a relatively small database
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like the technical jobs site Dice [http://www.dice.com] with its approximately 100,000 job
listings is the same as the number of sample documents collected from the much larger and
more diverse Monster site [http://www.monster.com] with its one million job listings in a
variety of diverse fields. We argue that the simple uniform sampling approach misses the rel-
ative quality of each database sample with respect to the entire space of sampled databases
(e.g., by sampling too few documents from Monster and too many from Dice) and tends to
produce lower quality samples, severely affecting the overall quality and performance of the
distributed query sampling framework. In this chapter we present an adaptive sampling
framework that is quality-conscious and self-configuring and our experiments show that our
approach is effective in producing higher quality samples and improving the performance
and quality of distributed database selection services.
6.3 Adaptive Architecture for Distributed Query-Sampling
In contrast to the simple uniform sampling approach that makes no attempt to optimize the
sampling quality for each text database based on the overall quality of all n databases, the
main idea of our adaptive sampling framework is to dynamically determine the amount of
sampling at each text database based on an analysis of the relative merits of each database
sample during the sampling process. In practice, optimizing the overall quality of the
database samples is difficult for a number of reasons. First, databases tend not to export
detailed quality statistics for aiding text database sampling. Second, the dynamic sampling
process typically does not have access to the entire database contents for evaluating the
quality of the extracted database samples.
In this section we introduce a distributed and adaptive query-sampling framework and
examine three quality-conscious sampling schemes to estimate critical database size and
vocabulary parameters as a proxy for database quality to guide the sampling process. The
challenging issue is the balance between the quality of each text database sample versus the
quality of all database samples.
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Table 10: Sampling Notation
S total number of sample documents
Sseed total number of sample documents for Seed Sampling
Sdyn total number of sample documents for Dynamic Sampling
sseed(Di) number of sample documents allocated for Seed Sampling
of database Di
sdyn(Di, j) number of sample documents allocated for Dynamic Sampling




s(Di) ideal total number of sample documents that should be
allocated to database Di
ŝ(Di) estimated total number of sample documents that should
be allocated to database Di
6.3.1 Adaptive Sampling Steps: An Overview
The goal of the adaptive approach to the distributed query-sampling problem is to identify
the optimal allocation of the S documents to the n databases. The challenging issue is
the balance between the quality of each text database sample versus the quality of all
database samples. The adaptive sampling approach to the distributed query sampling
problem divides the query-based sampling process into three steps: the initial seed sampling,
the dynamic quality conscious sampling allocation, and the dynamic sampling execution.
The last two steps are typically implemented using an iterative approach, such that each
sampling iteration dynamically allocates the amount of samples based on estimated database
size and quality parameters derived during the previous sampling iteration.
1. Seed Sampling: In this step, we collect an initial seed sample from each database to
bootstrap the iterative distributed query-sampling process. A portion of the total sample
documents S is allocated for seed sampling, denoted by Sseed. One simple approach to
selecting a seed sample is to use the uniform allocation of S to n databases under consid-
eration, such that each database Di (i = 1, ..., n) is sampled using Query-Based Sampling
until sseed(Di) = Sseedn documents are extracted.
2. Dynamic Sampling Allocation: This step utilizes the seed samples collected from
each database to estimate various size and quality parameters of each participating database.
The remaining number of sample documents is denoted by Sdyn where Sdyn = S − Sseed.
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The adaptive sampling can be conducted in m iterations and in each iteration, Sdyn/m
sample documents are dynamically allocated to n databases based on a Quality-Conscious
Sampling scheme. When m = 1, there is no iteration. We denote the number of sample
documents allocated to database Di in iteration j as sdyn(Di, j). We provide a detailed
discussion of three concrete quality-conscious sampling schemes for guiding the dynamic
sampling allocation in the subsequent section.
3. Dynamic Sampling Execution: In this step, the n databases are sampled according
to the documents allocated by the Dynamic Sampling Allocation step using Query-Based
Sampling. In the case of m > 1, steps 2 and 3 will be iterated m times. At the end of the
Query Sampling Execution step, we will have sampled for each database Di a total number
of documents, denoted by stot(Di), such that stot(Di) = sseed(Di) +
∑m
j=1 sdyn(Di, j).
Table 10 summarizes the notation introduced in this section.1
6.3.2 Quality-Conscious Sampling Schemes
In this section, we focus the discussion on the problem of dynamic sampling allocation based
on relative size and quality characteristics of the n participating databases. These quality
statistics are estimated by analyzing the sampled documents from the previous sampling
step. Concretely we conquer the dynamic sampling allocation problem in two stages. First,
we describe three quality-conscious sampling schemes, and each scheme recommends for
each Di a total number of documents to sample, denoted by ŝ(Di), which is designed to be
a close approximation of what would be recommend when the complete information about
each database is available, denoted by s(Di). Then we will discuss how to find the dynamic
sampling allocation sdyn(Di) for each database based on ŝ(Di).
6.3.2.1 Scheme 1: Proportional Document Ratio [PD]
The first Quality-Conscious Sampling Scheme is based on the relative size of each database.
Instead of simply collecting the same number of documents from each database as in the
1Note that we require that all sample sizes be integers since they correspond to the number of documents
to be sampled from each database. In the rest of the chapter, we shall omit the rounding of sample sizes for
presentation purposes.
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naive uniform sampling approach, this scheme seeks to collect the same proportion of doc-
uments from each database, say 5% of the documents at D1, 10% of the documents at
D2, and so on. The hypothesis is that document samples that better reflect the relative
distribution of documents at each database will lead to higher-quality samples and hence,
better application performance like database selection, categorization, and so on.
If we assume that the sampling framework has access to the total number of documents
|Di| in each database Di, i = 1, ..., n, then the proportion of documents to be sampled from
each database is governed by the total documents available for sampling and the total size
of the databases to be sampled: ratioPD = S∑n
i=1 |Di|
.
Hence, the goal of the Proportional Document Ratio (PD) scheme is to sample the same
fraction ratioPD from each database. So, the total number of documents to be extracted
from database Di is given by: sPD(Di) = ratioPD · |Di| = S∑n
j=1 |Dj |
· |Di|.
Of course, the actual number of documents in each database may not be known a priori.
As a result, the PD scheme will typically rely on an estimate |D̃i| of the number of documents
in database Di, instead of the actual size |Di|. Hence, we must estimate the fraction of
documents to be extracted from each database with: r̃atioPD = S∑n
i=1 |D̃i|
. As a result, we
may approximate sPD(Di) with the estimate: ŝPD(Di) = r̃atioPD · |D̃i| = S∑n
j=1 |D̃j |
· |D̃i|.
Another important quality measure is the database size estimates which can be calcu-
lated after the Seed Sampling step by analyzing the extracted document samples. There
have been two previous efforts to estimate the number of documents in a text database: (1)
the capture-recapture algorithm in [110]; and (2) the sample-resample algorithm in [161].
Both approaches rely on analyzing a document sample, but the sample-resample approach
has been shown to be more accurate and less expensive in terms of queries and the number
of documents necessary to sample.
The sample-resample technique assumes that the database responds to queries by indi-
cating the total number of documents in which the query occurs (although only a fraction of
this total will be available for download by the client). The “sample” phase collects a docu-
ment sample (say 300 documents), then the “resample” phase issues a handful of additional
queries and collects the c(t,D) statistics for these queries. The driving assumption of this
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technique is that the fraction of sampled documents that contain a term is the same as the
fraction of all documents in the database that contain the same term, i.e. c(t,Ds)|Ds| =
c(t,D)
|D̃| ,
where the database provides c(t,D) or a reasonable approximation. Hence, |D̃| = |Ds|·c(t,D)c(t,Ds) .
This database size estimate may be further refined by considering a set of p probe terms





. In practice, we collect
the c(t,D) statistics for all queries issued to the database.
The original sample-resample algorithm suggests sending queries that are randomly
selected from the sampled documents – in our experiments we have seen that this technique
may grossly underestimate |D|. Since term occurrences follow a Zipfian distribution, many
of the terms in the sampled documents will be infrequent, and hence, a simple random
selection will tend to oversample rare terms, which can lead to poor estimates of the number
of documents. For example, suppose we have a sample of 300 documents for a database
consisting of 100,000 documents. A choice of a probe term that occurs in only 1 document
in the database (and 1 document in our sample) will result in a size estimate for the total
database of 300, an underestimation error of over 99%. In contrast, we use a weighted
random selection of resample probes based on the frequency of the terms in the sampled
documents.
6.3.2.2 Scheme 2: Proportional Vocabulary Ratio [PV]
The second quality-conscious sampling scheme is similar in spirit to the Proportional Doc-
ument Ratio scheme. Instead of collecting the same proportion of documents from each
database, the Proportional Vocabulary Ratio (PV) scheme seeks to sample the same vocab-
ulary proportion from each database, say 10% of the vocabulary terms at D1, 10% of the
vocabulary terms at D2, and so on. Unlike the first scheme, the PV scheme is intuitively
more closely linked to the quality of the database samples, since it emphasizes the presence
of unique terms, and not just document quantity.
Assume for a moment that we have complete access to the documents in all databases.
Given this information, we know the total vocabulary size |Vi| for each database Di. The
PV sampling scheme must then determine the fraction of documents necessary to sample
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Figure 65: How Many Documents Should be Sampled to Yield ratioPV · |V | Vocabulary
Terms?
that will yield some fraction ratioPV of the total vocabulary for each database. That is,
how many documents should be sampled to extract ratioPV · |Vi| vocabulary terms for each
database Di?
According to Heaps Law [13], a text of n words will have a vocabulary size of Knβ ,
where K and β are free parameters and typically 0.4 ≤ β ≤ 0.6. What this means is that
there are diminishing returns of vocabulary terms as the text size grows larger. In the
context of distributed text databases, documents sampled earlier in the sampling process
will tend to contribute more new vocabulary terms than will documents that are sampled
later in the process. As a result, the PV scheme must rely on a more sophisticated approach
than the linear one of the PD scheme.
Suppose we randomly examine documents in a database and then plot the number of
documents examined versus the vocabulary size, yielding a Heaps Law curve. If we were
to repeat this process, we would derive a Heaps Law curve similar to the one illustrated
in Figure 65. To identify the number of sample documents sPV (Di) necessary to extract
ratioPV · |Vi| vocabulary terms, we need only consult the Heaps Law curve to identify
sPV (Di). Due to the inherently random nature of the sampling process and since documents
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in a text database can be of different lengths and the number of vocabulary terms may vary
from document to document, this technique provides an average-case estimate of the number
of documents necessary to achieve a particular fraction of all vocabulary terms.
In practice, the sampling framework must rely only on the seed sample to estimate the
vocabulary fraction and the corresponding number of documents necessary to achieve the
fraction ratioPV · |Vi|. To estimate the number of documents necessary requires that we
carefully inspect the sampled documents in the seed sample. We may begin by approximat-
ing the total size of the vocabulary |V | of D based on a sample of documents Ds by relying
on a version of Heaps Law adapted to the distributed text database domain:
|V | = K (f(D))β
where f(D) =
∑
t∈V f(t,D) refers to the total frequency of all terms in D. The keys for
the vocabulary estimation are now reduced to identifying the appropriate values for K,
β, and f(D) based on the sample documents only. Hence, we will find Ks, βs, and f(D̃)
respectively by analyzing the sample documents only.
Estimating f(D): First, we will discuss how to approximate f(D) with f(D̃). If we let
|d|avg denote the average number of terms per document for the entire database, then we
may write f(D) as a product of |d|avg and the total number of documents in the database:
f(D) = |d|avg · |D|. Since we showed how to approximate |D| with |D̃| in the previous
section, we need only approximate |d|avg in order to find f(D̃). We can estimate the
average number of terms per document |d|avg for the entire database by examining the
seed sample: |d̃|avg = f(Ds)|Ds| , where f(Ds) refers to the total frequency of all terms in the
document sample Ds: f(Ds) =
∑
t∈Vs f(t,Ds). Hence, we have f(D̃) = |d̃|avg · |D̃|.
Estimating K and β: Next, we will show how to approximate the Heaps Law parameters
K and β with Ks and βs, respectively. To do so, we consider increasingly larger sub-samples
of the total set of sampled documents. In particular, we randomly select a document
(without replacement) from the set of sampled documents Ds and add it to the sub-sample
Dss. For each sub-sample Dss, we plot the total term frequency (i.e. text size) f(Dss) versus
the actual vocabulary size |Vss| of the sub-sample. This process repeats until all documents
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in the sample have been selected. As a result, we will have |Ds| points consisting of the
text size and the corresponding vocabulary size. We may then estimate the values of Ks
and βs by using a curve fitting tool (like the FindFit function available in Mathematica) to
fit the best function that conforms to Heaps Law to these |Ds| points.
With these estimated parameters, the total vocabulary size |V | of the database may be
approximated with the estimate |Ṽ | by calculating:
|Ṽ | = Ks(|f(D̃)|)βs
Hence, by analyzing only the documents in the Seed Sample step, we may estimate the
total vocabulary size of all n text databases.
Recall that the Proportional Vocabulary Ratio scheme seeks to equalize the quality of
the database samples for each database by extracting the same fraction of the estimated
vocabulary from each database. Hence, we need to find the sample size ŝPV (D) that should
yield ratioPV · |Ṽ | vocabulary terms at a database. Relying on the Heaps Law parameter
estimates (Ks and βs) and the average size of each document (|d̃|avg) for each database, we
have n equations of the form:
ratioPV · |Ṽ | = Ks(|d̃|avg · ŝPV (D))βs
Solving for ŝPV (D) yields:
ŝPV (D) = e
ln ratioPV |Ṽ |−ln Ks
βs
−ln |d̃|avg
Given the n equations for ŝPV (Di) (one for each database), we need to determine
the appropriate choice of ratioPV such that the total documents to be sampled is S =∑n
1 |ŝPV (Di)|, where 0 ≤ ratioPV ≤ 1. Since each equation is monotonically increasing
with respect to the choice of ratioPV , we may solve the non-linear optimization problem
using the simple search approach in Figure 66.
As a result, we may find for each database the estimated number of documents necessary
to extract some proportion (ratioPV ) of all vocabulary terms at the database.
173
SearchRatioPV
Initialize MIN = 0 and MAX = 1
repeat




if S′ < S, let MIN ← ratioPV
else, let MAX ← ratioPV
until |S − S′| < ε
return ratioPV
Figure 66: Simple Search Strategy to Find RatioPV
6.3.2.3 Scheme 3: Vocabulary Growth [VG]
The final sampling scheme is based on the vocabulary growth rate at each database. Rather
than seek to extract the same proportion of vocabulary terms from each database as in the
Proportional Vocabulary Ratio scheme, the goal of the Vocabulary Growth (VG) scheme is
to extract the most vocabulary terms from across the space of distributed text databases.
This scheme relies on the Heaps Law parameter estimates κs and βs for each database,
as we presented in the previous section. By analyzing how fast each database “produces”
new vocabulary terms as more documents are sampled, our goal is to extract the “cheapest”
vocabulary terms first. Some databases may have a very slow growing vocabulary, meaning
that many more documents must be sampled to equal the same number of vocabulary terms
as a database with a fast growing vocabulary. Due to the nature of the Heaps Law curve,
at some point the additional vocabulary terms for each sampled document may slow to a
point that additional sampling is not worthwhile in the context of many distributed text
databases.
To guide the VG sampling scheme, we must first understand the vocabulary growth
rate at each database. To estimate the growth rate of the vocabulary size, we may consider
the incremental vocabulary terms that each additional sampled document may be expected
to yield. If we let x denote the number of documents sampled from a database through
query-based sampling, then we can write the estimated vocabulary size for the x documents
as |V (x)|:
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|V (x)| = Ks(|d̃|avg · x)βs
To determine the incremental vocabulary terms – denoted by ∆(|V (x)|) – available by
sampling x documents versus sampling x−1 documents, we take the difference between the
expected vocabulary size for a sample of size x documents and for a sample of size x− 1:
∆(|V (x)|) = |V (x)| − |V (x− 1)|
∆(|V (x)|) = Ks(|d̃|avg · x)βs −Ks(|d̃|avg · (x− 1))βs
Hence, we may determine the expected incremental vocabulary terms of each successive
sampled document. For each of the databases, we may calculate the incremental vocabulary
terms ∆(|V (x)|) for all documents available at the database. If we consider the “price” of
each additional vocabulary term extracted from a database as the number of documents
per new vocabulary term, then we may choose to sample from each database based on the
“cheapest” database for extracting new vocabulary terms. Equivalently, we choose from
which database to sample based on how many additional vocabulary terms it is expected to
yield per document sampled. With a total number of documents to sample of S, we select
the top-S documents from across all databases as scored by ∆(|V (x)|). We then allocate
to each database ŝV G(Di) documents based on the total number of Di’s documents in the
top-S.
Example: To illustrate the VG sampling scheme, consider a simple example scenario
with three databases – A, B, and C, shown in Figure 11. Suppose for each we have estimated
the appropriate κ and β parameters describing the vocabulary growth curve for each. We
then show the incremental vocabulary terms expected from sampling one to ten documents.
Given a total budget for sampling 10 documents, we show in bold the ten documents with
the highest incremental vocabulary terms. As a result, the VG sampling scheme would
extract 5 documents from A, 2 from B, and 3 from C.
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Table 11: Example Vocabulary Growth Scenario
A(κ = 100; B(κ = 120; C(κ = 80;
Doc β = 0.6) β = 0.4) β = 0.6)
1 100.0 120.0 80.0
2 51.6 38.3 41.3
3 41.7 27.9 33.4
4 36.4 22.7 29.1
5 32.9 19.5 26.3
6 30.4 17.3 24.3
7 28.4 15.6 22.7
8 26.8 14.3 21.4
9 25.5 13.3 20.4
10 24.4 12.4 19.5
Unlike the PD and PV sampling schemes, the Vocabulary Growth scheme is concerned
not with the relative size of each database, but in the “efficiency” of each database with
respect to how fast each produces new terms as documents as sampled. As a result, the
VG scheme does not rely on estimating either the total number of documents or the total
vocabulary size for each database.
6.3.3 Dynamic Sampling Allocation
Recall that given a collection of n databases and the maximum S documents to be sam-
pled, our distributed adaptive the query-sampling framework divides the total number S
of documents to be sampled into an amount for Seed Sampling Sseed and the amount for
Dynamic Sampling Allocation & Execution, namely S = Sseed + Sdyn. As a result, each
database Di receives a total allocation of stot(Di) = sseed(Di) + sdyn(Di) for i = 1, . . . , n.
We have described three quality-conscious sampling schemes, which can be used to recom-
mend an approximation of the ideal number of documents that should be allocated to each
database when complete information about Di is available, denoted by ŝ(Di). Now we need
to determine the number of documents to be sampled from each of the n databases for
dynamic sampling, denoted by sdyn(Di), such that the total documents sampled adaptively
from each remaining database, denoted as stot(Di), closely matches the number of docu-
ments prescribed by the sampling scheme, that is: ŝ(Di) ≈ stot(Di). There are two cases
to consider:
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Case 1. If for all databases, the seed sampling step has extracted fewer documents than
the scheme recommends in total (i.e., ŝ(Di) > sseed(Di)), then we simply let the Dynamic
Execution step sample the remaining documents sdyn(Di) = ŝ(Di)− sseed(Di).
Case 2. However, it may be the case that a database has already been oversampled in the
Seed Sampling step with respect to the sampling recommendation by the quality-conscious
sampling scheme, i.e., ŝ(Di) < sseed(Di). This oversampling requires two corrections. First,
any database that has been sampled sufficiently in the Seed Sampling step is dropped from
the Dynamic Sampling Execution step. Second, we must re-scale the documents allocated
to the remaining databases. A number of scaling factors can be considered, assuming that
A denotes the set of databases under consideration by the Dynamic Sampling Allocation




Example: To illustrate this scaling, consider an example scenario, shown in Figure 12.
There are five databases, ranging in size from 20,000 to 500,000 documents. Suppose the
framework may sample a total of 10,000 documents. With perfect information the PD
sampling scheme would result in an ideal sampling allocation as shown in the column labelled
s(Di). The goal of the PD sampling scheme is to closely emulate this ideal allocation. In
the Seed Sampling step, half of the sampling documents are uniformly distributed for each
database, meaning 1,000 documents are sampled from each [column sseed(Di)], leaving
5,000 documents for the Dynamic Sampling Allocation and Dynamic Sampling Execution
steps. Suppose the sampling scheme has estimated the appropriate database parameters
and has derived the estimate ŝ(Di) for each database, which in this case correlate closely
with the ideal sampling allocation. In this case, two of the databases (D and E) have
been oversampled already by the Seed Sampling step (1, 000 > 600, and 1, 0000 > 300).
Hence, we need consider only database A, B, and C for the Dynamic Sampling Execution
step. Based on the scaling factor described above, we can find sdyn(Di) for each database,
resulting in the total sample sizes shown in column stot(Di).
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Table 12: Example Sampling Scenario: PD Sampling Scheme
Di |Di| ŝ(Di) sseed(Di) sdyn(Di) stot(Di)
A 500,000 5,100 1,000 3,360 4,360
B 300,000 2,900 1,000 1,560 2,560
C 130,000 1,100 1,000 80 1,080
D 50,000 600 1,000 0 1,000
E 20,000 300 1,000 0 1,000
Total 1,000,000 10,000 5,000 5,000 10,000
6.3.4 Adaptive Sampling: Multi-Round Iterations
So far we have described in detail the basic distributed query-sampling framework, which
considers a Seed Sampling step, followed by a single round of Dynamic Sampling Alloca-
tion and Dynamic Sampling Execution. A single round dynamic sampling means that each
quality-conscious sampling scheme makes a recommendation of document sampling alloca-
tion only once, immediately after the Seed Sampling step. One obvious drawback of single
round adaptive sampling is the situation where the initial seed samples do not reflect the
true underlying database contents. Therefore the Dynamic Sampling Allocation step may
misallocate the remaining documents relative to the actual database contents.
An effective approach to address this problem is to extend the basic algorithm by sup-
porting multiple rounds of Dynamic Sampling Allocation and Dynamic Sampling Execution.
The multi-round iteration bases approach allocates the sample documents available for dy-
namic sampling Sdyn over multiple (r) rounds of dynamic sampling, where each round is
allocated Sdyn/r total documents. Since each sampling scheme depends on database size
and quality estimates based on an analysis of the extracted document samples, we would
expect that increasing the number of rounds would result in more refined dynamic sam-
pling, and reducing the impact of errors generated in the seed sampling step on the quality
of adaptive sampling phase.
6.4 Experiments
In this section, we present three sets of experiments designed to test the distributed query-
sampling framework. The experiments rely on data drawn from two standard TREC infor-
mation retrieval datasets summarized in Table 13.
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Table 13: Overall TREC Dataset Summary Information
Name Size (GB) Documents Total Terms
TREC123 3.2 1,078,166 258,212,077
TREC4 2.0 567,529 155,575,164
TREC123:: This set consists of 100 databases created from TREC CDs 1, 2, and 3.
The databases are organized by source and publication date as described in [141].
TREC4: This set consists of 100 databases drawn from TREC 4 data. The databases
correspond to documents that have been clustered by a k-means clustering algorithm using a
KL-divergence based distance measure as described in [184]. By construction, each database
is topically similar.
Detailed information about the 100 component databases can be found in Table 14.
Table 14: Per Database Summary Information
Documents Vocab (’000s)
Name Min Avg Max Min Avg Max
TREC123 752 10,782 39,731 27.4 63.8 92.4
TREC4 301 5,675 87,727 9.8 35.4 200.0
In addition, we created six large databases to further test the distributed query-sampling
framework. The large databases were created from TREC123 data and are listed in Table 15.
The large database AP is composed of all 24 databases of Associated Press articles in the
TREC123 dataset. Similarly, WSJ is composed of the 16 Wall Street Journal databases;
FR the 13 Federal Register databases; and DOE the 6 Department of Energy databases.
The two other databases – Rand1 and Rand2 – are each combinations of 20 non-overlapping
randomly selected databases from TREC123. Based on these large databases, we created
three additional datasets.
Table 15: Large TREC Datasets
Name Documents Vocab Size Total Terms
AP 242,918 347,762 61,381,800
WSJ 173,252 314,791 43,542,976
FR 45,820 503,774 34,588,476
DOE 226,087 206,653 16,874,516
Rand1 232,031 544,558 50,129,684
Rand2 228,701 553,007 50,152,660
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TREC123-A: This dataset consists of the large AP and WSJ databases, plus the 60
other trec123 databases (excluding the AP and WSJ databases), for a total of 62 databases.
The AP and WSJ databases are much larger than the other databases and contain a dispro-
portionate share of relevant documents for the tested query mix for the database selection
application scenario.
TREC123-B: This dataset consists of the large FR and DOE databases, plus the 81
other trec123 databases (excluding the FR and DOE databases), for a total of 83 databases.
The FR and DOE databases are much larger than the other databases, but contain very
few relevant documents for the tested query mix.
TREC123-C: This dataset consists of the large Rand1 and Rand2 datasets, plus the
60 other trec123 databases, for a total of 62 databases. By construction, the Rand1 and
Rand2 datasets contain approximately the same proportion of relevant docs as all the other
databases.
All database sampling and selection code was written in Java. The curve fitting nec-
essary for parameter estimation was performed with Mathematica via the Java interface
J/Link. Each dataset was indexed and searched using the open source Lucene search en-
gine. The search engine indexes and database samples do not include a list of standard
stopwords; the terms have been stemmed using the standard Porter’s Stemmer [140]. In all
cases the Query-Based Sampling component relied on a simple random prober that drew
probe terms initially from the standard UNIX dictionary and subsequently from the sampled
documents; a maximum of four documents were retrieved for each query.
6.4.1 Estimation Error
In the first set of experiments, we study how effectively the sampling framework may esti-
mate the critical database size parameters necessary to drive the three sampling schemes.
Depending on the sampling scheme, the seed sample is used to estimate either (1) the num-
ber of documents at each database [for the PD scheme]; or (2) the total vocabulary size of
each database and vocabulary-related parameters κ and β [for the PV and VG schemes].
In this set of experiments, we measure the relative error for estimating the total size |D| of
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each database and the vocabulary size |V |.
There are number of open issues with respect to this estimation that we seek to answer
with this set of experiments: (1) Does the estimation error fall as the sample size increases?;
(2) Does the error fall quickly? Or does it require samples of such considerable size that
the estimation is infeasible in practice?; and (3) Does the estimation technique work well
across databases of different sizes and characteristics?
We measure the relative error for the database size as ED =
|D̃|−|D|
|D| , where |D| denotes
the actual database size in documents and |D̃| denotes the estimated database size based on
the sampled documents. Similarly, we measure the relative vocabulary size error as EV =
|Ṽ |−|V |
|V | , where |V | denotes the vocabulary size of the actual database and |Ṽ | denotes the
estimated vocabulary size based on the sampled documents and the parameter estimation.
To assess the quality of the parameter estimation, we measure the error rate across the 100
TREC4 databases, the 100 TREC123 database, and the six large databases described in
Table 15. For each database, we extracted from 50 to 500 documents and calculated the
error rate for the size estimates. We repeated this process five times and report the average.
We begin by reporting the database size error ED. Across the TREC4 and TREC123
databases, as the sample size increases from 50 documents to 500, the estimation error
quickly becomes reasonable. For TREC4, the relative error ranges from 13% to 18%. Sim-
ilarly, for TREC123, the relative error ranges from 14% to 18%. For the large databases,
the database size error ranges from 20% to 30%, on average. These results validate the
results from the original sample-resample chapter [161] and provide strong evidence that
the database size may be estimated for large database by examining only a small fraction
of the documents.
The vocabulary size estimation is significantly more difficult since it relies on estimating
multiple parameters, including the κ and β parameters for the Heaps Law curve, as well
as the average size of each document in the database. In Figures 67 and 68 we report
the average vocabulary estimation error for the 100 TREC4 databases, the 100 TREC123
databases, and the 6 large databases. Since the vocabulary size estimation relies on knowing
the number of documents in a database, we report the vocabulary error in the ideal case
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Figure 67: Vocabulary Estimation Error - Database Size Known
when the database size is known and in the more realistic case when the database size must
be estimated. The results are encouraging. In all cases, the error falls quickly, requiring
sample sizes of fewer than 200 documents for reasonably accurate quality estimates. For
example, both the TREC4 and TREC123 estimates are within 50% of the actual after
examining only 150 documents. For the large databases, the error is within a factor of 2
after only 100 documents.
To further understand the vocabulary estimation error, we report in Figures 69 and
70 the cumulative probability distribution of the average vocabulary estimation error for
TREC4 and TREC123. Each line represents the error distribution based on a particular
sample size. So the line “150” indicates the error distribution when the vocabulary estimate
is made after sampling 150 documents. More than half of the database have an estimation
error of less than 0.30, and 90% of the databases have an error less than 0.50 after sampling
only 150 documents. As the sample size used for estimation increases, the quality of the
vocabulary estimates gets better. Similar results hold for the large databases.
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Figure 68: Vocabulary Estimation Error - Database Size Estimated
Figure 69: Cumulative Error Distribution [Estimated Docs], TREC4
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Figure 70: Cumulative Error Distribution [Estimated Docs], TREC123
6.4.2 Database Sample Quality
As we have seen, the distributed query-sampling framework may estimate the database
size and vocabulary parameters using fairly small seed sample sets. In this next set of
experiments, we study the impact on the overall sample quality of the three quality-conscious
sampling schemes – Proportional Document Ratio (PD), Proportional Vocabulary Ratio
(PV ), and Vocabulary Growth (V G) – versus the uniform sampling approach. Our goal
in this experiment is to understand whether the three schemes are capable of extracting
higher-quality database samples than the uniform sampling approach.
Since previous research efforts have claimed that 300 documents are reasonable for
extracting high-quality database samples from databases ranging in size from thousands of
documents to millions (e.g., [37, 36]), for each of the datasets we assumed a total document
budget of S = 300 · n, where n is the number of databases in the dataset. So, the total
budget for TREC123 (100 databases) is 30,000 documents, for TREC4 (100 databases)
30,000, for TREC123-A (62 databases) 18,600, for TREC123-B (83 databases) 24,900, and
for TREC123-C (62 databases) 18,600 total documents.
For each of the datasets, we collected baseline document samples using the Uniform
sampling approach (U), meaning that 300 documents were sampled from each database.
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For the three quality-conscious sampling schemes – Proportional Document Ratio (PD),
Proportional Vocabulary Ratio (PV ), and Vocabulary Growth (V G) – we allocated half of
the total budget for the Seed Sampling step (i.e., 150 documents per database). We then
allocated the remaining half of the total budget based on the specific sampling scheme. In
this first set of sample quality experiments we consider a single round of dynamic sampling.
Based on the seed samples alone, the schemes calculated the appropriate allocation of
documents for the dynamic sampling.
6.4.2.1 Sample Quality Metrics
To assess the quality of the database samples produced by each sampling scheme, we con-
sider a suite of six distinct quality metrics. Each metric compares a database sample Ds to
the database D from which it is drawn.
Common Terms: This first metric measures the degree of term overlap between a database




where again V denotes the vocabulary of database D and Vs denotes the vocabulary of the
database sample Ds.
Weighted Common Terms: Since the common terms metric disregards the relative





which is also known as the ctfratio[36].
Term Rankings: To assess the quality of the relative frequency of terms in the database
sample, we rely on the Spearman rank correlation coefficient as defined in [36]. The Spear-
man coefficient measures the level of agreement between two rankings. In our case, we
compare the rankings induced by ordering the terms in the actual database by c(t,D) with
the rankings induced by ordering the terms in the database sample by c(t,Ds). The Spear-
man coefficient measures only the quality of the relative ranking assignment, not the values
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assigned to each term. If both the database and the sample rank every term in the same
position, then the Spearman coefficient is 1. Uncorrelated rankings result in a Spearman co-
efficient of 0; reverse rankings (i.e., the top-ranked term in the database is the lowest-ranked
term in the database sample) result in a Spearman coefficient of −1.
Vector Similarity: The fourth quality metric is based on the vector space cosine similarity
metric, which is often used to compare documents to documents, and queries to documents.









The cosine ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating a higher degree of similarity.
In contrast, the cosine between orthogonal vectors is 0, indicating that they are completely
dissimilar. The cosine measures the angle between two vectors, regardless of the length of
each vector.
Distributional Similarity: To measure the distributional similarity of the database sam-
ple and the actual database, we rely on the Jensen-Shannon divergence (or JS-divergence)
[109]. It is based on the relative entropy measure (or KL-divergence), which measures the
difference between two probability distributions p and q over an event space X: KL(p, q) =∑
x∈X p(x) · log(p(x)/q(x)). Adopting a probabilistic interpretation, we can consider a text
database D as a source randomly emitting a term t according to the overall prevalence of t
in D. Hence, we can define p(t|D) = f(t,D)f(D) – where f(D) refers to the total frequency of all
terms in D: f(D) =
∑
t∈V f(t,D). Hence, kl(D,Ds) = kl(p, q) =
∑
t∈V p(t|D) · log
p(t|D)
q(t|D) .
Intuitively, the KL-divergence indicates the inefficiency (in terms of wasted bits) of using
the q distribution to encode the p distribution. Unfortunately, when comparing a database
sample that lacks a single term from the actual database (which is almost always the case),
the KL-divergence will be unbounded and, hence, will provide little power for evaluating
database samples. In contrast, the Jensen-Shannon divergence avoids these problems. The
JS-divergence is defined as:
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js(Ds, D) = js(p, q) = α1kl(p, α1p+ α2q) + α2kl(q, α1p+ α2q)
where α1, α2 > 0 and α1 + α2 = 1. In our case, we consider α1 = α2 = 0.5. The lower
the JS-divergence, the more similar are the two distributions. Unlike the KL-divergence,
the JS-divergence is symmetric and does satisfy the triangle inequality, meaning that it is
a metric. Additionally, the JS-divergence is bounded, so meaningful comparisons may be
made between summaries that differ in the presence of certain terms (as is almost always
the case).
The “Information” of a Text Database: The final quality metric measures the informa-
tion of the sampled documents using a variation of the classic entropy measure. The entropy
(or self-information) of a random variable X is defined as H(X) = −
∑
x∈X p(x) log p(x),
whereH(X) ≥ 0 with higher values indicating more information (or randomness). Adopting





where p(t|Ds) = f(t,Ds)f(Ds) . The maximum possible entropy for a sample increases as the
number of terms in the sample increases. So a document sample that explores a richer
space of the database (with respect to the number of terms) will have the opportunity
to yield a higher entropy, 0 ≤ H(Ds) ≤ log2(|Vs|). Unlike the other quality metrics, the
entropy does not require knowledge of the actual database contents to be evaluated. As
we will see, the entropy is strongly correlated with many of the evaluation metrics that do
require knowledge of the actual database contents, and so we anticipate further study of it.
For each of the six quality metrics, we measure the overall quality of the collected
database samples for a dataset by calculating the average quality metric weighted by the





6.4.2.2 Sample Quality Results
In Figures 71 to 76, we compare the Uniform (U) sampling approach versus the three
quality-conscious sampling schemes of the sampling framework – Proportional Document
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Figure 71: Common Terms (Summary Quality)
Ratio (PD), Proportional Vocabulary Ratio (PV ), and Vocabulary Growth (V G). To
minimize the randomness inherent in any sampling-based approach, we report the average
results based on repeating the document sampling a total of five times for all tested schemes.
We note several interesting results. First, even under the strong constraint that the
sampling schemes must rely solely on the seed samples for guiding the rest of the sampling
process, we see that the PV and PD schemes outperform the uniform sampling approach
U over all five datasets and all six quality metrics, indicating that the distributed query-
sampling framework can yield higher quality samples based on multiple measures of sample
quality. These results are encouraging since they indicate that there are significant oppor-
tunities for improving sample quality.
Second, the V G scheme significantly underperforms the U approach in all cases. On
inspection, we discovered that the V G scheme resulted in an overall collection vocabulary
of from 1.5 to 3 times as many vocabulary terms versus the other approaches across all
settings. In Figure 77, we chart the total collection vocabulary size for each dataset. What
is interesting here is that simply extracting more vocabulary terms from a collection of
databases is not necessarily correlated with overall high-quality database samples. As we
would expect, the V G scheme was very effective at extracting the most vocabulary terms of
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Figure 72: Weighted Common Terms (Summary Quality)
Figure 73: Cosine (Summary Quality)
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Figure 74: Spearman (Summary Quality)
Figure 75: Entropy (Summary Quality)
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Figure 76: JS-Divergence (Summary Quality) [Lower is Better]
all the schemes tested, since it focuses solely on sampling from the most efficient databases
in terms of vocabulary production. What we noticed, though, was that the V G scheme
tended to allocate all of the sampling documents to a few small databases each with a fairly
large vocabulary. These databases had significantly steep vocabulary growth curves, and
as a result, the overall collection vocabulary for the V G approach was higher than for the
other approaches. But, since the sampling documents were assigned to only a handful of
small databases, the larger databases (which tend to have slower growing vocabulary growth
rates) were undersampled. We are interested in further exploring the effectiveness of the
V G scheme in application scenarios that rely on rich coverage of vocabulary terms.
6.4.2.3 Additional Results
Given the good results for the PD and PV schemes, we next tweak several of the factors
impacting the sampling framework for better understanding of its performance.
First, we consider the impact of the total number of sample documents S on the quality
of the extracted database samples. As the framework is able to sample more documents, we
would expect to extract higher quality samples. We consider three scenarios. In Scenario
1, we have total sample documents S = 100 · n, where n is the number of databases in
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Figure 77: Total Collection Vocabulary Size
the dataset; in Scenario 2, we have S = 300 · n; and in Scenario 3, we have S = 500 · n.
So, for example, the total sampling allocation for TREC123 and its 100 databases is 10,000
documents in Scenario 1, 30,000 documents in Scenario 2, and 50,000 documents in Scenario
3.
In Figures 78 to 80, we show the impact of increasing S over the Uniform sampling ap-
proach (U [100], U [300], and U [500]) as compared to the Proportional Document sampling
scheme (PD[100], PD[300], and PD[500]). For the PD cases, we allocate half the docu-
ments available for seed sampling (meaning that in Scenario 1, we collect a seed sample of
50 documents from each database; in Scenario 2, we collect a seed sample of 150 documents;
in Scenario 3, we collect a seed sample of 250 documents). We restrict Figures 78, 79, and
80 to results for two of the datasets and three of the quality metrics; note that the general
results hold for all datasets and quality metrics.
Of course, as we increase the total sample document allocation, both the uniform and
quality-conscious sampling schemes result in higher quality samples, since more of each
database may be sampled. We note that in all cases, the quality-conscious sampling schemes
approach outperforms the uniform approach, even when the total sample document allo-
cation is significantly limited and the sampling framework must rely on even smaller seed
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Figure 78: Impact of Increasing the Total Number of Sample Documents S, Weighted
Common Terms
Figure 79: Impact of Increasing the Total Number of Sample Documents S, Spearman
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Figure 80: Impact of Increasing the Total Number of Sample Documents S, JS-Divergence
[Lower is Better]
samples for estimating the size of the database.
Second, we study the impact of the total allocation to the Seed Sampling step (Sseed)
versus the dynamic sampling step (Sdyn), where recall that S = Sseed +Sdyn. Devoting too
many of sampling documents for the seed sampling may result in more precise estimates for
use by each quality-conscious sampling scheme, but leave too few documents available for
dynamic sampling. Conversely, devoting too few sampling documents for the seed sampling
may result in less precise parameter estimates, and hence may lead to the sampling scheme
misallocating the remaining documents for the dynamic sampling step.
In Figures 81 to 83, we show the impact of the total seed sampling allocation for the
Proportional Document scheme with S = 300 · n, where n is the number of databases
in the dataset. We consider three scenarios – in Scenario 1, we collect a seed sample of
50 documents from each database (PD[50, 250]), leaving 250 · n documents available for
dynamic sampling; in Scenario 2, we collect a seed sample of 150 documents from each
database, leaving 150 · n (PD[150, 150]); in Scenario 3, we collect a seed sample of 250
documents, leaving only 50 · n documents available for dynamic sampling (PD[250, 50]).
For comparison, we also consider the uniform sampling approach U . We restrict Figures 81,
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Figure 81: Impact of Seed Sampling, Weighted Common Terms
82, and 83 to results for two of the datasets and three of the quality metrics; note that the
general results hold for all datasets and quality metrics.
Interestingly, the dynamic sampling approach results in higher quality samples in all
cases. As the seed sampling allocation of documents increases, the advantage of the quality-
conscious sampling schemes is diminished only slightly relative to the uniform approach.
This is expected since fewer documents are available for dynamic sampling, and hence the
performance will converge to the uniform approach.
Finally, we have also studied the impact of the number of rounds on the multi-round
distributed query-sampling framework. All of our experiments so far have relied on a single
round of dynamic sampling. Interestingly, we find that increasing the number of rounds
from 1 to 10 results in slight improvements to the extracted database samples primarily
due to the refined parameter estimates made possible by re-calculating the appropriate
allocation after each round.
6.4.3 Application Scenario: Database Selection
We have shown that the adaptive query-sampling framework results in higher-quality database
samples compared to the uniform sampling approach used in many existing query sampling
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Figure 82: Impact of Seed Sampling, Spearman
Figure 83: Impact of Seed Sampling, JS-Divergence [Lower is Better]
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schemes. In this section, we evaluate the impact of our adaptive sampling framework on the
real-world application of database selection. Current approaches for text database selection
map queries to databases based on previously acquired metadata for each database. Due
to network bandwidth and time constraints, the goal of database selection is to identify
only those databases that can contribute to a particular query by analyzing the metadata
of each database.
Typical database selection algorithms work in the context of a query q and a set of
candidate databases U . For each database D ∈ U , a goodness (or quality) score is assigned
in terms of query relevance. The databases are ranked according to the relevance score and
the query is then routed to the top-k ranked databases. In our experiments, we consider the
popular CORI algorithm as introduced in [34] and described in [63]. CORI assigns scores
















= mean number of words among dbs being ranked. Obviously the quality of such a database
selection algorithm will be impacted by the quality of the frequency and count estimates
generated by the document samples from the sampling process.
For the TREC123-A, B, and C datasets, we use queries drawn from the TREC topics
51-100 title field. These queries are, on average fairly short (ranging from 1 to 11 words,
with an average of 3.8), and resemble Web-style short keyword queries. For the TREC4
dataset, we use queries from the TREC topics 201-250 description field (ranging from 8 to
33 words, with an average of 16 words).
To isolate the quality of database selection from the rest of the distributed informa-
tion retrieval problem (which also includes components for results merging and ranking),
we adopt a commonly accepted criterion for measuring the database selection recall. The
database selection recall metric, denoted by Rn, evaluates the quality of the database se-
lection algorithm’s ranked list of databases versus a baseline ranking [72]. Several baseline
rankings have been proposed before, including (1) size-based ranking – a query-independent
ranking that ranks databases in descending order of size; (2) relevance-based ranking – a
query-dependent ranking that ranks databases by the number of query-relevant documents
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Figure 84: Database Selection Recall, TREC123-A
each has; and (3) best-document ranking – where databases are ranked by the similarity
of the best document to the query [123]. In this chapter, we rely on the commonly used
relevance-based ranking, partly because the TREC data comes with relevance decisions for
several query sets. If we let rel(q,D) denote the number of relevant documents in database
D to the query q, then for a baseline ranking of n databases: B = (B1, ..., Bn) and a ranking
induced by the database selection algorithm E = (E1, ..., En), we may define the recall for




, where 0 ≤ Rk(q) ≤ 1. By evaluating Rk(q)
for different values of k, we may assess the recall at different levels (e.g., recall for the top-5
databases, the top-10, and so on). A database selection algorithm that induces a ranking
that exactly matches the baseline (optimal) ranking, will result in Rk values of 1 for all
choices of k.
Finally, we run experiments on the database samples using the setup described in Sec-
tion 6.4.2.2 to compare our adaptive sampling framework with the uniform sample allocation
scheme. For each dataset, we evaluated the CORI algorithm over the extracted database
samples and the query mix discussed above. In Figures 84 to 86, we report the database
recall metric for the TREC123-A, B, and C datasets. These results confirm that the higher
quality PV and PD samples reported in the earlier set of experiments positively impact
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Figure 85: Database Selection Recall, TREC123-B
the performance of database selection relative to the uniform approach, and again, the V G
scheme significantly lags. We see a similar, though less pronounced, advantage over the
TREC4 and TREC123 datasets, as shown in Figures 88 and 87.
6.5 Related Work
The distributed query-sampling sampling framework presented in this chapter is designed
to extract high-quality database samples from distributed text databases like those on the
Deep Web.
The Deep Web (sometimes referred to as the hidden or invisible Web) has garnered
increased research interest in recent years. Several studies have noted the immense size of
the Deep Web relative to the surface Web of static documents [16, 39, 117]. One of the first
Deep Web crawlers for discovering and interacting with Deep Web databases was proposed
in [145], where the complexity of interacting with Web search interfaces was noted. More
recently, there have been efforts to match Deep Web query interfaces [169, 182, 193], and a
study of how to efficiently sample an entire collection [135].
The sampling-based approach at the heart of the framework presented in this chapter
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Figure 86: Database Selection Recall, TREC123-C
Figure 87: Database Selection Recall, TREC4
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Figure 88: Database Selection Recall, TREC123
has garnered previous research attention and has shown some success in many contexts, in-
cluding distributed information retrieval, database selection, database categorization, peer-
to-peer information retrieval, and others, e.g., [35, 91, 114, 160].
There have been several studies on how to sample a database in an effort to generate
a summary of the database internals [36, 37, 43, 74, 84, 91, 93, 124, 166, 170]. The main
purpose of these techniques is to generate a representative content summary of the under-
lying database in cases where the database provides only limited access. These sampling
approaches typically rely on interacting with the database through a query interface and
extracting sample data through a series of query probes. Querying methods suggested in-
clude the use of random queries, queries learned from a classifier, and queries based on
a feedback cycle between the query and the response. In addition, Agichtein et al. [4]
have developed a formal reachability graph model for assessing the quality of query-based
database summarization techniques. A common assumption in the literature is to extract
300 documents from a database to create a summary, e.g., [90, 133, 161]. In contrast to
the sampling-based approach, other researchers have studied the problem of downloading




We have presented the adaptive distributed query-sampling framework for optimizing the
quality of database samples. The optimization is performed by dynamically revising the
sampling allocation among the n databases based on estimated quality metrics derived
during the sampling process. To the best of our knowledge, our framework is the first one
for sampling that takes into account both the overall quality of all text databases under
consideration and the presence of realistic resource constraints. We have introduced three
concrete sample allocation schemes for estimating database quality, and have shown how the
adaptive framework supports higher-quality document sampling than the existing solutions,
and how the real world application of database selection may be improved.
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CHAPTER VII
TRUSTED WEB RESOURCE DISCOVERY
In the previous chapter, we introduced the controlled sampling approach for extracting
high-quality Web resource samples to reduce the opportunities of attackers to corrupt Web-
based categorization and integration services. In this chapter, we use the controlled sampling
approach as a foundation for supporting trusted Web resource discovery. By leveraging a
set of user-trusted information resources, the system provides a set of related information
resources that can be grouped by content and trustworthiness properties to auto-generate
a trusted categorization hierarchy.
7.1 Overview
Our research interest is to provide support for the management of Deep Web databases
beyond that captured by traditional search engines. Typically, a search engine is optimized
to identify a ranked list of documents (or Web pages) relevant to a user query. This
document-centric view has proven immensely successful. On the other hand, with the rise
of high-quality Deep Web databases and the emergence of digital libraries and corporate
information servers, we believe that there is ample opportunity for a new class of queries
optimized not on the document level, but on the more general relationship level between
Deep Web databases.
Rather than requesting the top-ranked documents containing a certain keyword, say
“autism”, we propose that a user may be more interested in relationship-centric queries
about the many available Deep Web databases. For example, a user familiar with the
popular online medical literature site PubMed1 that provides access to millions of scientific
and medical literature citations may be interested in posing some of the following queries:
• What other Deep Web databases are most similar to PubMed?
1http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/PubMed/
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• What other Deep Web databases are more general than PubMed? Or more special-
ized?
• Are there any other Deep Web databases that complement PubMed’s coverage?
We could also imagine extending these queries to more sophisticated ones that cover
relationships among multiple Deep Web databases. Additionally, the granularity of the
relationship discovered may be further refined to consider subsets of the databases. For
example, a user may be interested in relationship-centric queries about specific journals
within the PubMed database, and not PubMed as a whole.
We envision a number of scenarios in which a relationship-centric framework over Deep
Web databases would be of significance:
• First, a relationship-centric framework can be used for supporting direct relationship
queries about Deep Web databases like the ones listed above.
• In addition to these types of direct relationship queries, a user may simply be inter-
ested in discovering any non-obvious relationships that may exist among a group of
Deep Web databases. The relationship-centric framework supports this type of data
mining.
• The relationship-centric framework may also be used to augment traditional document-
centric queries over Deep Web databases. For example, a user interested in medical
literature may choose to query both PubMed and all databases with a similarity-
based relationship to PubMed. Alternatively, a user interested in maximizing cov-
erage of multiple topically-distinct Deep Web databases, may choose to query both
PubMed and any other Deep Web database that has complementary coverage relative
to PubMed.
• Finally, the relationship-centric framework may also support the refinement and gen-
eralization of traditional document-centric queries over Deep Web databases. A user
issuing a query to PubMed may be overwhelmed by responses from a number of differ-
ent medical journals. She may prefer to refine the query to the Deep Web databases
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that are more specialized on a particular topic like cancer research. Alternatively, she
may find too few responses to a particular query and wish to generalize the scope
of the query to include more Deep Web databases that have broader coverage than
PubMed.
Currently, there are no effective means to answer queries that rely on a relationship-
centric view of Deep Web databases without relying on significant human intervention or
hand-tuned categorization schemes. Search engines rely on a document-centric view of the
Web and are not designed to handle relationship-level queries. Similarly, directory services
– like the ones offered by Yahoo! and the Open Directory Project [dmoz.org] – offer gen-
eral categories but do not provide coverage and specialty ratings for direct comparisons
between Deep Web databases. So a user may find a category listing for medical literature
resources that includes PubMed, but she would lack support for understanding the rela-
tionship between PubMed and the other medical literature resources, or for understanding
the relationship between PubMed and resources listed under a different category.
With the rapid increase in the number and variety of available Deep Web databases,
there is a growing need for providing a relationship-centric framework for discovering and
understanding the interrelationships among Deep Web databases. To answer these chal-
lenges, we present a novel approach to discover interesting relationships among Deep Web
databases based on source-biased database analysis. This source-biased approach supports
a relationship-centric view over a collection of Deep Web databases through source-biased
probing and source-biased relevance metrics. Source-biased database analysis and discov-
ery presents a number of unique properties. First, our approach is capable of answering
relationship-centric queries of the form posed above by focusing on the nature and degree of
the relationship of one Deep Web database to another. Since Deep Web databases tend to
be large and may be updated frequently ([92, 117]), we rely on a sampling-based approach
to extract a portion of each Deep Web database through source-biased probing. Given a
database like PubMed – called the source - the source-biased probing technique leverages the
summary information of the source to generate a series of biased probes to other databases
– called the targets. This source-biased probing allows us to determine whether a target
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database is relevant to the source by probing the target with very few focused probes. Sec-
ond, we introduce the biased focus metric to discover highly relevant Deep Web databases
and to assess the nature of the relationship between databases. For each source database,
we use the biased focus to rank target databases and to identify interesting relationship
sets that support relationship-centric queries. Such relationships can be further utilized as
value-added metadata for each database discovered. Third, to further reduce the number
of probes necessary to assess a target database, we introduce a performance optimization
called source-biased probing with focal terms. The main idea is to identify terms in the un-
biased summary of the source that share a similar topical category and then to divide the
source summary into k clusters, where each cluster represents a group of similar summary
terms.
Our experiments on both simulation and Web datasets show how the source-biased
database analysis approach results in efficient discovery and ranking of Deep Web databases.
We also illustrate how our approach supports relationship-centric queries through the iden-
tification of interesting relationship sets, including similarity-based and hierarchical rela-
tionship sets. Additionally, we present the design and architecture of our DynaBot system
for crawling, probing, and supporting relationship-centric queries over Deep Web databases
using the source-biased approach.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We present related work in Section 7.2 and
briefly discuss the motivation and system model in Section 7.3. In Section 7.4, we describe
the algorithm for source-biased analysis of databases, including source-biased probing, the
biased-focus metric, and the assessment of inter-database relationships. We refine the basic
source-biased algorithm with focal terms in Section 7.5. We present the design and architec-
ture of the DynaBot crawler for supporting relationship-centric queries over the Deep Web
in Section 7.6. In Section 7.7, we provide extensive experimental evidence to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our algorithms and end in Section 7.8 with our final thoughts.
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7.2 Related Work
In the database community, considerable attention has been dedicated to the database se-
lection problem [34, 46, 55, 63, 65, 72, 73, 84, 111, 123, 141, 191]. In database selection, the
problem is to take a query and match it to potentially relevant databases for processing.
Typically the database exports a description to help guide database selection. Instead of
matching a query to a set of databases, our work is concerned with analyzing and under-
standing the relationships among Deep Web databases in a source-biased framework. As
we will show, these interesting relationships may be used to help guide database selection
in addition to supporting relationship-centric queries.
As we discussed in Chapter 6, other researchers have previously studied the problem of
sampling a database in an effort to generate a summary of the database internals [36, 37, 43,
74, 84, 91, 93, 124, 166, 170]. In this chapter, we show how traditional unbiased sampling
approaches – especially in the context of the large size and dynamic nature of Deep Web
databases – may be inadequate for exposing relationships among Deep Web databases. As
a result, we promote a source-biased perspective to overcome these issues.
Others [74, 93] have introduced a probing-based approach for classifying Deep Web
databases into a pre-determined Yahoo!-style hierarchy. However, this approach relies on
a pre-learned set of queries for database classification, which requires the potentially bur-
densome and inflexible task of labelling training data for learning the classifier probes in
the first place. Additionally, if new categories are added or old categories removed from
the hierarchy, new probes must be learned and each source re-probed. Our approach is
designed to work flexibly in a “bottom-up” fashion by placing each Deep Web database at
the center of its own neighborhood of related databases.
7.3 System Model and Problem Statement
In this section, we present the system model and discuss in detail current approaches for
sampling Deep Web databases. We identify problems with the current approaches that
motivate the source-biased framework for identifying interesting relationships among Deep
Web databases. The large and increasing number of Deep Web databases accessible through
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the Web not only makes a relationship-centric view over a collection of Deep Web databases
important but also demands for an efficient and effective framework for discovering and
understanding the interesting interrelationships among Deep Web databases.
7.3.1 Modeling Deep Web Databases
We consider a Web-enabled document database (or Deep Web database) to be a database
that is composed primarily of text documents and that provides query-based access to these
documents either through keyword search or more advanced search operators. In particular,
we are interested in Deep Web databases that are beyond the control of the typical users.
For example, Web data sources that provide a search mechanism like the resources on the
Deep Web, digital libraries, and databases deployed across loose corporate federations are
all examples of Deep Web databases for which a typical user can only access through query-
based mechanisms. For such types of Deep Web databases, relationship-centric queries of
the form: “What other Deep Web databases are most similar to X? Or complementary to
X?” would require significant human intervention to yield a satisfactory result.
We consider a universe of discourse U consisting of d Deep Web databases: U =
{D1, D2, . . . , Dd} where each database produces a set of documents in response to a par-
ticular query. Hence, we describe each Deep Web database Di as a set of Mi documents:
Di = {doc1, doc2, · · · , docMi}. There are N terms (t1, t2, ..., tN ) in the universe of discourse
U , where common stopwords (like “a”, “the”, and so on) have been eliminated. Optionally,
the set of N terms may be further refined by stemming [140] to remove prefixes and suffixes.
Adopting a vector-space model [154] of the database contents, we may describe each
Deep Web database Di as a vector consisting of the terms in the database along with a
corresponding weight:
Summary(Di) = {(t1, wi1), (t2, wi2), · · · , (tN , wiN )}
A term that does not occur in any documents in Deep Web database Di will have weight
0. Typically, for any particular Deep Web database Di, only a fraction of the N terms will
have non-zero weight. We refer to the number of non-zero weighted terms in Di as Ni.
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This vector-based approach has received great attention and support in the information
retrieval community for representing documents where it has been applied effectively across
a wide variety of application settings [13]. In the database community, the vector-based
approach has been popularized by GlOSS [72] and related projects.
We call the vector Summary(Di) a resource summary for the Deep Web database Di.
A resource summary is a single aggregate vector that summarizes the overall distribution of
terms in the set of documents produced by the database. To find Summary(Di), we must
first represent each document docj (1 ≤ j ≤ Mi) as a vector of terms and the frequency of
each term in the document:
docj = {(t1, freqj1), (t2, freqj2), · · · , (tN , freqjN )}
where freqjk is the frequency of occurrence of term tk in document j. The initial weight
for each term may be based on the raw frequency of the term in the document and it can
be refined using alternative occurrence-based metrics like the normalized frequency of the
term and the term-frequency inverse document-frequency (TFIDF ) weight. TFIDF weights
the terms in each document vector based on the characteristics of all documents in the set
of documents.
Given a particular encoding for each document, we may generate the overall resource
summary for each Deep Web database in a number of ways. Initially, the weight for each
term in the resource summary may be based on the overall frequency of the term across all
the documents in the database (called the database frequency, or dbFreq):




Alternatively, we can also define the weight for each term based on the number of
documents in which each term occurs (called the document count frequency, or docCount):




where Ij(tk) is an indicator function with value 1 if term tk is in document j and 0 otherwise.
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Once we have chosen our database model, to effectively compare two Deep Web databases
and determine the relevance of one database to another, we need two technical components:
(1) a technique for generating a resource summary; and (2) a metric for measuring the
relevance between the two databases.
7.3.2 Estimating Resource Summaries
Ideally, we would have access to the complete set of documents belonging to a Deep Web
database. We call a resource summary for Di built on the complete set of documents an
actual resource summary or ASummary(Di). However, the enormous size of many Deep
Web databases coupled with the non-trivial costs of collecting documents (through queries
and individual document downloads) make it unreasonable to generate an actual resource
summary for every Deep Web database available. Additionally, the well-noted dynamic
nature of Deep Web data [92] makes extracting the complete set of documents belonging
to a Deep Web database infeasible, since Deep Web databases may add new content and
delete old content faster than all documents may be extracted.
As a result, previous researchers have introduced several techniques for sampling a
database through a series of probe queries to generate a representative summary based on
a small sample of the entire database [37, 36]. We call such a representative summary an
estimated resource summary, denoted as
ESummary(Di) = {(t1, wi1), (t2, wi2), · · · , (tN , wiN )
The number of occurring terms (i.e., those terms that have non-zero weight) in the
estimated summary is denoted by N ′i . Typically, N
′
i will be much less than the number of
non-zero weighted terms Ni in the actual resource summary since only a fraction of the total
documents in a database will be examined. Hence, the goal of a prober is typically to find
ESummary(Di) such that the relative distribution of terms closely matches the distribution
of terms in ASummary(Di), even though only a fraction of the total documents will be
examined.
Current probing techniques for estimating resource summaries aim at estimating the
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overall summary of the content for a Deep Web database. We classify these sampling
techniques into two categories: random sampling and query-based sampling.
Random Sampling − No Bias
If we had unfettered access to a Deep Web database, we could randomly select terms from
the database to generate the estimated resource summary ESummary(Di). Barring that,
we could randomly select documents with which to base the estimated resource summary.
We will call such a random selection mechanism an unbiased prober since all terms (or doc-
uments) are equally likely to be selected. In practice, an unbiased prober is unrealistic since
most Deep Web databases only provide a query-based mechanism for extracting documents.
Query-based Sampling − Query Bias
As a good approximation to unbiased probing, Callan et al. [37, 36] have introduced a
query-based sampling technique for generating accurate estimates of Deep Web databases
by examining only a fraction of the total documents. The Callan technique relies on repeat-
edly requesting documents from a source using a limited set of queries. Since the documents
extracted are not chosen randomly, but are biased by the querying mechanism through the
ranking of returned documents and by providing incomplete access to the entire database,
we say that the Callan technique displays query bias. There are several ways to define the
limited set of queries, including random selection from a general dictionary and random
selection augmented by terms drawn from the extracted documents from a database. The
query bias technique has some advantages over the no bias approach, since two databases
that consist of the same set of documents, but have different ranking approaches will be
sampled (and hence represented by the estimated summary) differently. Through exper-
imental validation, the Callan technique has been shown to extract high-quality resource
summaries (through a number of metrics) over databases consisting of over one million
pages by collecting only a few hundred documents. Since the distribution of terms across
the documents of a text database follows a Zipfian distribution [36] – meaning that a few
words occur in many documents, while the majority of terms occur in very few documents
– extracting a small sample of documents may be successful at extracting the most popular
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terms in a database, resulting in a high-quality resource summary. In the rest of the chap-
ter, when we refer to an estimated resource summary ESummary(Di), we mean one that
has been produced by a query-biased prober.
7.3.3 Potential Problems
In order to determine the relevance of one Deep Web database Di to another database Dj
and to assess the nature of their relationship, we require an appropriate relevance metric.
There are a number of possible relevance metrics to compare two resource summaries,
including a simple count of the common terms in both resource summaries to a weighted
version that considers the term weights of the common terms in both resource summaries.
We consider two different relevance metrics here that each emphasize a different notion of
relevance.
The first is a popular symmetric relevance metric adopted from the information retrieval
community for comparing the resource summaries of two databases Di and Dj – the cosine









where wik is the weight for term k in ESummary(Di) and wjk is the weight for term k in
ESummaryDj . The cosine ranges from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating a higher degree
of similarity. In contrast, the cosine between orthogonal vectors is 0, indicating that they
are completely dissimilar. The cosine measures the angle between two vectors, regardless
of the length of each vector.
The second relevance metric is asymmetric in nature and measures the fraction of terms




If all of the terms in Di also occur in Dj , then the containment is 1. If no terms in
Di occur in Dj then the containment is 0. The containment relevance metric may be used
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to measure the containment of each resource summary with respect to the other, and vice
versa.
We now use an example to illustrate why the existing resource summary estimation
techniques are inadequate for effectively revealing interesting relationships between two
databases, especially in terms of the content coverage of one (target) in the context of the
other (source). We considered three real-world Deep Web databases – the PubMed medical
literature site, the job-posting site Monster.com, and the popular search engine Google. We
consider Google to be a Deep Web database since it provides an advanced ranking engine
over a database of indexed content. We further note that all three Deep Web databases
provide access to vast content that is constantly being updated (i.e., PubMed adds new
citations, Monster provides up-to-date job postings, and Google updates its index to reflect
changes in the Web), meaning that a sampling-based approach is necessary to provide a
current snapshot of the state of each Deep Web database.
Example: We collected 300 documents from Google, PubMed, and Monster, respec-
tively, using a query-based sampling technique for resource summary estimation. For each
site, we issued a random query term drawn from the standard Unix dictionary and col-
lected a maximum of four documents per query. We then extracted the plain text from
each sampled document by removing all HTML tags and eliminated a list of common stop-
words (e.g., “a”, “the”, and so on). Using the resource summaries constructed, we find
that cos(PubMed,Google) = 0.15 and cos(PubMed,Monster) = 0.16. Similarly, we find
that for the asymmetric relevance metric, we have contain(PubMed,Google) = 0.19 and
contain(PubMed,Monster) = 0.22, meaning that 22% of the terms in the PubMed esti-
mated summary also occur in the Google estimated summary, whereas 25% of the PubMed
terms occur in Monster. Hence, for both relevance metrics we see that both Google and Mon-
ster appear to have relatively low relevance with respect to PubMed. Although Monster does
provide some health-related content (like medical job postings), we expect that Google should
be significantly more relevant to PubMed since it provides as much or more health-related
content. When we reverse the containment calculation, we find that contain(Google, PubMed) =
0.32 and contain(Monster, PubMed) = 0.36. Interestingly, these statistics support exactly
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the opposite conclusion we would anticipate: that more of Google’s content is contained in
PubMed, than vice versa.
This example underlines a critical problem with current techniques for probing and com-
paring resource summaries. Current resource summary estimation techniques are concerned
with generating overall summaries of the underlying databases. The goal is to generate es-
sentially an unbiased estimate of the actual resource summary. Due to the Zipfian distribu-
tion of terms across the documents of a Deep Web database, an unbiased summary will focus
on terms that are relatively popular across the space of all documents. For two Deep Web
databases that have overlapping content (like PubMed and Google), a comparison over these
unbiased summaries will not necessarily identify these specialized areas of commonality. In
this example, since Google has such broad coverage, few terms in an unbiased estimated
summary may be common to the PubMed estimated resource summary. Hence, many top-
ics that are relevant for context-based database comparisons may be under-represented or
overlooked completely, since the summaries contain just a small fraction of the total terms
in each database. In the context of our example, it would be interesting to discover both
that Google is much more relevant to PubMed than Monster and that Google has much
broader coverage than Monster. When comparing databases, the relevance metrics based
on the unbiased summaries of each database like the ones described above are clearly inad-
equate, since they fail to adequately capture the asymmetric relationship between the two
databases. This example shows both the need for a new query probing technique to hone
on the common areas between two databases, allowing for more in-depth comparisons, and
the need for more effective relevance metrics to more appropriately capture the nature and
degree of the relationship between two databases.
7.4 Source-Biased Database Analysis
Bearing these issues in mind, we introduce a source-biased approach – called source-biased
database analysis – to efficiently discover interesting relationships among text document
databases. There are three fundamental steps in performing source-biased database analy-
sis: (1) source-biased probing for Deep Web database discovery; (2) evaluation and ranking
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of discovered Deep Web databases with the biased focus metric; and (3) leveraging the bi-
ased perspective of sources and targets to discover interesting relationships. This framework
provides the foundation for enabling relationship-centric queries over Deep Web databases.
7.4.1 Source-Biased Probing
In order to find the target databases that have high relevance to a source, we need to
generate a source-biased summary of the target databases instead of using unbiased sum-
maries of the targets. We introduce a source-biased probing algorithm that can compute
the relevance of the target databases with respect to the source in very few probes. Given a
Deep Web database – the source – the source-biased probing technique leverages the sum-
mary information of the source to generate a series of biased probes for analyzing another
Deep Web database – the target. This source-biased probing allows us to determine in very
few interactions whether a target database is relevant to the source by probing the target
with focused probes. Note that the goal of source-biased probing is not to generate an
unbiased estimated resource summary like the query-based sampling approach discussed
above. Instead, the goal is to intentionally skew the estimated summary of a target Deep
Web database towards the source database for enabling more effective comparisons. This
source-biasing is especially important for supporting relationship-centric queries over a di-
verse and large set of Deep Web databases for which exhaustive sampling of each database
is infeasible.
To help differentiate the source-biased approach from others discussed in Section 7.3,
in this section we use σ to denote the source database and τ to denote the target database
instead of Di and Dj . Given two databases σ and τ , the output of the source-biased probing
is a subjective resource summary for τ that is biased towards σ. We denote the source-biased
summary of the target database as:
ESummaryσ(τ) = {(t1, wσ1 ), (t2, wσ2 ), · · · , (tN , wσN )}
N is the total number of terms used in analyzing the set of Deep Web databases. wσi
(1 ≤ i ≤ N) is the weight of term ti, defined using one of the weight functions introduced
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SourceBiasedProbing(Database σ, Database τ)
For target database τ , initialize ESummaryσ(τ) = ∅.
repeat
Invoke the probe term selection algorithm to select a one-term
query
probe q from the source of bias ESummary(σ).
Send the query q to the target database τ .
Retrieve the top-m documents from τ .
Update ESummaryσ(τ) with the terms and frequencies from
the top-m documents.
until Stop probing condition is met.
return ESummaryσ(τ)
Figure 89: Source-Biased Probing Algorithm
in Section 7.3.1. It is important to note that typically the inequality wj 6= wσJ does hold.
Concretely, the source-biased probing algorithm generates a source-biased summary
for a target as follows: It begins with an unbiased resource summary of the source σ,
denoted by ESummary(σ), that is generated through a standard application of query-
based sampling. It uses the unbiased resource summary ESummary(σ) as a dictionary of
candidate probe terms and sends a series of probe terms, selected from ESummary(σ), to
the target database τ ; for each probe term, it retrieves the top m matched documents from
τ , generates summary terms and updates ESummaryσ(τ), the source-biased summary of
the target database. Note that the updating process requires the simple updating of the
term-frequency statistics in the source-biased summary based on the statistics extracted
from the new batch of sampled documents. This process repeats until a stopping condition
is met. Figure 89 illustrates the source-biased probing process.
In general, we may extend the pairwise source-biased probing algorithm along two di-
mensions: to consider k bias sources with one target database, or to consider k target
databases with one source.
Let S be a subset of databases from the universe of discourse U . S consists of k (0 ≤
k ≤ d) databases from U , where S = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σk}. Each σj ∈ S corresponds to a
database Di ∈ U . We may then define a set of biased summary estimates for σj based on
the sources of bias in S: {ESummaryσ1(τ),ESummaryσ2(τ), ...ESummaryσk(τ)}. Hence,
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with source-biased probing, a target database may be viewed through the lens of a set
of biasing sources, rather than through a single unbiased summary. As a result, we may
use these biased summaries to characterize the target database, which can be helpful for
clustering and categorization applications, as well as for supporting query routing to the
appropriate Deep Web database. For example, we may discover that the PubMed-biased
summary of Monster contains many more medical-related job postings than a PubMed-
biased summary of the technical jobs site Dice. Hence, a query engine could choose to route
medical-jobs-related queries to Monster, rather than Dice.
Similarly, a set of target databases can be evaluated and compared with respect to one
source using the source-biased lens. Extending the pairwise source-biased probing algorithm
along this dimension allows for the evaluation and ranking of the target databases with
respect to the source database. We discuss this type of analysis in great detail in the
following section.
The performance and effectiveness of the source-biased probing algorithm depends upon
a number of factors, including the network characteristics of the target database (like up-
time, latency, etc.), the ranking algorithm used at the target database for ranking the re-
turned documents, the selection criterion used for choosing source-specific candidate probe
terms, and the type of stop condition used to terminate the probing process. In this chapter,
we focus our attention on the selection criterion and the stop probing condition.
Mechanisms to Select Probe Terms
There are several possible ways to select the probes based on the statistics stored with each
resource summary, including uniform random selection and selection based on top-weighted
terms. In general, the selection criterion will recommend a query term drawn from the set
of all non-zero weighted terms in the unbiased source summary ESummary(σ).
Uniform Random Selection: In this simplest of selection techniques, each term that occurs in
ESummary(σ) has an equal probability of being selected, i.e., Prob(selecting term j) = 1Nσ .
Weight-Based Selection: Rather than randomly selecting query terms, we could instead
rely on a ranking of the terms by one of the statistics that are recorded with each resource
summary. For example, all terms in ESummary(σ) could be ranked according to the weight
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of each term. Terms would then be selected in descending order of weight. Depending on
the type of weight cataloged (e.g., dbFreq, docCount, etc.), several flavors of weight-based
selection may be considered.
Different Types of Stop Probing Conditions
The stop probing condition is the second critical component in the source-biased probing
algorithm. It is interesting to note that the more documents the source-biased probing
algorithm extracts from a target database, the more likely the source-biased estimated
summary of the target database will tend to closely correlate with the unbiased estimated
summary of the target database, meaning that the choice of stop probing condition is vitally
important. So long as there are still query terms available in the source summary for use
in probing, the source-biased probing algorithm will continue to extract documents, even
if the queries issued are less indicative of the source subject matter. For example, if we
are using PubMed as a source of bias for probing a non-relevant sports database, a poorly
selected stop probing condition could result in the algorithm exhausting all of the heavily-
weighted scientific and medical query probes, forcing the algorithm to send lowly-weighted
(and hence, less indicative of PubMed) probes, resulting in a target summary that closely
resembles an unbiased summary. Hence, the stop probing condition is critical to guide
the quality of the source-biased probing algorithm. We consider four different types of
conditions that might be used in practice:
Number of Queries: After some fixed number of query probes (MaxProbes), end the prob-
ing. This condition is indifferent to the number of documents that are examined for each
database.
Documents Returned: In contrast to the first technique, the second condition considers not
the number of queries, but the total number of documents (MaxDocs) returned by the
database.
Document Thresholding: Rather than treating each document the same, this third alterna-
tive applies a threshold value to each document to determine if it should be counted toward
MaxDocs. For each document, we may calculate the relevance of the document to the
source of bias ESummary(σ). If the document relevance is greater than some threshold
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value, then the document is counted. Otherwise, the document is discarded.
Steady-State: Rather than relying on a count of queries or documents, this final stopping
condition alternative instead relies on the estimated summary reaching a steady-state. After
each probe, we calculate the difference between the new value of ESummaryσ(τ) and the
old value. If the difference (which may be calculated in a number of ways) is less than some
small value ε, then we consider the summary stable and stop the probing.
7.4.2 Evaluating and Ranking Databases with Biased Focus
Given a source and a target database, once we generate the source-biased summary for the
target database, we need an efficient mechanism to measure the source-biased relevance
of a target database with respect to the source. Once a set of target databases have been
evaluated with the source-biased relevance metric, we can then rank the targets with respect
to the source of bias. We perform this task using the second component of source-biased
database analysis – a source-biased metric.
Let σ denote a source database modeled by an unbiased summary and τ denote a
target database with a σ-biased summary, and let focusσ(τ) denote the source-biased focus
measure. We define focusσ(τ) to be a measure of the topical focus of the target database τ
with respect to the source of bias σ. The focus metric ranges from 0 to 1, with lower values
indicating less focus and higher values indicating more focus. In general, focus is not a
symmetric relation. We may describe any two Deep Web databases σ and τ with the focus
in terms of σ by focusσ(τ) or in terms of τ by focusτ (σ). The biased focus is intended as
a measure of inclusion [132]; that is, it measures the amount of the source included in the
target.
There are several ways to calculate the biased focus for a source and a target. Adopting
the cosine similarity introduced in the previous section for the case of a source-biased target













where wσk is the weight for term k in ESummary(σ) and wστk is the σ-biased weight for
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term k in ESummaryσ(τ). Again, we note that the cosine ranges from 0 to 1, with higher
scores indicating a higher degree of similarity.
Alternatively, we could approximate the focus measure by computing the ratio of com-
mon terms between source and target over the source summary estimate. We call this




This approximation counts the number of common terms between the source of bias and
the target and divides by the size of the source of bias. So if all terms in the source of bias
occur in the target, then the target is perfectly focused on the source and CTfocusσ(τ) = 1.
Conversely, if no terms in the source of bias occur in the target, then the target has no
focus on the source and CTfocusσ(τ) = 0. Unfortunately, a common-term based focus
measure will tend to understate the importance of highly-weighted terms and overvalue the
importance of lowly-weighted terms. An obvious solution to address the above-mentioned





where wσk is the weight for term k in ESummaryσ. The term weight based focus measure
can be seen as a generalization of the ctfratio introduced in [37].2
While the TWfocusσ(τ) approximation overcomes the problems of the CTfocusσ(τ),
it introduces new issues. For example, the term weights used in the TWfocusσ(τ) approx-
imation are from the unbiased summary of the source. Thus the actual weights of terms in
the source-biased estimate may be distorted by relying on the unbiased summary weights.
Intuitively, the cosine-based biased focus is the most appealing of the three biased focus
candidates since it seems to more reasonably capture the relevance between two Deep Web
databases. In the experiments section we show that, compared with TWfocusσ(τ) and
2The ctfratio is presented in the context of comparing an estimated resource summary DB
′ to an actual




i∈DB ctfi, where ctfi = number of times term i occurs in
the source. Here, we have generalized this formulation for comparison of summaries from different databases,
and for use with term weightings other than the ctf .
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CTfocusσ(τ), the Cosine focusσ(τ) measure can quickly approximate the actual focus
measure using fewer documents.
Ranking Relevant Databases
Given an appropriate biased focus measure, we may probe a group of target databases to
identify the most relevant databases to the source of bias. For a single source of bias D1
from our universe of discourse U , we may evaluate multiple target databases D2, D3, ...,
Dd. For each target database, we may evaluate the appropriate focus measure for each
source-target pair (i.e., focusD1(D2), focusD1(D3), etc.). We may then rank the target
databases in descending order in terms of their source-biased focus with respect to D1.
7.4.3 Identifying Interesting Inter-database Relationships
The critical third component of source-biased database analysis are the techniques for ex-
ploiting and understanding relationships between Deep Web databases using a source-biased
lens. By analyzing the nature of the relationships between Deep Web databases, we will
provide support for relationship-centric queries. For example, we may identify relationship
sets for a source that support queries of the form: “What other Deep Web databases are
most similar to X? Or complementary to X?”, among others.
As we have discussed before, current search and directory technologies for comparing
Deep Web databases (such as search engines or Yahoo!-like directories) are not optimized
for the type of relationship-centric queries that have a strong source-biased flavor. Some
examples were given in the introduction of this chapter. In contrast, our source-biased
probing framework and biased focus measure provide the flexible building blocks for au-
tomated identification of interesting relationships between Deep Web databases, especially
since the framework promotes an asymmetric source-biased view for any two Deep Web
databases. Our relationship discovery module creates a flexible organization of Deep Web
databases, where each database is annotated with a list of relationship sets. The two typical
relationship types we have identified are similarity-based and hierarchical-based.
Similarity-Based Relationships
Given the universe of discourse U = {D1, D2, . . . , Dd}, we identify three similarity-based
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relationship sets for a particular Deep Web database Di. These relationship sets are defined
in terms of threshold values λhigh and λlow, where 0 ≤ λlow ≤ λhigh < 1.
λ− equivalent: The first relationship says that if both focusDi(Dj) > λhigh and focusDj (Di) >
λhigh hold, then we may conclude that Di is sufficiently focused on Dj and Dj is sufficiently
focused on Di. Hence, the two databases are approximately the same in terms of their
content coverage. We call this approximate equality λ-equivalence. It indicates that the
equivalence is not absolute but is a function of the parameter λhigh. Formally:
λ-equivalent(Di) = {∀Dj ∈ U | focusDi(Dj) > λhigh ∧ focusDj (Di) > λhigh}
λ-equivalent(Di) = {∀Dj ∈ U | focusDi(Dj) > λhigh ∧ focusDj (Di) > λhigh}
λ−mutex: If both focusDi(Dj) < λlow and focusDj (Di) < λlow hold, then we can con-
clude that Di and Dj are sufficiently concerned with different topics since neither one is
very focused on the other. We annotate this approximately mutually exclusive (mutex)
nature with the λ prefix. Formally:
λ-mutex(Di) = {∀Dj ∈ U | focusDi(Dj) < λlow ∧ focusDj (Di) < λlow}
λ− overlap: When two Deep Web databases Di and Dj are neither λ-equivalent nor λ-
mutex, we say that the two Deep Web databases λ-overlap. Formally:
λ-overlap(Di) = {∀Dj ∈ U | Dj /∈ λ-mutex(Di) ∧Dj /∈ λ-equivalent(Di)}
Hierarchical Relationships
In addition to similarity-based relationship sets, we also define hierarchical relationship sets
by measuring the relative coverage of target databases in U with respect to a particular
Deep Web database Di (source). These hierarchical relationship sets are defined in terms
of a parameter λdiff , where 0 ≤ λdiff ≤ 1.
λ− superset: If focusDi(Dj)− focusDj (Di) > λdiff , then a relatively significant portion
of Di is contained in Dj , indicating that Dj has a λ-superset relationship with Di. We use
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the λ prefix to indicate that Dj is not a strict superset of Di, but rather that the relationship
is parameterized by λdiff . Formally:
λ-superset(Di) = {∀Dj ∈ U | focusDi(Dj)− focusDj (Di) > λdiff}
λ− subset: Conversely, If focusDj (Di)−focusDi(Dj) > λdiff , then a relatively significant
portion of Dj is contained in Di, indicating that Dj has a λ-subset relationship with Di.
Similarly, Dj is not a strict subset of Di, but rather the relationship is parameterized by
λdiff . Formally:
λ-subset(Di) = {∀Dj ∈ U | focusDj (Di)− focusDi(Dj) > λdiff}
We note that the determination of the appropriate λ-values is critical for the correct
assignation of databases to each relationship set. In our experiments section, we illustrate
how these relationship sets may be created; for now, we leave the optimization of λ-values
as future work.
Using Relationship Sets
Both similarity-based and hierarchy-based inter-database relationships can be generated
automatically, and used as metadata annotation to each of the Deep Web databases. These
source-biased relevance data provide a flexible foundation for relationship analysis among
Deep Web databases. For any Deep Web database Di, we need only consult the appropriate
relationship set to evaluate a relationship-centric query. The three similarity-based relation-
ship sets provide the basis for answering queries of the form: “What other databases are
most like X? Somewhat like X? Or complementary to X?”. The two hierarchical-based sets
provide the basis for answering queries of the form: “What other databases are more gen-
eral than X? Or more specialized than X?”. Of course, the relationship-centric queries may
be further refined by considering a number of criteria besides topical relevance, including
trust, quality-of-service, and size, among others.
In addition, these relationship sets are useful for routing regular document-centric
queries to appropriate databases. For example, a user interested in medical literature may
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choose to query both PubMed and all of the databases that have a λ-equivalence rela-
tionship with PubMed. Alternatively, a user interested in maximizing coverage of multiple
topically-distinct Deep Web databases, may choose to query both the source database she
knows about and any members in the mutually exclusive set of the source database. The
hierarchical relationship sets are particularly helpful in cases where a user may refine a
query to more specialized resources, or alternatively, may choose to generalize the scope of
the query by considering databases further up the hierarchy to get more matching answers.
In this chapter, our goal is to illustrate the importance of relationship sets and show that
they may be discovered using source-biased probing. We anticipate the further exploration
of relationship sets in our future work.
7.5 Focal Term Probing
One of the critical parameters to the success of source-biased probing is the choice of probe
terms from the source of bias σ. We have discussed several selection techniques as well as
different ways to define stop-probing conditions. In this section we introduce a refinement
over these simple selection techniques whereby the source summary is segmented into k
groups of co-occurring terms. The main idea is to iteratively select one term from each of the
k groups to probe the target. We call these terms the focal terms of the corresponding group.
When used in conjunction with the general source-biased probing algorithm, we have an
enhanced version called source-biased probing with focal terms. Like the basic algorithm of
source-biased probing, the goal remains to produce source-biased target resource summaries
that are effective for detecting interesting relationships between a source of bias and a target.
A unique advantage of using focal terms is that these source-biased summaries of target
databases can be generated in far fewer queries and with higher quality.
7.5.1 Focal Terms and Focal Term Groups
Let σ denote a source database with its unbiased resource summary ESummaryσ. We
denote the set of terms with non-zero weight in ESummaryσ (i.e., the terms that actually
occur in the database σ) as Terms(σ), where Terms(σ) consists of n terms t1, t2, ..., tn. A
focal term group is a subset of terms in the set Terms(σ) that co-occur in the documents of
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Table 16: Example Focal Terms for PubMed
Group Terms
1 care, education, family, management, ...
2 brain, gene, protein, nucleotide, ...
3 clinical, noteworthy, taxonomy, ...
4 experimental, molecular, therapy, ...
5 aids, evidence, research, winter, ...
σ. We denote a focal term group i as FTermsi. The main idea behind source-biased probing
with focal terms is to partition the set Terms(σ) into k disjoint term groups such that the
terms within each term group co-occur in documents of σ more frequently than they do
with terms from other term groups. We note this measure of co-occurrence is rather coarse;
our notion of co-occurrence merely indicates that two words occur in the same document
together, regardless of their semantic relationship. Recall that in the vector-space model
adopted in this chapter, the order of words within a document and the nearness of one word
to another in a document are not considered, though we anticipate refining the measure of
co-occurrence in future work.
Formally, we need an algorithm that can find a partition of Terms(σ) into k focal term
groups:
Terms(σ) = {FTerms1, . . . , FTermsi, . . . , FTermsk|
k⋃
i=1
FTermsi = {t1, ..., tn} and
FTermsi ∩ FTermsj = ∅}
In Table 16, we show an example of five focal term groups for a collection of 100 PubMed
documents. Note that k is intended to be very small since the focal term groups are meant
to be very coarse. We will describe the concrete algorithm to find k partitions of the set
Terms(σ) in the next section.
Given k focal term groups, by selecting a focal term from each term group FTermsi as
a probing query, we hope to retrieve documents that also contain many of the other words
in that focal term group. For example, suppose we are using a frequency-based measure for
query probe selection from PubMed. The top four query terms may be “brain”, “gene”,
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“protein”, and “nucleotide”. Suppose these four terms tend to co-occur with each other as
indicated in Table 16. By sending the first query “brain” to a target database, we could
reasonably expect to find the other three terms since our analysis of the source indicates
that these four terms tend to co-occur. A naive source-biased prober would ignore this
co-occurrence information and, instead, send the other three queries “gene”, “protein”,
and “nucleotide”, even though we might reasonably expect for those queries to generate
documents similar to the first query “brain”. In essence, we will have used four queries
when a single query would have sufficed at adequately exploring the term space of the target.
In cases in which both the source and target database have similar term co-occurrences,
then we would anticipate focal term probing providing an advantage over the other probe
selection techniques.
The sophistication of source-biased probing with focal terms is to identify these co-
occurrence relationships in order to reduce the number of queries necessary to efficiently
detect relationships between a source and a target database. By using focal terms, we may
generate more accurate biased summaries of target databases in far fewer probe queries and
with higher quality.
In an ideal case, every focal term group would consist of terms that only co-occur with
each other and not with any other terms in the other focal terms groups. By selecting
a single term from each perfectly segmented term group, we ideally could send no more
than k probes, one for each focal term group. Each probe would produce a document that
contained every other term in that focal term group. In the more realistic setting, we will
need to handle varying degrees of co-occurrence, but we still expect a good reduction in the
number of probes necessary to generate a high-quality biased summary estimate for each
target database.
It is important to note that, unlike previous research in grouping terms – for query-
expansion [144, 185] or finding similar terms [158] – our goal is not to find close semantic
relationships between terms, but rather to find very coarse co-occurrence associations among
terms to support a more efficient and effective biased resource summary estimation. For
example, though we may discover that “brain” and “protein” tend to co-occur, we do not
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claim that there is a close semantic relationship between the two terms.
7.5.2 Finding Focal Terms
Now that we have discussed the motivation of finding focal terms, we are still faced with
the task of actually segmenting Terms(σ) into k groups of focal terms. In this section,
we discuss how we may adapt a popular clustering technique to the problem of focal term
discovery. Recall that in Section 7.3.1, we view a Deep Web database Di as a set of
documents, each of which is described by a vector of terms and weights. We now invert
our view of a database using the same set of information. We consider a database Di as a
collection of terms, each of which is described by a vector of the documents in which the term
occurs and a weight describing the occurrence frequency of the term in the corresponding
document. Hence, we have: Terms(Di) = {term1, term2, · · · , termN}.
For the N terms in the database, each termj (1 ≤ j ≤ N) is a vector of documents and
weights:
termj = {(doc1, wj1), (doc2, wj2), · · · , (docM , wjM )}
We can define a segmentation technique for finding focal term groups by clustering the
set Terms(Di) into k clusters. Given the term vectors and the similarity function, a number
of clustering algorithms can be applied to partition the set Terms(Di) of N terms into k
clusters. We choose Simple K-Means since it is conceptually simple and computationally
efficient. The algorithm starts by generating k random cluster centers. Each term is assigned
to the cluster with the most similar (or least distant) center. The similarity is computed
based on the closeness of the term and each of the cluster centers. Then the algorithm refines
the k cluster centers based on the centroid of each cluster. Terms are then re-assigned to
the cluster with the most similar center. The cycle of calculating centroids and assigning
terms in Terms(Di) to k clusters repeats until the cluster centroids stabilize. Let C denote
a cluster in the form of a set of terms in the cluster. The centroid of cluster C is:
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FocalTerms(Number of Clusters k, Input Vectors D)
Let D = {d1, ..., dn} denote the set of n term vectors
Let M denote the total number of documents in D
Let dj = < (doc1, wj1), . . . , (docM , wjM ) > denote a term vector
of M elements,
wjl is the TFIDF weight of the docl in term j (l = 1, . . . ,M)
Let C = {C1, ..., Ck} denote a clustering of D into k clusters.
Let µi denote the center of cluster Ci
foreach cluster Ci
Randomly pick a term vector, say dj from D
Initialize a cluster center µi = dj , where dj ∈ D
repeat
foreach input term vector dj ∈ D
foreach cluster Ci ∈ C i = 1, . . . , k
compute δi = sim(dj , µi)
if δh is the smallest among δ1, δ2, . . . , δk
µh is the nearest cluster center to dj
Assign dj to the cluster Ch
// refine cluster centers using centroids
foreach cluster Ci ∈ C




µi ←< (doc1, cwi1), . . . , (docM , cwiM ) >
until cluster centers no longer change
return C

















where wjl is the weight of term j in document l, and the formula 1|C|
∑
l∈C wjl denotes
the average weight of the document l in the cluster C. A sketch of the K-Means term
clustering based on term-vector of a Deep Web database is provided in Figure 90.
The similarity function used in Figure 90 can be defined using a number of functions.
In this chapter, we use the cosine similarity function. Given a set of N terms and a set
of M documents, where wik denotes the weight for term k in document i (1 ≤ k ≤ N ,
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In Section 7.7 we report experiments on the effectiveness of using focal terms to optimize
the source-biased probing algorithm, showing that the source-biased algorithm with focal
terms results in more efficient probing for varying numbers of focal-term groups.
7.5.3 Selecting Focal-Based Probes
Once the k focal term groups have been constructed for a source, the remaining problem is
how to select the best terms for probing a target database. We rely on a simple round-robin
selection technique whereby a single term is selected from each focal term group in turn. In
each round, a single term may be selected according to one of the probe selection techniques
discussed above, like uniform selection or weighted selection. Once a single term has been
selected from each group, the cycle repeats by selecting a second term from each group, a
third term, and so on. The cycle of selecting focal terms and querying the target database
may be stopped according to one of the stop probing conditions discussed above. Given
this basic strategy, we may use a number of techniques for determining the order by which
to select terms from the k groups and for selecting probe terms from each focal term group.
One way to determine the order of focal term groups is based upon the size of each group.
We begin with the group with the most terms and end each cycle with the group that has
the smallest number of terms.
7.6 Implementing Source-Biased Database Analysis in DynaBot
In this section, we present the preliminary design and architecture of the DynaBot system for
supporting relationship-centric queries over the Deep Web. The Deep Web of online Web-
enabled databases is a large and growing component of the Web – with recent estimates
suggesting that there are nearly 92,000 terabytes of data on the Deep Web versus only 167
terabytes on the surface Web [117]. Traditional crawling and indexing techniques that have
shown tremendous success on the surface Web of hyperlinked pages are insufficient for the
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Figure 91: DynaBot System Architecture
Deep Web – where data is stored in databases or produced in real-time in response to a
particular user query.
In response to these challenges, we have developed the DynaBot system for harnessing
the vast amounts of data available in Web-enabled databases [150]. DynaBot is designed
with a modular architecture to support the entire lifecycle of supporting Deep Web data
access, ranking, and query support – including the relationship-centric queries introduced
in this chapter. Figure 91 presents the overall architecture of DynaBot, with an emphasis
on the initial crawling, discovery, and source-biased analysis modules.
DynaBot utilizes an advanced crawler architecture that includes standard crawler com-
ponents like a URL frontier manager, network interaction modules, global storage and
associated data managers, and document processors, as well as the pluggable DynaBot-
specific semantic analyzers, which analyze the candidate Deep Web databases. We note
that the name resolver in Figure 91 takes a URL and converts it into the corresponding IP
address. The current semantic analyzers that have been incorporated into DynaBot include
the service class matcher and the source-biased analyzer.
Rather than rely on a generic crawling strategy, we use the focused crawling framework
to guide DynaBot on domain-specific crawls for identifying Deep Web databases related to
a specific topic. Focused crawling has previously been introduced for guiding traditional
Web crawlers to Web pages related to a specific topic [38]. A DynaBot crawl begins from
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a seed list of URLs that may be supplied by the user and geared toward a particular
domain. So a DynaBot crawl for PubMed-related resources could begin from a URL seed
list including PubMed and URLs that point to PubMed. The service class matcher uses
focused crawling of the Deep Web to discover candidate Deep Web databases that are
relevant to a specific domain of interest – e.g., bioinformatics sources, online retailers, etc.
The main idea of the service class matcher is to support guided matching of candidate
Deep Web databases by finding members of a common service class of functionally similar
Deep Web databases. Each service class is encoded in a service class description that
describes the key attributes that define the service class. When the crawler comes across a
Web-based query interface, it invokes the service class matcher to determine if it is indeed
a candidate of the service class. The service class matcher includes tools for probing a
candidate Deep Web site, generating a site-specific script for interacting with a Deep Web
database, and classifying a site as a member of a particular service class based on the service
class description. The classification component considers the input schema of the Deep Web
database’s query interface, the output schema of sampled data, and a seed list of example
probing templates for the particular service class. The output of the service class matcher
is a set of functionally similar Deep Web databases for use by the source-biased analyzer.
For the PubMed example, the Deep Web databases identified would all be members of a
service class for medical and scientific literature databases. The DynaBot crawling module
may be run for multiple service class instances to discover a large and diverse set of Deep
Web databases for consideration by the subsequent modules.
The source-biased analyzer module uses the site-specific scripts generated in the ser-
vice class matching module for interacting with each Deep Web database discovered. The
source-biased probing, biased focus evaluation, and relationship-set discovery introduced in
this chapter are all incorporated into the source-biased analyzer module of DynaBot. Our
current efforts are focused on continuing to enhance the capability and efficiency of these




In this section, we describe five sets of experiments designed to evaluate the benefits and
costs of our source-biased approach compared to existing approaches. The first set of
experiments intends to show the effectiveness of our source-biased probing algorithm and
performance comparison with query probing and unbiased probing. The second set evaluates
the biased focus measure for ranking Deep Web database. The third set is designed to
show the efficiency of the biased focus measure in identifying interesting inter-database
relationships. The fourth set of experiments evaluates the efficacy of source-biased probing
with focal terms by comparing the basic source-biased probing versus source-biased probing
with varying number of groups of focal terms. Our experiments show that source-biased
probing with focal terms can achieve about ten percent performance improvement over the
basic algorithm for source-biased probing. And the final set of experiments considers the
impact of several key parameters on the overall performance of the source-biased approach.
We choose two different sets of Deep Web databases for our experiments: (1) a large
collection of newsgroups designed to emulate the diversity and scope of real-world Deep
Web databases; and (2) a modest collection of real-world Deep Web Deep Web databases.
Since the contents of Deep Web databases in the Deep Web collection change frequently
and are beyond our control, and in an effort not to overload any one site, we relied on the
newsgroup dataset for rigorous experimental validation. We additionally note that a similar
newsgroup setup has been used before to emulate Deep Web databases [93].
Newsgroup Collection: We collected articles from 1,000 randomly selected usenet news-
groups over the period June to July 2003. We eliminated overly small newsgroups contain-
ing fewer than 100 articles, heavily spammed newsgroups (which have a disproportionate
number of off-topic messages), and newsgroups with primarily binary data. After filtering
out these groups, we were left with 590 single topic newsgroups, ranging in size from 100
to 16,000 articles. In an effort to match the heterogeneity and scope inherent in many
real-world Deep Web databases, we constructed 135 additional groups of mixed topics by
randomly selecting articles from anywhere from 4 to 80 single topic newsgroups, and 55 ag-
gregate topic newsgroups by combining articles from related newsgroups (e.g., by selecting
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random documents from all the subgroups in comp.unix.* into a single aggregate group).
In total, the newsgroup collection consists of over 2.5GB worth of articles in 780 groups.
Deep Web Collection: For the second collection, we randomly selected 50 sites from
the ProFusion 3 directory of Deep Web sites, in addition to Google and PubMed. We
queried each site with a randomized set of single-word probes drawn from the standard
Unix dictionary, and collected a maximum of 50 documents per site. Previous research has
indicated that small samples of several hundred pages may result in high quality resource
summaries over databases consisting of over one million pages, since the distribution of
terms across the documents of a text database follows a Zipfian distribution [36]. In this
case, we choose a sample size of 50 documents to determine if even smaller samples can
yield positive results in the source-biased context.
Probing Framework: We built a probing engine in Java 1.4 for use in all of our experi-
ments. For each group in both datasets, we constructed the actual resource summary based
on the overall term frequency of each term (dbFreq). We eliminated a set of common stop-
words (e.g., “a”, “the”, and so on) as well as collection-specific stopwords (e.g., “wrote”,
“said”, and so on for the newsgroup collection). Terms were not stemmed.
7.7.1 Effectiveness of Source-Biased Probing
The goal of our first set of experiments is to compare source-biased probing with existing
probing techniques such as query probing and unbiased probing and to evaluate the effi-
ciency and quality of source-biased probing. The source-biased probing shows significant
gain in terms of the percentage of documents probed that are similar to the source. For
this experiment, we assume that the document download costs outweigh the query issuing
cost. Hence we evaluate the efficiency of source-biased probing in terms of the number
of documents required to be extracted from each target and the percentage of the docu-
ments extracted that are similar to the source. The higher percentage of documents similar
(relevant) to the source, the more effective a probing algorithm is.
We selected 100 random source-target pairs from the newsgroup collection. For each
3http://www.profusion.com/
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pair, we evaluated four probing techniques – a source-biased prober (Source Bias) that
selects probe terms from the source summary in decreasing order of dbFreq; a query-biased
prober (Query Bias 1 ) that randomly selects probes from the standard Unix dictionary
of English terms; a query-biased prober (Query Bias 2 ) that selects its initial probe from
the Unix dictionary, but once the first document has been retrieved from the target, all
subsequent probes are selected based on the estimated dbFreq of the target’s resource
summary; and an unbiased prober (No Bias) that selects documents at random from each
target. For each pair, we evaluated each of the four probing techniques for up to 100 total
documents extracted from each target, collecting a maximum of 5 documents per probe
query from each target.
In Figure 92, we show the average percentage of documents similar (relevant) to the
source (Cosine focusσ(τ)) over all 100 source-target pairs as a function of the number
of documents examined in each target. The percentage of the documents extracted that
are similar to the source (biased focus measure) indicates the quality of document being
extracted from each target. We see that the source-biased probing outperforms the No
Bias prober and the Query Bias 1 prober, resulting in an average source similarity that is
initially 35% higher down to 13% after 100 documents have been extracted. Similarly, the
source-biased prober outperforms the Query Bias 2 prober, resulting in an average source
similarity that is initially 57% higher down to 18% after 100 documents. Clearly, the higher
focus value means the higher success for a probing algorithm.
Figure 93 shows another experiment where we also identified, in our set of 100 source-
target pairs, all of those pairs that were a priori similar (e.g., comp.sys.mac.apps and
comp.sys.mac.system) or dissimilar (e.g., rec.crafts.textiles.sewing and comp.lang.perl.misc).
We show the relative performance of the Source Bias, Query Bias 1, and No Bias probers
against these similar and dissimilar pairs. The Query Bias 2 results track closely with
the Query Bias 1 results, and we drop them from this figure. The source-biased prober
requires fewer documents to achieve the same relevance level as the other probers for all
100 source-target pairs and for the similar and dissimilar pairs. For example, for the similar
source-target pairs in Figure 93, the source-biased prober identifies target documents with
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Figure 92: Probing Efficiency for 100 Source-Target Pairs
0.8 focus after extracting only 30 documents. In contrast, the other probers require between
two and three times as many documents to achieve the same quality.
The third experiment is shown in Figure 94. Here we want to show how quickly a source-
biased prober can hone on the most source-relevant documents in a target by plotting the
percentage of the documents extracted that are similar (relevant) to the source for each of
the four probers. As shown in Figure 94, the source-biased prober performs nearly two-times
better than other probers: over 70% of the first 10 documents extracted from a target are
source-relevant, whereas the other probers identify between 25% and 45% source-relevant
documents. As more documents are examined for each target, the source-biased prober
continues to maintain an advantage over the other probers. Since the source-biased prober
extracts the highest-quality source-related documents from the target database first, we see
the gradual decline in the Source Bias line, meaning that it performs the best in extracting
relevant documents. We see fluctuations in the other approaches due to the randomness
inherent in the query selection process. Unlike the source-biased prober which sends its
best queries first, the other query probers may send a high-quality (source-relevant) query
at any point of the querying process (or not at all), leading to the fluctuations in the quality
of the extracted documents.
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Figure 93: Probing Efficiency for Similar and Dissimilar Pairs
Figure 94: Average Document Quality for 100 Pairs
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Table 17: Identifying Databases Relevant to PubMed
Query Bias Source Bias
1. AMA 1. Open Directory (13)
2. WebMD 2. Google (27)
3. Linux Journal 3. About (11)
4. HealthAtoZ 4. WebMD (2)
5. DevGuru 5. AMA (1)
6. FamilyTree Magazine 6. HealthAtoZ (4)
7. Mayo Clinic 7. Monster (22)
8. Novell Support 8. Mayo Clinic (7)
9. Random House 9. Random House (9)
10. January Magazine 10. BBC News (12)
7.7.2 Ranking Effectiveness with Biased Focus
The second set of experiments intends to evaluate how well source-biased probing compares
with the alternative techniques when it comes to evaluating a collection of target databases.
We performed two experiments using the Deep Web collection. In the first, we use PubMed
as the source and examine all 50 Deep Web databases as targets. We computed the biased
focus score using Cosine focusσ(τ) and then ranked all target databases relative to PubMed
using the biased focus measure. Since the Deep Web sites do not support random document
selection, we are unable to evaluate an unbiased prober. So this experiment only compares
the source-biased prober with query biased prober 1. Table 17 shows the top-10 ranked
sites relative to PubMed. In the Source Bias column we also list in parenthesis the rank of
each site assigned by the Query Bias prober.
The query-biased prober identifies several health-related sites in the Deep Web collec-
tion, but it mistakenly lists Linux Journal ahead of HealthAtoZ, as well as listing a Web
development site (DevGuru) and a genealogical magazine (FamilyTree) ahead of the health-
related Mayo Clinic. Overall, only four of the top-ten sites could be considered topically
relevant to PubMed. In contrast, the source-biased prober’s top-eight sites are somewhat
relevant to PubMed. In addition to the health-related sites, the source-biased prober also
identifies three general sites that offer access to medical literature (Open Directory, Google,
and About) that are ranked significantly lower by the query-biased prober. Interestingly,
the source-biased prober identifies a fair number of scientific and bioinformatics-related job
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Table 18: Identifying Databases Relevant to Google
Query Bias Source Bias
1. Metropolis Magazine 1. About (3)
2. More Business 2. Open Directory Project (20)
3. About 3. Webmonkey (7)
4. Linux Journal 4. Monster (6)
5. Family Tree Magazine 5. Metropolis Magazine (1)
6. Monster 6. Random House (12)
7. Webmonkey 7. Linux Journal (4)
8. DevGuru 8. Family Tree Magazine (5)
9. US Customs 9. HealthAtoZ (15)
10. January Magazine 10. January Magazine (10)
descriptions in the Monster jobs site, resulting in its high relevance (similarity) score to
PubMed (high biased focus value). While we are encouraged by the rankings here, we
note that there are some problems – for example, the three general sites (Open Directory,
Google, and About) are ranked ahead of the three more medically-related sites (WebMD,
AMA, and HealthAtoZ). In the next section, we show how the bilateral assessment of focus
for identifying relationship sets may overcome these problems.
In the second experiment, we use Google as the source and examine all 50 Deep Web
databases as targets, using the setup as described above. Table 18 shows the top-10 ranked
sites relative to Google. In the Source Bias column we also list in parenthesis the rank of
each site assigned by the Query Bias prober.
The query-biased prober identifies only one meaningful related site (About) in the top-
10, whereas the Google source-biased prober finds both relevant sites in the top-10 – About
and the Open Directory Project – and ranks them as the top-2 most relevant sites. These
results are further confirmation of the impact of the source-biased approach.
As a further illustration, for the source Linux Journal, we found that the top 10 source-
biased probes are: linux, Web, system, software, kernel, time, source, journal, user, file.
These probes are representative of the coverage of Linux Journal and are surely more ef-
fective for discovering target databases relevant to Linux Journal than random probes. On
inspection, we found that when probing the jobs site Monster, the resulting Linux-biased
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Table 19: Relevance Precision for 10 Source Newsgroups
Source No Bias Query Bias Source Bias
comp.unix.misc 0.1 0.0 0.7
gnu.emacs.help 0.1 0.3 0.4
rec.aviation.owning 0.1 0.2 0.4
rec.games.chess.misc 0.1 0.1 0.6
rec.org.sca 0.1 0.0 0.4
sci.physics.research 0.5 0.3 0.8
talk.religion.misc 0.1 0.1 0.6
soc.culture.hawaii 0.2 0.1 0.2
rec.pets.cats.misc 0.1 0.1 0.1
comp.sys.mac.system 0.4 0.0 0.1
Monster summary is skewed towards linux-related jobs and other technical jobs. In con-
trast, the unbiased Monster summary is less relevant to the Linux Journal since on average,
Monster contains many other types of jobs besides those that are linux related.
To validate the quality of source-biased database evaluation, we next randomly selected
10 sources from the newsgroup collection to evaluate against the entire set of 780 news-
groups. We compared the three probers Source Bias, Query Bias 1, and No Bias. For
each of the 10 sources, we measured relevance precision as the percentage of the top-10
ranked target databases that are considered relevant to the source using Cosine focusσ(τ).
Relevance judgments were determined by the consensus opinion of three volunteers. Note
that we do not measure recall since it is so expensive to calculate, requiring a relevance
judgment for each source versus every database in the newsgroup collection.
Table 19 shows the precision for the three probers after extracting 40 documents per
target database. Source Bias results in the highest precision in seven of ten cases, tying
with the next best prober in two cases, and losing outright in one case. For the lone failure,
Source Bias does succeed after extracting 80 documents, indicating that the mistake may
be attributable to the error inherent in probing very few documents. In general, the average
precision of the source-biased prober is nearly double that of the next best prober.
In Figure 95 we show the average precision for the ten sources when increasingly more
documents are extracted per target. The source-biased approach displays higher precision
than both the query-biased and unbiased probers in all cases considered, especially when
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Figure 95: Average Relevance Precision
based on very few documents. We again note that the source-biased prober extracts higher
quality (source-relevant) documents at the beginning of the probing, which is vitally impor-
tant for limiting the amount of probing necessary to yield adequate comparisons, especially
given the size and growth rate of the Deep Web. As we mentioned before, the stop probing
condition is especially critical since eventually the source-biased target summary may con-
verge to the unbiased summary as more and more documents are extracted. In this case,
we can see that as the number of documents extracted increases, the two alternatives to
source-biased probing improve, but still lag significantly.
While we are encouraged by the results in this section, we see that there is still some
room for improvement. In the next section, we show how the bilateral assessment of focus
for identifying relationship sets may yield even stronger results.
7.7.3 Identifying Inter-database Relationships
The third set of experiments is designed to evaluate the effectiveness of using the source-
biased framework to support the identification of interesting inter-database relationships
that the alternative schemes do not. As discussed in Section 7.4.3, the source-biased
framework can identify both similarity-based relationship sets and hierarchical relation-
ship sets for a pair of Deep Web databases or for a source database and a collection of
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Table 20: Source-Biased Analysis: Identifying Relationships Relative to PubMed
Resource (D) URL Description focusPM (D) focusD(PM) Relationship
WebMD www.webmd.com Health/Medical 0.23 0.18 λ-equivalent
AMA www.ama-assn.org Health/Medical 0.19 0.16 λ-equivalent
HealthAtoZ www.healthatoz.com Health/Medical 0.18 0.16 λ-equivalent
Open Directory dmoz.org Web Directory 0.44 0.08 λ-superset
Google www.google.com Web Search Engine 0.37 0.10 λ-superset
About www.about.com Web Channels 0.25 0.08 λ-superset
Monster www.monster.com Jobs 0.14 0.08 λ-overlap
Mayo Clinic www.mayoclinic.com Health/Medical 0.12 0.11 λ-overlap
Silicon Investor www.siliconinvestor.com Finance 0.03 0.04 λ-mutex
Usenet Recipes recipes2.alastra.com Recipes 0.02 0.03 λ-mutex
Film Critic www.filmcritic.com Movies 0.01 0.03 λ-mutex
target databases. Unlike the query-biased and unbiased probers, the asymmetric nature of
source-biased probing allows us to characterize the nature of the relationship beyond the
single relevance ranking using biased focus measure. Identifying relationship sets requires
that each database be probed once for each source of bias considered, meaning that it can
be more expensive than simple query-based probing.
We first illustrate relationship sets for PubMed over the Deep Web collection. In Table 20
we show four classes of relationship sets for λhigh = 0.15, λlow = 0.05, and λdiff = 0.10
using the source-biased prober described above. In contrast to the simple relevance ranking
in Table 17, we see how the source-biased framework can differentiate between the very
similar resources (the λ-equivalent sites WebMD, AMA, and HealthAtoZ) and the more
general resources (the λ-superset sites Open Directory, Google, and About) relative to
PubMed. In addition, we can identify sites with some common content (the λ-overlap
sites Monster and Mayo Clinic) and sites concerned with significantly different topics (the
λ-mutex sites Silicon Investor, Usenet Recipes, and Film Critic).
Similarly, we show in Table 21 several interesting relationships derived from the news-
group collection for λhigh = 0.70, λlow = 0.40, and λdiff = 0.30 using the Source Bias
prober discussed before. For each source considered, we probed all databases in the news-
group collection, evaluated the biased focus metric, and report in Table 21 the relationships
discovered. Again, by relying on the source-biased database analysis we may characterize
relationships sets for each source that are helpful for answering relationship-centric queries
of the kind posed at the beginning of the chapter.
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Table 21: Source-Biased Analysis: Identifying Relationships in the Newsgroup Collection
A B focusA(B) focusB(A) Relationship
comp.sys.mac.apps comp.sys.mac.system 0.86 0.76 λ-equivalent
comp.sys.mac.system comp.sys.mac.advocacy 0.79 0.74 λ-equivalent
sci.physics.particle sci.physics 0.86 0.80 λ-equivalent
sci.physics.particle mixed45 0.86 0.62 λ-subset/superset
comp.unix.misc mixed120 0.91 0.56 λ-subset/superset
rec.boats.paddle mixed11 0.88 0.57 λ-subset/superset
rec.sport.volleyball rec.sport.cricket 0.47 0.46 λ-overlap
rec.games.go rec.games.chess.misc 0.50 0.53 λ-overlap
comp.os.linux comp.unix 0.43 0.48 λ-overlap
rec.crafts.textiles.sewing comp.lang.perl.misc 0.35 0.32 λ-mutex
comp.sys.mac.system misc.immigration.usa 0.23 0.36 λ-mutex
comp.lang.c++ talk.religion.misc 0.21 0.29 λ-mutex
As an example, we identify sci.physics.particle as a member of the λ-subset rela-
tionship set of the mixed topic newsgroup mixed11, which consists of 25% physics-related
articles in addition to articles on backgammon, juggling, and telecommunications. Interest-
ingly, we can see that there are several overlapping relationships between newsgroups in re-
lated but slightly different fields (e.g., the two sports newsgroups rec.sport.volleyball and
rec.sport.cricket and the game-related newsgroups rec.games.go and rec.games.chess.misc).
Finally, we also identify several unrelated newsgroups, including comp.sys. mac.system rel-
ative to misc.immigration.usa and comp.lang.c++ relative to talk.religion.misc.
7.7.4 Probing with Focal Terms
In our fourth set of experiments, we consider the impact of focal term probing on the success
rate of source-biased probing. We evaluate four flavors of focal term probing – with the
number of focal term groups k from which to draw source-biased probes set to 2, 3, 5,
and 10. In our experiments with focal term probing, we discovered that there was little
impact on either the efficiency of probing or the quality of target database evaluation when
considering sources from the single-topic newsgroup collection.
In contrast, we discovered that focal term probing had a significant impact when used
on mixed topic newsgroups, in which there are documents from several unrelated single
topic newsgroups. In Figure 96, we show the probing efficiency for the four focal term
source-biased probers relative to the best basic source-biased prober for 10 source-target
pairs from the newsgroup collection. In each case, the sources were drawn exclusively from
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Figure 96: Impact of Focal Term Probing
the mixed topic newsgroups.
All of the focal term techniques resulted in more efficient probing versus basic source-
biased probing and only minor differences in ranking precision and relationship set gener-
ation quality, indicating that focal term probing can be advantageous in certain circum-
stances. Our intuition is that identifying focal terms is considerably more important in
cases in which there are clear distinctions in term distributions as would be reflected in the
mixed topic newsgroups in which several groups of documents are concerned with different
topics.
7.7.5 Varying Key Parameters
For our final set of experiments, we evaluate the impact of several key parameters on
the efficiency of source-biased probing. Again, we selected 10 sources and 10 targets at
random from the entire newsgroup collection, resulting in 100 source-target pairs. The
first parameter we consider is the choice of query selection for source-biased probing. We
consider three alternatives: random probe selection (Source Bias (random)), probe selection
based on the overall frequency of terms in the source summary (Source Bias (dbFreq)), and
probe selection based on the document count of each term in the source summary (Source
Bias (docCount)). We show the results in Figure 97. The two frequency-based measures
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Figure 97: Query Selection Comparison
result in approximately the same quality of extracted document, requiring the extraction
of fewer documents to achieve the same relevance level as the randomized source-biased
prober. Since the set of candidate probes in a source’s resource summary is large (on the
order of 1000s), it seems reasonable to conclude that a random prober has a high likelihood
of selecting non-discriminating probe terms, and hence extracting documents that are not
relevant to the source of bias.
The second parameter we consider is the number of documents retrieved for each query.
We considered the Source Bias prober described above, but we now vary the number of
documents we retrieve per query, from 5 up to 20. As you can see in Figure 98, there is
little change, so varying retrieved documents appears not to have a significant impact on
the quality of source-biased probing.
The third parameter we compare is the choice of focus measure. In Figure 99, we
compare the three versions of focus first discussed in Section 7.4.2: Cosine focusσ(τ),
TWfocusσ(τ), and CTfocusσ(τ). The dashed lines indicate the actual value of the over-
all focus measures calculated based on the actual resource summaries of the sources and
targets. The upper dashed line corresponds to the actual TWfocusσ(τ). The other two
dashed lines correspond to Cosine focusσ(τ) and CTfocusσ(τ) and are overlapping. The
first critical point to note is that both the TWfocusσ(τ) and CTfocusσ(τ) are slow to
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Figure 98: Documents Retrieved Comparison
approach the actual overall focus as indicated by the dashed lines, indicating that sub-
stantially more documents must be extracted per target before the estimated focus can be
considered reliable. In contrast, the cosine-based focus approaches the actual focus in only
45 documents on average, further bolstering our claims for its use. Additionally, we note
that Cosine focusσ(τ) slightly overestimates the actual focus. This is reasonable, since for
source-biased estimates based on very few documents, we would expect to identify high-
quality documents first. Hence, the focus should be an overestimate. As the number of
documents examined in a target nears the total available in the target, this upward bias
should disappear.
One of the critical parameters to the overall success of source-biased probing with respect
to comparing a source and a target is the quality of the original source summary. In this set
of experiments, we investigate the degree to which the source summary quality impacts the
effectiveness of source-biased probing. We again randomly selected 5 sources to compare
to the entire set of 780 groups. For each source Di (1 ≤ i ≤ 5), we constructed three
resource summaries by extracting either 100%, 10%, or 1% of the documents using the No
Bias prober. A resource summary based on 100% of the documents is exactly the actual
summary ASummary(Di). The resource summaries based on 10% and 1% of the total
documents are estimated summaries of decreasing quality. For each of the 5 sources, we
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Figure 99: Comparison of Three Focus Measures
identified the number of relevant groups in the entire dataset (call this total r for each
source). For non-obvious cases, we determined relevance by the consensus opinion of three
volunteers. We then evaluated the summary quality by collecting 20 documents for each
candidate target and ranking the targets by the Cosine focusσ(τ) metric. We calculated
the effectiveness for each source as the percentage of relevant targets ranked in the top-r. In
Figure 100, we show the relevance ranking effectiveness for each source for each of the three
resource summaries. The overall relevance is not impacted very much by the degradation in
the quality of the resource summary. In three of the cases, the relevance either remains the
same or falls slightly as the source summary quality decreases in quality. In two of the cases
tested, the relevance precision increases slightly as the source summary quality decreases in
quality. We attribute this phenomenon to the randomness inherent in the target summary
probing, and aim to study it further in future work.
In our final experiment, we further illustrate how source summaries based on fairly small
data samples may perform nearly as well as the actual source summaries for evaluating a
target database. In Figure 101, we show the impact of the source summary quality for
one source-target pair (including additional data for a 50% summary and a 5% summary).
Interestingly, the relative slope for each curve is approximately the same, with only the 1%
summary shifted down significantly from the performance of the actual (100%) summary.
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Figure 100: Impact of Source Summary Quality on Ranking
This suggests that relying on fairly small source samples (e.g., 5%) may be reasonable for
evaluating Deep Web databases.
7.8 Summary
We have presented a novel source-biased approach for supporting trusted Web resource
discovery. Our source-biased approach supports a relationship-centric view over a collection
of Deep Web databases through source-biased probing and source-biased relevance metrics.
Concretely, we have shown that the source-biased approach allows us to determine in very
few interactions whether a target database is relevant to the source database by probing
the target with very precise probes. The biased focus measure allows us to evaluate the
relevance of Deep Web databases discovered and identify interesting types of source-biased
relationships for a collection of Deep Web databases. Additionally, we have introduced
source-biased probing with focal terms as a performance optimization to further improve
the effectiveness of the basic source-biased model. Our experiments show that the source-
biased approach outperforms query-biased probing and unbiased probing in most of the
cases we have examined.
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Figure 101: Impact of Resource Summary Quality
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As the Web and Web-based open systems continue to grow and encourage far-reaching
impacts – from advances in knowledge discovery to ecommerce to emerging applications
– their effectiveness and quality will be under continued bombardment. As we have seen,
malicious participants can undermine the quality of Web-based information and disrupt the
normal functioning of Web-based systems.
In this thesis, we have developed algorithms and architectures for the efficient, reliable,
and secure use of the Web where users have trust in the data and information derived
from these systems, even in the presence of users intent on undermining the quality of
information. We have identified three classes of vulnerabilities that threaten these systems:
vulnerabilities in link-based search services, vulnerabilities in reputation-based trust services
over online communities, and vulnerabilities in Web categorization and integration services.
To address these risks, we have introduced a suite of methods for increasing the tamper-
resilience of Web-based open systems in the face of a large and growing number of threats.
Specifically, we have made new contributions in three areas:
First, we have presented a source-centric architecture and a set of techniques for provid-
ing tamper-resilient link analysis of the World Wide Web. Link-based analysis of the Web
provides the basis for many important services, like Web search, Web-based data mining,
and Web page categorization, and is the subject of considerable attention by spammers.
We identified a number of attacks on link-based analysis of the Web - including hijacking-
based attacks, honeypot-based attacks, and collusion-based attacks - that each subverts
traditional link-based analysis and undermines the quality of information offered through
link-based search systems. To counter these attacks, we presented a source-based link anal-
ysis approach that promotes a hierarchical abstraction of the Web graph based on the strong
Web link structure in which links display strong source-based locality, for example, in terms
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of administrative domains and hosts. Unlike traditional page-based link analysis, in which
all pages are treated as equal nodes in a flat Web graph, this source-centric approach is
promising since it captures the natural link-locality structure of the Web, supports more
efficient Web applications, and naturally incorporates tamper-resilience by discounting links
internal to a source. We augmented this source analysis by proposing the concept of link
credibility and argueing that the intrinsic quality of a source should be distinguished from its
intrinsic link credibility. We introduced a technique for assessing link credibility for all Web
resources, and presented a credibility-based link analysis technique for significantly reduc-
ing the impact of malicious spammers on Web rankings. We showed that these approaches
significantly reduce the impact of malicious spammers on Web rankings.
Second, we presented the design and evaluation of the SocialTrust framework for
aggregating trust in online social networks. Community-based social networking systems
are already extremely important and growing rapidly. For example, the popular MySpace
and Facebook social networking sites boast over 100 million profiles, community-based Web
discovery tools (like Digg) have 100,000s of registered users, the collaborative Wikipedia
includes over 1 million articles, and eBay and Amazon rely on massive collaborative re-
view and feedback systems. The framework supports tamper-resilient trust establishment
in the presence of large-scale manipulation by malicious users, clique formation, and dis-
honest feedback. We have introduced relationship link quality as a scoped random walk
and explored key factors impacting it. Link quality can be optimized depending on the
context and application scenario and on the risk tolerance of the social network. We have
developed a new random walk trust model incorporating relationship link quality and trust
group feedback, and provided the first large-scale trust evaluation over real social network
data. We showed that our trust models support high quality information discovery and are
robust to the presence of malicious participants in the social network.
Finally, we introduced a set of techniques for reducing the opportunities of attackers
to corrupt Web-based categorization and integration services. Spammers can tamper with
these services by flooding them with poor quality or duplicate information sources, by ad-
vertising corrupt or untrustworthy metadata, and by infiltrating legitimate categorization
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services. To mitigate the impact of such manipulation, we introduced two complementary
tamper-resilient approaches for Web categorization and integration: the controlled sampling
architecture and the trusted Web resource discovery system. The controlled sampling ar-
chitecture supports the extraction of high-quality database samples for reducing the impact
of poor quality or intentionally misleading resources. By leveraging a set of user-trusted
information resources, the trusted Web resource discovery system provides a set of related
information resources that can be grouped by content and trustworthiness properties to
auto-generate a trusted categorization hierarchy. We showed that these techniques reduce
the impact of poor quality or intentionally misleading resources and support personalized
Web resource discovery.
8.1 Future Research Opportunities
Building tamper-resilient Web-based open systems is an exciting and growing area. We are
interested in revisiting some of the Web risks and vulnerabilities described in Chapter 2
and in pushing this research in several interesting directions, including:
8.1.1 Incentive and Behavior Modeling
The observed attempts to manipulate Web-based open systems necessarily raise the question
of why these manipulations occur in the first place. We believe it would be beneficial
to formalize a model of behavior in a system of concern – with proper emphasis placed
on the costs to each participant in terms of manipulating the system and the perceived
benefits the manipulator accrues. For example, in the Web ranking manipulation studied
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, a link-based attack incurs direct costs like domain registration
fees, hosting service fees, and other maintenance costs associated with operating the spam
pages; payments by colluding spammers for exchanging links; and the high cost associated
with the expulsion risk for a spammer. By engaging in a Web spam attack, a spammer risks
detection and potential expulsion from the ranking system, meaning a complete loss of the
accumulated links and rank position. Based on a formal economic model of spam behavior,
can we structure these systems to place correct economic incentives for participants to use
the system properly, e.g., for the overall betterment of all participants? Can we develop
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new models that are more resistant to fraud, but that still guarantee ease-of-use for the
user and little disruption to the system?
8.1.2 Evolutionary Tamper-Resilience
The traditional Web data supply chain of content production, distribution, and consumption
is rapidly evolving. On the content production side, more and more data is being produced
by devices and sensors, and even traditional Web content is being pushed in new directions,
as data is being augmented with the richer semantics associated with social media and online
communities. Similarly, on the content consumption side, users are demanding content in
new and innovative ways that depart from the traditional desktop mode. Mobile devices,
gaming systems, and pervasive information systems embedded in our everyday life are
placing new demands on content dissemination. There is a great opportunity for developing
new architectures, techniques, and optimizations for enabling scalable, decentralized, and
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